Islam and Civil Society:Case Studies from Jordan and Egypt by Petersen, Marie Juul & Sparre, Sara Cathrine Lei
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Islam and Civil Society
Petersen, Marie Juul; Sparre, Sara Cathrine Lei
Publication date:
2007
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Petersen, M. J., & Sparre, S. C. L. (2007). Islam and Civil Society: Case Studies from Jordan and Egypt. (1 ed.)
Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
1
ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
CASE STUDIES FROM JORDAN AND EGYPT 
Sara Lei Sparre
Marie Juul Petersen
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
October 2007
D
IIS
 R
EP
O
RT
DIIS . DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
2
© Copenhagen 2007
Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS 
Strandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark
Ph: +45 32 69 87 87
Fax: +45 32 69 87 00
E-mail: diis@diis.dk
Web: www.diis.dk
Cover Design: Carsten Schiøler
Layout: Allan Lind Jørgensen
Printed in Denmark by Vesterkopi AS
ISBN: 978-87-7605-233-1
Price: DKK 50.00 (VAT included) 
DIIS publications can be downloaded 
free of charge from www.diis.dk
Hardcopies can be ordered at www.diis.dk
Marie Juul Petersen, MA in sociology of religion and African studies, Research Assistant at DIIS
Sara Lei Sparre, MSc, anthropology, Research Assistant at DIIS
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
3
The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said: ‘Every Muslim has to 
give in charity’. The people then asked: ‘(But what) if someone has nothing 
to give, what should he do?’ The Prophet replied: ‘He should work with his 
hands and beneﬁt himself and also give in charity (from what he earns).’ 
The people further asked: ‘If he cannot ﬁnd even that?’ He replied: ‘He 
should help the needy who appeal for help’. Then the people asked: ‘If he 
cannot do (even) that?’ The Prophet said ﬁnally: ‘Then he should perform 
good deeds and keep away from evil deeds, and that will be regarded as 
charitable deeds.’ 
Sahih al-Bukhari, Volume 2, Hadith 524
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Abstract
There is a long-standing tradition among scholars and journalists to focus on the 
politisation of Islam while analysing the role of religion in Middle Eastern society. In 
particular, Islamist movements and regimes have captured the attention of western 
observers, often at the expense of those Muslim actors who do not have an explicit 
political agenda. Therefore, a more comprehensive understanding of the role of Islam 
in Middle Eastern societies calls for the inclusion of the wide variety of Muslim civil 
society organisations who are primarily engaged in social and cultural activities such 
as social welfare organisations, development NGO’s, charities, youth movements, 
health clinics or various educational institutions.
Through two independent case studies, the present report provides concrete empirical 
examples of such actors, paying particular attention to the role Islam plays in these 
organisations. The case study on Jordan focuses on the sector of social welfare organi-
sations in the country, illustrating the broad spectrum of diﬀerent Muslim discourses 
and practices found in Jordanian civil society. The case study on Egypt focuses more 
speciﬁcally on a smaller group of recently established youth organisations, presenting 
new ways of organising and of using Islam in this process. Based on interviews with 
staﬀ, volunteers and beneﬁciaries, the two studies present detailed descriptions of these 
diﬀerent organisations, discussing topics such as charity versus development, youth 
and volunteerism, concepts of social and individual change, motives for participation 
as well as the relationship with the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, and exploring 
the diﬀerent ways in which Islam plays a role in relation to these topics.
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Preface
The politicisation of Islam has dominated contemporary debates on the Middle East. 
In particular, since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the media coverage of the 
region and scholarly work on Islam have focussed on topics such as Islamist ideologies, 
religious radicalism, terrorist networks and fundamentalist movements. However, 
in order to comprehend the role of Islam in Middle Eastern societies, we must also 
shift our focus to Muslim actors who do not play an explicitly political role. There 
exists a broad range of Muslim organisations1 in Middle Eastern civil societies today 
that tend to escape our attention. These organisations comprise a puzzling variety 
of charity associations, development NGOs, youth clubs, health clinics and schools, 
which are primarily engaged in social and cultural activities. Although they may be 
less conspicuous, these Muslim civil society organisations represent a much broader 
and possibly more important dimension of public religious engagement in Middle 
Eastern societies than their (in)famous political counterparts. 
Looking at religious civil society organisations in Jordan and Egypt, the aim of 
this report is to enhance our understanding of the role of Islam in the Middle East 
beyond the sphere of directly visible political action. In this way, we also hope to 
make a contribution to a more nuanced understanding of Islam and Muslim actors 
in the region. The report has a predominantly descriptive aim, mapping sectors of 
civil society in Jordan and Egypt and presenting some concrete examples of the role 
religion plays in this multiplicity of diﬀerent organisations. 
The report is the ﬁrst outcome of the research project Islam and Civil Society 
Organisations in Jordan and Egypt, anchored within the research unit Religion, 
Social Conﬂict and the Middle East at the Danish Institute for International Studies 
(DIIS). The project goes back to an initial idea of Marie Juul Petersen’s. Together 
with Sara Lei Sparre, we designed a short-term research project, limited to one 
year, which was then carried out by Sara Lei Sparre and Marie Juul Petersen under 
my supervision. 
In the course of our research, we made two important observations, bringing into 
question some of our initial assumptions about religion and civil society. First of all, 
1  Please refer to Chapter 1, section 1.4.2. for a clariﬁcation of our use of the terms Muslim and Islamic in relation 
to organisations.
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the analytical distinction between religious and secular2 civil society organisations 
becomes increasingly blurred when one enters the ﬁeld. There is no clear-cut boundary 
consistently demarcating Muslim from secular organisations. Looking at diﬀerent 
levels of analysis – individual, organisational, actions, ideologies – the religious and 
the secular often intersect in cross-cutting ways. Secondly, the kinds of religiosity 
we can observe in these organisations are not easy to deﬁne and often ambiguous 
in character. Religiosity is, in other words, not a straight-forward characterisation. 
Groups and individuals employ religious discourses in a variety of ways, interpreting 
Islam along a ﬂuid continuum between the extreme poles of radical Islamist ideologies 
and liberal-secular versions of personal religiosity. They sometimes mix traditional 
practices and norms with entirely new religious interpretations and secular values, 
constructing and re-constructing Islam according to the social and intellectual en-
vironments in which they move. 
Given this background, our research is still in its initial phase. There is no doubt that 
we have to look more deeply into the meaning that religion in general and Islam in 
particular can acquire in the larger context of public engagement in Middle Eastern 
societies. Thus this report does not come to ﬁnal conclusions or hastily drawn sugges-
tions for policy advice. Our aim is more modest. The following pages present some 
of our very preliminary ﬁndings on the topic, which we nevertheless think are well 
worth sharing with our readers. We sincerely intend to develop this research further, 
aiming at the publication of an academic volume in due course.
We would like to express our gratitude to both the Royal Danish Ministry of For-
eign Aﬀairs and DIIS for funding and facilitating this research project. Likewise, 
we wish to express our special gratitude to the numerous people in both Jordan and 
Egypt who consented to be interviewed, oﬀering us their time and expertise. These 
include researchers, university professors, journalists, governmental representatives, 
and – most importantly – representatives from civil society organisations. Last, but 
not least, we would like to thank all the people who oﬀered us their help in practical 
matters, including in particular our assistants.
Dietrich Jung, Copenhagen, October 2007
2  The term ”secular” is here used in the sense ”not religious”.
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1. Introduction
1.1  Objectives and scope of the project
This report is the ﬁrst output of the research project Islam and Civil Society Organi-
sations in Jordan and Egypt, based at the Danish Institute for International Studies 
and ﬁnanced by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs. 
The overall objective of the project has been to contribute to a more nuanced knowl-
edge and understanding of the role of Islam and Muslim actors in Middle Eastern 
societies through case studies of civil society organisations in Jordan and Egypt. Since 
this is a ﬁeld which is relatively uncharted among both academics and practitioners, 
the report aims to provide concrete examples of existing civil society organisations 
and the role Islam plays in these. As such, it is our hope that the report will also serve 
as input to current discussions among NGOs and policy-makers of the feasibility and 
desirability of practical cooperation and partnerships with religious organisations.
The selection of our two case studies was guided by considerations such as accessibil-
ity to the ﬁeld, available literature, pre-established contacts and relevance for Danish 
foreign policy. Therefore, this report does not claim to present a comparative case 
study of Muslim civil society organisations in Jordan and Egypt. On the contrary, the 
two chapters have distinct characters, putting the focus on those kinds of actors that 
appeared to be the most relevant phenomena to study. The chapter on Jordan focuses 
on the broad sector of social welfare organisations, which make up almost half of all 
civil society organisations in the country and provide an excellent illustration of the 
wide spectrum of diﬀerent religious discourses and practices found in civil society 
organisations. The chapter on Egypt focuses more speciﬁcally on a smaller group of 
recently established youth organisations which in many ways present new ways of 
organising as well as using and interpreting Islam in this process. Thus, while conducted 
within the same overall framework of Islam and civil society, the two chapters reﬂect 
two diﬀerent case studies which can be read independently of one another.
1.2  Project design
The project was designed and carried out by the authors of this report, Sara Lei Sparre 
and Marie Juul Petersen, working as research assistants under the supervision of 
senior researcher Dietrich Jung. Marie has been responsible for the study on Jordan, 
Sara for that on Egypt.
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The project ran from October 2006 to October 2007 and included desk studies, inter-
views, an academic workshop and several meetings in Denmark, as well as ﬁeld studies 
in Jordan and Egypt. In Denmark, we interviewed and had meetings with representa-
tives of Danish NGOs working in either Jordan or Egypt and other resource people 
with substantial knowledge of civil society in either of the two countries. The ﬁeld 
studies in Jordan and Egypt were divided into two phases: a joint exploratory trip to 
both countries in November-December 2006, and the actual ﬁeldwork in March-May 
2007, when Sara went to Egypt and Marie to Jordan. We both carried out interviews 
with representatives of civil society organisations, representatives of governmental 
institutions, researchers and journalists, as well as representatives of the UN and other 
international organisations, totalling some ninety interviews in each country. Before we 
go into the case studies, this ﬁrst chapter will present some of the core methodological 
and conceptual considerations shaping our approach to the project.
1.3  Methodological considerations
1.3.1  Access
While the desk studies and interviews in Denmark did not present us with any major 
methodological, practical or ethical obstacles, our ﬁeldwork in Jordan and Egypt 
prompted a number of considerations.3 Chief among them was the question of access 
to the organisations. Would we encounter diﬃculties in trying to access Muslim civil 
society organisations, whether as female researchers, non-natives (one of us even being 
a non-Arabic speaker), or as Danes, the latter in light of the recent Cartoon Crisis? 
These concerns proved unnecessary. In Jordan, no organisation turned down our 
requests for interviews, and in Egypt only two organisations did so. In our interviews, 
most people were open, talkative and eager to participate. Many interviewees greatly 
appreciated the subject and approach of our study, which they saw as an attempt to 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Muslims and their organisations. 
When they heard that we were from Denmark, some asked if the Cartoon Crisis was 
a motivation for our study. We responded that the Crisis had deﬁnitely contributed 
to our interest, but that our study was not a direct consequence of it. The fact that 
a few people mentioned the Crisis did not prevent friendly conversations – most 
people merely gave their opinion on the matter.4 One of the few exceptions was a 
3  See Schwedler (2006) and Carapico (2006) on doing ﬁeldwork in the Middle East.
4  While quite a few people were still clearly upset and some encouraged the continued boycott of Danish goods, 
the majority interpreted the incident as a reminder of the necessity of dialogue and cultural understanding. 
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board member of one of the Egyptian youth organisations, who insisted that Sara 
accounted for her personal stance before agreeing to participate in the interview.
Likewise, being young female researchers did not present us with any major obstacles 
in terms of access. On the contrary, we sometimes had the feeling that – when tak-
ing the necessary precautions – this fact might even have facilitated a more relaxed 
atmosphere, since we were felt to be more harmless and less threatening than, e.g., an 
older, higher-ranking man would have been. Precautions included an awareness of 
gender practices such as hand-shaking, gender segregation etc. In Jordan, most of the 
men we interviewed preferred not to shake hands with us, and some also declined to 
be interviewed on their own. One avoided eye contact, though for the majority this 
did not seem to be common practice. Nowhere were we requested to use a headscarf. 
In Egypt, most men were prepared to shake hands and to be interviewed on their 
own. On two occasions, the representatives of particular organisations suggested that 
Sara should wear a headscarf when participating in and observing their activities. 
However, this was not presented as a requirement but was intended to allow her to 
blend into the crowd and thus feel more comfortable. 
In both Jordan and Egypt, we made use of assistants, all of whom were young univer-
sity students or recent graduates who helped us in the planning and organisation of 
meetings, interpretation and translation when needed, as well as other practical issues. 
The personal qualities, skills and backgrounds of these assistants may in many ways 
have facilitated our access to the organisations. In Egypt, for instance, the assistant 
had previously worked for Mona Atia, a North American Fulbright scholar in her 
studies on ﬁnancial aspects of Muslim social welfare organisations, meaning that he 
had solid knowledge of the subject. Furthermore, he was a highly skilled interviewer 
and was in many cases capable of carrying out interviews on his own. Similarly, one 
of the Jordanian assistants was the daughter of a well-known Islamic scholar who is 
highly respected by both conservative and liberal Muslims in Jordan. This popular-
ity reﬂected back on his daughter, whose family name prompted approving nods 
almost whenever she was mentioned. Adding to this, she had organisational talent 
and a winning personality. 
In some instances, however, the use of assistants complicated rather than facilitated 
matters. For practical reasons, Marie had to use several diﬀerent assistants, not all 
of whom were equally capable or experienced. For instance, during interviews one 
assistant would sometimes oﬀer her own opinion on the topic being discussed or 
simply state that what was being said was not correct. This hints at another prob-
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lem, with possibly deeper implications, namely language barriers. In Jordan, this 
was relatively speaking a more serious obstacle than in Egypt, since Marie does not 
speak Arabic and the proportion of non-English-speaking people was higher than 
in Egypt, where the majority were both willing and able to speak English and where 
Sara as an Arabic speaker could understand those who did not speak English. In 
Jordan, approximately two thirds of all interviews were held in Arabic/English with 
interpretation being provided by an assistant, whereas in Egypt more than two thirds 
were held in English. While in most instances the use of interpreters and translators 
functioned smoothly, there is no doubt that this approach inevitably leads to the loss 
of many nuances and details. 
1.3.2  Methods
We sketched the overall design and structure of the project based on interviews and 
a workshop with resource persons in Denmark, as well as desk studies of the two 
countries. During our ﬁrst trip to Jordan and Egypt, we interviewed a number of 
resource persons from research institutions, universities, newspapers and interna-
tional organisations with the purpose of confronting them with our initial ideas 
and received expert feedback on these. We completed the project design taking 
these comments and suggestions into consideration, including the speciﬁcations for 
our study (namely social welfare organisations in Jordan and new youth organisa-
tions in Egypt), as well as the elaboration of a strategy for our ﬁeldwork and an 
interview guide.5
In each country, our ﬁrst task was the selection of the sample of organisations in-
cluded in our study. Through a combination of our assistants’ knowledge of the ﬁeld, 
recommendations from other researchers and our own knowledge acquired from 
literature and internet searches, together with a certain snowball eﬀect, we were 
able to compile extensive lists of organisations potentially relevant for the purpose 
of our study. Looking at variables such as size, forms of activities and membership, 
and aiming at a broad variety, we then selected a number of diﬀerent organisations 
for our interviews.
Our ﬁeldwork was divided into three parts: i) interviews with representatives from 
a number of civil society organisations, as well as with the representatives of state 
institutions, universities, newspapers and international organisations; ii) participant 
observation in the organisations; and ﬁnally iii) the collection of written material. 
5  See Annex A for a copy of the original interview guide.
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Our interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions, thus allowing for 
a high degree of informality and ﬂexibility while maintaining a focus on the topic 
of our study. Most often, the interviews took place on the premises of the organisa-
tion itself, while in a few instances, but more often in Egypt than in Jordan, this was 
not possible and we met the interviewees in a café, in their homes or, in a few cases, 
where we ourselves were staying. In Egypt, most of the interviews were recorded by 
dictaphone, but in Jordan, many people preferred not to be recorded.  In both cases, 
we took notes while interviewing, which nobody objected to. 
The majority of interviewees from the organisations were from the top management, 
including presidents, board members and directors, of whom the majority would be 
men. When contacting the organisations to arrange for meetings, people would often 
assume that we preferred to speak with the leadership rather than the regular staﬀ, 
volunteers or ordinary members. Therefore, we had to make a conscious eﬀort to 
include these groups in our study in order to ensure variation – not only in relation 
to the kinds of participants who were included, but also in relation to gender. In the 
end, the Jordanian sample comprised around 50 percent men and the top manage-
ment approximately 64 percent.6 In Egypt, some 61 percent of the interviewees were 
men and approximately 56 percent from the top management.7
While we therefore managed to obtain an acceptable balance as regards gender and 
top versus middle and bottom levels of the organisations, our data clearly lack inter-
views with the beneﬁciaries of the organisations, such as single mothers, orphans, 
the unemployed, students and the sick. When asked, some activists were more than 
willing to facilitate interviews with their beneﬁciaries. However, these interviews 
often took the form of awkward ten-minute encounters with eight-year old children 
very scared at having to answer strange questions from an even stranger woman, and 
with the director staring angrily at them from his chair in the corner. Attempts to 
interview women participating in a vocational training course were also unsuccess-
ful, as the women were shy and clearly uncomfortable with the set-up. In order to be 
successful, interviews with this group of people require substantial groundwork and 
preparation, including a high level of skills in Arabic. Furthermore, the interviews 
should be conducted outside the facilities of the organisation in order to build up 
the necessary trust between interviewer and interviewee.  
6  This ﬁgure includes interviews with representatives of the social welfare organisations. It does not include 
interviews with resource persons and representatives of other organisations and institutions. 
7  This number includes interviews with representatives of youth organisations as well as a number of traditional 
Muslim social welfare organisations. 
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A diﬀerent way of obtaining information about beneﬁciaries is through participant 
observation in the organisations’ activities. We participated in such activities in 
both Jordan and Egypt, including the distribution of food packages, the celebration 
of religious holidays, clothes exhibitions, human development courses, courses in 
basket-making, health information courses and education. Due to time constraints, 
however, we were forced to prioritise our eﬀorts and were not able to spend as 
much time in these forms of participant observation as would have been desirable. 
Since the purpose of our study was to provide a general picture of a large group 
of organisations, we chose to prioritise interviews with as many organisations as 
possible, rather than reducing the number, thus leaving more time for participant 
observation. This decision means that, while it includes some observations on or-
ganisational practices, our study of civil society organisations and the role of Islam 
in these should be considered primarily an analysis of organisational discourses 
rather than practices. Furthermore, this means that the descriptions we present in 
our report are not necessarily descriptions of the organisations as they are but of 
their self-representations.
1.3.3  Ethical considerations
Apart from the methodological and practical considerations outlined above, we en-
countered a number of more ethical concerns during our ﬁeldwork. A main concern 
has been one of ensuring that our research would not end up as yet another example 
of research conducted on people from the third world, but beneﬁting solely people 
from the ﬁrst world. As the director of a Jordanian organisation said, every week he 
would welcome a new researcher and every week they would promise to send him 
their reports, but so far he had not received a single report. In order to avoid this 
kind of one-way research, we intend to have our report translated into Arabic and 
distributed to all the participants in the study.8
Another concern related to anonymity. In the case of Jordan, all interviewees were 
asked whether they preferred anonymity, which only two did. In the case of Egypt, 
the majority also agreed to full disclosure. Despite this, we have decided to anonymise 
participants in our study, primarily due to security concerns. In both Jordan and 
Egypt, state control and surveillance of civil society organisations is common, and it 
can be diﬃcult to judge which statements might prove to be a cause of concern for 
state representatives. 
8  An ideal process would have allowed time for feedback from participants; however, this proved impossible for 
practical reasons.
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1.4  Our approach
1.4.1  Muslim civil society activism: diﬀerent approaches
Recent years have seen an increased interest in Middle Eastern civil societies,9 
paralleling the growth in organisations such as human rights movements, women’s 
organisations and development NGOs everywhere in the region. Most analyses 
have focused primarily on the importance of these new civil society organisations 
in the promotion of democracy, interpreting their growth as a sign of democratic 
empowerment and participation (Hawthorne 2004:3). Among policy-makers, this 
argument is reﬂected in the focus on strengthening precisely these new actors through 
development and democracy assistance programmes in the Middle East. However, 
there are several problems with this approach. First, the relationship between civil 
society and democracy is not one of straight forward causality.10 Secondly, human 
rights movements, women’s organisations and development NGOs are not the only 
relevant actors in Middle Eastern civil societies. In fact, they might not even be the 
most relevant ones. In recent years, other new actors, such as Muslim organisations 
and movements, have come to play an increasingly visible role in discourses, symbols 
and social practices in Muslim societies, and it could be argued that they belong to the 
most vibrant parts of civil societies in the Muslim world today. Unfortunately, social 
scientists and practitioners often tend to disregard precisely these actors because of 
an intrinsic secularist bias in their concepts of civil society.11 
The few analyses of Muslim civil society actors that do exist present a number of 
problems. As Wiktorowicz notes, in many studies the religious dimension has 
been seen as the primary explanatory variable for these actors, and as such has been 
highlighted at the expense of other, perhaps equally or more important dimensions. 
While religion is in many instances an important and determining factor in Muslim 
collective action, it is not always the only or the most important factor. The focus 
on religion runs the risk of reinforcing exceptionalist views of Muslim civil society 
organisations as something basically and fundamentally diﬀerent than other kinds 
of civil society organisations – which is not necessarily the case. As Singerman points 
9  See Norton (1995), Kandil (1995), al-Sayyid (1993), Ismael (2001) and Sajoo (2002) for general discussions 
on civil society in the Middle East, Ibrahim (1993), Zaki (1995) and AbdelRahman (2004) on civil society in an 
Egyptian context; and Wiktorowicz (2000), Brand (1995), Talal (2004) and Antoun (2000) on Jordan. Also, Ben 
Néﬁssa, al-Fattah, Hanaﬁ and Milani (2005), Gubser (2002) on NGOs in the Arab world, Anheier and Salamon 
(1998) on civil society in the developing world, Benthall and Bellion on Muslim NGOs (2003).
10  See e.g. Özdalga and Persson (1997) for discussions of civil society and democracy in the Muslim world. 
11  The term “secularist” refers to the assertion that certain practices and/or institutions should exist separately 
from and independently of religion.
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out: “The organisational structures, repertoires of contention, collective identity, and 
so forth of Islamic movements are similar to those of other movements throughout 
the world” (in Wiktorowicz 2004:143). A predeﬁned focus on Islam may run the 
risk of overlooking other, equally or even more important dimensions of these or-
ganisations. Likewise, it may prevent the discovery of important religious elements 
in organisations that are traditionally not seen as religious. In other words, religion 
may be important or it may not – and, if it is important, it may be so in a number 
of very diﬀerent ways.
Furthermore, many studies of Muslim activism and civil society organisations 
have been based on socio-psychological approaches, understanding these collec-
tive actions as mechanisms for alleviating psychological discomfort derived from 
structural strains (Wiktorowicz 2004:6).12 In other words, people participate in 
Muslim organisations because they are poor and unemployed, because they have 
no opportunities for political participation or because they are frustrated at being 
excluded from Western modernity. Common to these studies is the understand-
ing of an inexorable link between structural strains and collective contention 
– but this thesis is not empirically grounded. Structural strains and discontent 
are found in all societies, but they do not always result in collective action: “In 
reality, social movements do not correspond to the strain-movement paired logic” 
(Wiktorowicz 2004:9). Also, these approaches are marked by a disregard of the 
purposive, political and organised dimensions of movements and by a view of 
participants as somehow dysfunctional individuals seeking psychological comfort, 
as Wiktorowicz puts it. In other words, Muslim collective action is seen primarily 
as a compensatory reaction to structural changes rather than a potential force for 
change in itself. 
1.4.2  A model for analysis
In light of the above, we conclude that a model for the analysis of Muslim civil 
society actors should be based on the following two assumptions. First, it should 
not frame Islam or any other single variable as the determining factor. The analysis 
should be open to the potential importance of a number of diﬀerent variables 
12  As noted by Wiktorowicz, for many scholars, the underlying impetus for activism derives from the structural 
crises produced by the failure of secular modernisation projects (e.g. Waltz 1986; Dekmejian 1995; Hoﬀman 
1995; Faksh 1997). Some focus on socio-economic factors as the main reason for Islamic activism, for instance, 
seeing young men’s fascination and joining of militant Islamic groups as a response to their social and economic 
immobility, which itself has led to their social alienation and anomie. Others see Islamic activism as a response 
to cultural imperialism and the growing inﬂuence of Western culture. Finally, some see political strains such as 
a lack of formal political access as the main cause of Islamic activism. 
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when studying civil society actors (Muslim as well as non-Muslim) while, at the 
same time, taking into account the possible relevance of Islam. Secondly, the 
explanatory frameworks should be open to other levels of analysis than the socio-
economic, including in particular the motivational dimensions of the individual 
actors themselves. 
Instead of focusing on Muslim civil society organisations, based on a predetermined 
assumption of the relevance of religion, we propose to focus more broadly on civil 
society organisations and the role that Islam might play in these. In rejecting any 
predetermined role of Islam, the analysis is open to the possible importance and 
inﬂuence of Islam to a variety of aspects, forcing us to investigate all dimensions of 
the organisations, and examining how and in what ways Islam might inﬂuence them. 
A model for the analysis of these actors should not be essentially diﬀerent from a 
model for the analysis of other civil society actors. In both cases, there is a need 
for a multi-dimensional approach, guaranteeing a nuanced understanding of these 
organisations Borrowing elements from social movement theories such as frame 
analysis, resource mobilisation theory and organisation theory, as well as new social 
movement theory, we propose an analytical framework that includes questions of 
why they work, how they work, where, when and with whom they work – and with 
religion as a cross-cutting concern.13
Model for analysis
13  Traditionally, social movement theory and the study of religious organisations and movements have been 
considered two separate ﬁelds of study, and few attempts have been made to integrate the two, although there 
are obvious overlaps and resemblances in the two approaches. Hannigan (1993) was one of the ﬁrst to point out 
this weakness, followed later by others. See e.g. Smith (1996) and Wiktorowicz (2004). 
Who are they?
Participants
Members
Target groups
Beneﬁciaries
Where and 
when do they 
work?
Context
History
Why do they 
work?
Vision 
Goals
Motivation
How do they 
work?
Activities
Strategies
Structures
Financing
With whom 
do they work?
Relations
Alliances
Conﬂicts
What is the role of Islam?
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We will apply the above model in the following analysis of Muslim civil society or-
ganisations. In Jordan, the analysis will turn primarily on what can be called social 
welfare organisations, which constitute the largest sector in Jordanian civil society. In 
Egypt, the focus will be on the new youth organisations, an emerging phenomenon 
not only in Egypt, but in a number of other Middle Eastern countries as well. Through 
empirical, micro-level studies, we will provide detailed descriptions of various aspects 
of the discourses and practices of the organisations, paying particular attention to 
the role of Islam in them.14 
In our study of these organisations, we originally intended to categorise them on the 
basis of three categories, namely i) “Islamic”, understood as organisations in which 
Islam played a role on an institutional level, e.g. in the form of religious activities or 
a formal connection to a mosque; ii) “Muslim”, referring to organisations displaying 
a less institutional religiosity, showing primarily at the level of the individual partici-
pants; and iii) ﬁnally “secular” referring to those organisations in which religion did 
not seem to play a role at all. In other words, “Islamic” would denote organisations in 
which Islam appeared to play a very signiﬁcant role and “secular” the ones in which 
it appeared to play no role –  with “Muslim” somewhere in-between. 
However, during our ﬁeldwork this categorisation encountered a number of obstacles. 
First of all, on a practical level the use of the term “Islamic” proved to be somewhat 
problematic since the term seems to have lost its neutrality. Thus, many people did not 
feel comfortable using the term, since they associated it with a political and perhaps 
even militant kind of Islam. For others, the term denoted a more intense or deep-felt 
religiosity than the term “Muslim”, and they preferred this to the latter.
Secondly, the distinction between Muslim and Islamic proved to be rather irrelevant as 
a way of describing the role and importance of Islam. In organisations that we would 
have termed Islamic, participants sometimes seemed less concerned with religion 
than participants in organisations we would have termed Muslim. Thus, it seems that 
religion does not necessarily play a bigger or more important role in organisations 
that are institutionally religious than in organisations that display religiosity only at 
the level of participants. 
14  This should not be interpreted as an attempt to measure which organisations are the most and least religious. 
The present analysis rests on an understanding of religiosity as a quality that cannot be compared in simple terms, 
meaning that it does not make sense to attempt to characterise people or organisations in terms of their being 
more or less religious than others. In other words, it is not possible to determine how religious an organisation 
is, but merely in what ways it is religious. 
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
19
Thirdly, we had to question the distinction between on the one hand “Islamic” and 
“Muslim”, i.e. religious, organisations and on the other “secular” organisations. The 
boundaries between secular and religious are not always clear-cut and static but most 
often blurred and dynamic, at least in the Jordanian and Egyptian contexts. For in-
stance, organisations we would otherwise characterise as secular – and which would 
characterise themselves as secular – would often use a religious language in order to 
improve communication with the beneﬁciaries of their work. Thus, instead of being 
mutually exclusive and sharply deﬁned categories, these distinctions represent two 
poles on a continuum on which organisations over time may move back and forth. 
As a way of accommodating these obstacles, in the following we refrain from distin-
guishing between Muslim and Islamic, using instead Muslim as a common denomina-
tor. Likewise, we do not distinguish sharply between secular and religious but use the 
broader and more ﬂexible categories of “religiously-oriented” and “secularly-oriented” 
or simply “not religiously oriented”15. 
15  The term “religion” refers to Islam, unless otherwise speciﬁed.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
20
2. Social Welfare Organisations and Islam in Jordan
In Jordan, social welfare organisations are among the most relevant civil society actors 
to look at, not only because of their number, but also because they present interest-
ing examples of social Islam, illustrating the wide spectrum of diﬀerent religious 
discourses and practices. Based on concrete empirical studies, this chapter oﬀers an 
analysis of a number of Jordanian social welfare organisations, asking questions as 
to who they are, what they do, why they do it and how they relate to others, while 
paying particular attention to the potential inﬂuence of Islam on these diﬀerent 
dimensions of the organisations. 
Following a short description of the context surrounding the Jordanian social welfare 
organisations, the second section gives an overview of this sector of civil society, 
presenting information on the numbers and types of organisations, their participants 
and beneﬁciaries, activities and ﬁnancing, as well as other aspects. Having provided 
an overall description of the group of social welfare organisations, the analysis then 
moves on to explore the role of Islam in these, focusing on some of those aspects to 
which the religion seems to be of particular relevance. Section three thus examines the 
rationale of the organisations, including the establishment of a connection between 
Islam and social welfare, and looks at how their understanding of social welfare and 
Islam inﬂuences their strategies and concrete activities. Section four focuses on the 
people carrying out these activities – the volunteers and employees – and discusses the 
diﬀerent kinds of motivation underlying their engagement in social welfare activism. 
The ﬁfth section discusses the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
certain social welfare organisations, and considers some of the consequences of this 
relationship. Finally, section six presents the conclusions of the analysis, summing 
up some of the ways in which Islam plays a role in Jordanian social welfare organisa-
tions, and brieﬂy characterising the diﬀerent kinds of Islam that have been expressed 
in foregoing examples. 
2.1  Islam and civil society in Jordan
2.1.1  Jordanian civil society: balancing on red lines
Since its birth in 1946, Jordan has enjoyed a reputation as a comparably stable monarchy 
in an otherwise conﬂict-ridden territory, characterised by a relatively high degree of 
political freedom, an increasingly liberalised economy and a fairly strong civil society, 
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at least when compared with neighbouring countries. After more than thirty years 
of martial law, in 1989 the ban on political parties was lifted and elections were re-
introduced by the late King Hussein, a process which led further to the growth of 
civil society organisations and the strengthening of a critical press. In his formulation 
of a number of democratic reform initiatives, known as the National Agenda, King 
Abdallah II has sought to continue this process of political liberalisation, and abroad 
in particular, the image of Jordan as a moderate and relatively democratic state is intact. 
However, several factors point in the opposite direction, prompting Valbjørn (2007), 
for example, to characterise the monarchy as a liberalising autocracy, but an autocracy 
nonetheless. As a constitutional monarchy, all executive authority of the country is 
vested in the King and a Council of Ministers, appointed by the King. The National 
Assembly, Jordan’s parliament, is elected by popular vote but may override the veto 
power of the King only with a two-thirds vote, thus in practice endowing the King 
with near-absolute powers. Parliament is without real inﬂuence and opposition is 
weak. The majority of members of parliament are individuals, often representatives 
of tribes, and most of the country’s fourteen registered political parties are weak and 
enjoy little popular support. Only one political party has seats in Parliament, namely 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Islamic Action Front, which in the 
2003 elections won 20 of the 84 seats.16
This schizophrenic character is reﬂected in the country’s civil society. On the one 
hand, it is true that Jordanian civil society organisations enjoy much more freedom 
than those in other countries in the region and that recent years have seen a sharp 
increase in their growth, including also human rights organisations and organisations 
for the promotion of democracy. On the other hand, all actors in Jordanian civil 
society know that, while this freedom might be relatively great, it is still restricted 
by certain red lines setting out the limits of acceptable behaviour in civil society. 
Thus, criticism of the King and the royal family can under no circumstances be 
accepted, nor can the country’s foreign policy and its peace treaty with Israel be 
questioned. Law No. 33 of 1966, which some describe as one of the oldest and most 
arbitrary NGO laws in the Middle East (Elbayar 2005:14), constitutes one of the 
most important tools of governmental control of civil society organisations. The 
law grants the ministries in charge wide powers to reject applications for any reason 
they see ﬁt, leaving the rejected organisations with no possibility for appeal. Once 
established, civil society organisations are subject to constant and thorough control 
16  Adding to this bleak picture, rumours of torture and arbitrary imprisonment are circulating, a new terror law 
has been introduced basically giving the intelligence services carte blanche, and the new law on political parties 
is said actually to be weakening the opposition. 
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and monitoring. They can only engage in certain kinds of activities, of which they 
are required to maintain a detailed record, and they have to submit annual reports to 
the ministry in charge.17 Likewise, ministerial agencies are free to send representatives 
to observe any meeting or election. If the ministry is dissatisﬁed with the activities 
or members of an organisation, it can dissolve it, replace individual members, or 
– as was recently the case with the Islamic Centre Charity Society – replace entire 
boards with governmentally appointed substitutes, all without judicial oversight or 
the possibility of appeal (Elbayar 2005:15). Often, the oﬃcial reasons quoted for 
such reactions are technical problems, such as corruption, a lack of compliance with 
reporting requirements or a failure to carry out general assembly elections. When 
one looks more closely at the cases of dissolution or replacement, however, it seems 
that the reason for the regime’s dissatisfaction might have more to do with the kinds 
of activities carried out in the organisation being deemed to be too critical of the 
regime, too political or otherwise crossing the red lines of acceptable behaviour. Ac-
cording to the regime, and as explicitly stated in the law, the purpose of civil society 
organisations is strictly social and cultural; no organisation is allowed to engage in 
“fulﬁlling any political objectives” .18 
This de-politicised understanding of civil society, a remnant of the period of martial 
law, is strongly reﬂected in the composition of Jordanian civil society today. Organisa-
tions that in other civil societies are strong political actors, such as human rights and 
democracy organisations, women’s rights organisations, environmental organisations 
and other advocacy-oriented organisations, in Jordan are weak and small in number. 
Furthermore, while many of them may have strong connections with Western state 
agencies and organisations (who consider them the ‘true’ civil society actors), among 
Jordanians they are often seen as elitist and enjoy little popular support. Instead, many 
argue that the so-called professional associations and the student unions are the only 
civil society actors that actually manage to play a somewhat political role,19 albeit 
17  Social welfare organisations and women’s organisations report to the Ministry of Social Development; cultural 
associations to the Ministry of Culture; sports clubs and youth centres to the Ministry of Youth and Sports; and 
civil protection and health care societies to the Ministry of Interior. Some organisations, such as human rights and 
democratic development organisations, as well as environmental groups, do not report to a particular ministry.
18  Law no. 33 of 1966, article 2.
19  There are fourteen professional associations in Jordan, the total membership exceeding 120,000 people. 
The associations cater for their members’ interests through, for example, the creation of pension and social 
security funds. These funds, together with membership fees, have accumulated large amounts of money which 
the associations have invested, with the result that many of them now have acquired a considerable amount of 
capital. Their ﬁnancial independence has allowed them greater independence of the government, which has in 
turn facilitated an increasingly political role in relation to, e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, the neo-liberal 
economic adjustment programme and Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel (Kassim 2006: 89). See also Knowles 
(2000) for discussions of professional associations and democratic transformation in Jordan.
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strictly monitored and limited by the state. The vast majority of organisations are not 
directly engaged in formal politics but prefer to focus on social and cultural issues, 
thereby steering clear of most clashes with the regime. Social welfare organisations 
engaged in activities such as education, health care, child-care, orphanages, cash and 
in-kind assistance and care of the elderly make up more than half of all civil society 
organisations, while recreational organisations, such as cultural organisations, sport 
organisations and scout organisations, also make up a large proportion. Furthermore, 
instead of applying for status as formal organisations, many civil society actors simply 
prefer to remain informally organised in loose networks and movements, thus by and 
large avoiding the control and surveillance of the regime. 
Table I: Distribution of civil society organisations among categories20
20  These ﬁgures have been calculated by the author using information from the Directory of Civil Society 
Organisations, Al-Urdun al-Jadid, 2006.
2.1.2  Muslim actors in Jordanian civil society
As a predominantly Muslim country, with Islam as its state religion and with a 
direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad as its king, it comes as no surprise 
that Islam plays an important role in Jordanian civil society. In relation to the 
topic of the present analysis, it is interesting to note that this inﬂuence seems to 
be most obvious among the strongest civil society actors – the professional asso-
ciations, the social welfare organisations and the informal networks – while the 
weaker ones, such as human rights organisations, women’s rights organisations and 
Category Number Percent
Social welfare organisations 881 50.5
Cultural associations 239 13.7
Sports, youth and scout organisations 264 15.1
Advocacy organisations 
(human rights, democracy, women’s rights etc)
117 6.7
Research centres and think tanks 118 6.8
Professional associations, professional associations and trade unions 64 3.7
Political parties 33 1.9
International non-governmental organisations 27 1.5
Total 1743 99.9
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environmental organisations, do not seem to be inﬂuenced by Islam to any larger 
degree. On the contrary, many of them do in fact seem to be rather secularist in 
their approach.21
Since the end of the 1980s, the professional associations have to an increasing degree 
been inﬂuenced by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who have come to power 
in the majority of associations through legitimate elections (Kassim 2006:90). One 
member of the Agricultural Association had the following to say about their activi-
ties:
The Islamists, as they call themselves, won by election, not by force. 
They have made a big diﬀerence. They introduced retirement schemes, 
the possibility to buy land and vehicles through the association, they 
provide medical insurance, they help you ﬁnd a job, they established a 
solidarity fund so if a colleague dies the family will get support. This was 
diﬀerent before. 
A similar trend is seen in the student councils. A representative of the National Fo-
rum for Youth and Culture told me that the student unions are dominated by two 
organisations, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the governmental organisations 
or Watan, and that in recent years, the majority of representatives on the councils 
have in fact been supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. This has prompted the 
government to introduce a new law in 2000, allowing the students to elect only half 
of the members of the student councils, while university administration selects the 
other half, based on academic merit. Similarly, new laws are now being discussed in 
attempts to restrict the power of the professional associations.
Likewise, among the informal civil society actors, it is not the nationalist or left-
wing movements that dominate the picture, but eather Muslim networks such as 
the conservative Salaﬁs. Their activities include informal interaction, lessons in 
private homes, seminars and conferences. Among the people I spoke to, there was 
disagreement as to exactly how many people are connected to this movement; but 
21  There are no oﬃcial statistics on the exact number of Muslim civil society organisations. According to 
Wiktorowicz (2001:84), the number of Islamic NGOs in 1995 was 49, or 6 percent of all NGOs, but it remains 
unclear how this number is calculated, since Wiktorowicz does not provide any deﬁnitions of the term ‘Islamic’. 
Using information from the Civil Society Directory 2006, and deﬁning a Muslim organisation as one with a 
name referring to Muslim traditions, persons or scripture, I counted the number of Muslim organisations at 142 
out of 1743, or 8.1 percent of all organisations. See Annex C, Table II, for a speciﬁcation according to categories. 
However, the question is whether such deﬁnitions cover all organisations that consider themselves Muslim? 
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it is clearly a signiﬁcant number. Some Salaﬁs even claim that the movement is as 
big as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2001:178). The movement is split in 
two, with a militant faction arguing for the use of violent measures and jihad against 
incumbent regimes, and a strictly apolitical and non-militant faction, to which the 
majority adheres . Related to this faction is the missionary network Jamayat al-Da’wa 
wal Tabligh, established in Pakistan but with representatives in Jordan as well as in 
other Middle Eastern countries. This movement consists of a number of individu-
als, often connected to mosques, who travel around the country as well as abroad, 
telling people about Islam with the purpose of “presenting Islam in a proper way, 
understanding it better”, as one person expressed it.
Finally, the large group of social welfare organisations presents ample examples 
of the inﬂuence of Islam on civil society discourses and practices, the most obvi-
ous being the Islamic Centre Charity Society (ICCS), established by members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in 1963 and today one of Jordan’s largest social welfare 
organisations. However, whereas in the professional associations Islam is primarily 
a tool for political inﬂuence, and in the Salaﬁ and Da’wa networks a missionary 
enterprise, as it appears in many social welfare organisations, it cannot necessarily 
be categorised so easily. In the following sections, I will take a closer look at this 
group of organisations with the purpose of examining the role and inﬂuence of 
Islam in them.
2.2  Social welfare organisations and Islam: an overview
Social welfare organisations are some of the oldest civil society organisations in 
Jordan, the ﬁrst one having been established in 1912. In 1931, the ﬁrst speciﬁcally 
Muslim organisation, Al-Maqasid al-Hijaziyya, was established, followed the fol-
lowing year by another Muslim organisation, the Circassian Brotherhood. Today, 
social welfare organisations in Jordan make up a diverse group, including small 
community-based associations, organisations with branches and oﬃces in every 
corner of the country, organisations run entirely by volunteers, highly professional 
organisations, women’s associations, organisations established by ethnic groups or 
tribes, schools, orphanages, and organisations setting up mass weddings for poor 
people, distributing sacriﬁcial lambs for Eid al-Adha or providing microﬁnance 
loans for women in the desert. 
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Graph I: Increase in number of social welfare organisations 1995-200522
22  The graph is based on information provided by the General Union of Voluntary Societies, according to whom 
the total number of social welfare organisations in 2005 was 925, slightly higher than the number calculated 
when using information from the Directory of Civil Society Organisations 2006, namely 881. 
23  See Hammad (1999) for an account of Jordanian women’s organisations.
24  The group of so-called royal organisations includes not only social welfare organisations, but also cultural 
associations, research institutions and youth centres.
Overall, the organisations can be divided into six groups. The ﬁrst group, including 
the vast majority of organisations, does not have a particular focus but is engaged 
in general social welfare activities. Women’s associations make up a second group, 
including approximately 125 organisations that are run entirely by women and that 
direct their activities speciﬁcally at women.23 Cooperatives make up the third group. 
The fourth group, the royal development NGOs, is a speciﬁc Jordanian phenom-
enon and consists of approximately ﬁve organisations established or chaired by a 
member of the royal family.24 The royal organisations are some of the strongest social 
welfare organisations; they are all registered with the state as private societies and as 
such are not subject to the same laws as other civil society organisations. The youth 
organisations constitute a ﬁfth type. Traditionally, youth organisations in Jordan 
have primarily been concerned with scout and sporting activities, but recently a few 
new youth organisations have started engaging in social welfare activities. The sixth 
group includes international, including Western and Arab, organisations working 
with social welfare in Jordan, either through direct involvement in projects and 
programmes of their own, or through partnerships with and sponsorship of local 
Jordanian organisations. Approximately thirty to ﬁfty international organisations 
are present in Jordan.
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Regardless of their diﬀerences, social welfare organisations have several similarities. 
They are all deﬁned as organisations which seek to provide a minimum level of income, 
service or other support for disadvantaged peoples such as the poor, elderly, disabled, 
students, unemployed, orphans, single parents or the sick.25 In many organisations, 
there is a particular focus on women. While most organisations reach out to between 
50 and 500 families, a few count their beneﬁciaries in several thousands, with the 
Islamic Centre Charity Society (hereafter ICCS) and some of the royal organisations 
topping the list, each reaching more than 50,000 people. According to the General 
Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS), the total number of beneﬁciaries reached 
by social welfare organisations amounts to almost half a million (cf. Wiktorowicz 
2001:25). Typical activities include, among others, ﬁnancial and material aid, care, 
education, vocational training, microﬁnance activities and health services. Recently, 
less traditional activities such as lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising campaigns 
have also become part of the repertoire in a few organisations, primarily the royal 
organisations.26
In most organisations, a small group of active members sit on the board and may, 
depending on its size and resources, also work as volunteers in the implementation of 
its activities, while larger organisations often employ professional staﬀ to implement 
the activities decided on by the board (Harmsen 2007:124). According to information 
from GUVS, 111,000 people are members of a social welfare organisation. Some of 
the largest organisations are the ICCS, with more than 3,000 employees working in 
the organisation’s health clinics, schools or more than 50 community centres, and 
the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Development ( JOHUD), with more than 400 
employees.27 
Most organisations base their income on membership fees, as well as donations from 
individuals and businesses within the local community.28 Some receive support from 
the GUVS and government sources. However, whereas one government representative 
25  For some scholars (e.g. Clark 2004), the question has been raised whether or not some of the Muslim organisations 
are targeting the middle classes rather than the poor in their activities. However, while some ICCS activities 
certainly do so, this does not mean that there are no activities targeting the lower classes, or that the middle classes 
are being prioritised over the poor.  
26  See Annex C, Table V, for an overview of activities.
27  See Annex C, Table IV, for an overview of employees, members, volunteers and beneﬁciaries.
28  Very few organisations have the capacity to establish more formal partnerships with major market institutions. 
Only organisations of the size of ICCS and the royal organisations have this possibility. One example of such 
cooperation is the project Zakat al-Fitr Campaign through Telephone, established in cooperation between Tkiyet 
Um Ali and the telephone companies Mobilecom and Jordan Telecommunication Co., which allows donations 
to be made by dialling a certain telephone number. 
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
28
stated that most social welfare societies receive some sort of government support, 
several organisations claimed that they do not receive anything from the government. 
On the contrary, several representatives, even of very small organisations, told me 
that the ministry sometimes sends them people who need help. Some organisations, 
primarily the royal ones as well as a few other large organisations, receive funding from 
international donor organisations.29 However, new anti-terror laws have meant that 
funding from abroad has become more problematic, and many prefer not to receive 
anything.30 As the director of one organisation said: 
It’s too complicated. Anyone who wants to give us money has to provide 
his name, address, identiﬁcation number, a long list of information, and 
we have to send a copy of the receipt to the ministry. Even for one JD31. 
It’s too much. 
The role of religion in the social welfare organisations varies widely. A few organisa-
tions are explicitly non-religious, whereas in most organisations, religion inﬂuences 
the discourse and practices to a greater or lesser degree.32 In some organisations, 
religion permeates everything that is said and done, whereas in others, it is merely 
something that pops up once in a while. Some organisations have a religious name, 
some oﬀer religious activities such as Quran reading and the celebration of religious 
holidays, and some are connected to religious structures such as mosques or zakat 
committees. And then there are organisations in which religion may not play any 
immediately visible role but in which participants are all driven by a religious mo-
tivation. On the following pages, I examine these diﬀerent roles of religion in more 
detail. While looking at various aspects of the organisations’ discourses and practices, 
I attempt to answer questions such as: Why do the organisations engage in social 
welfare activities? How do they do this? Who are the people participating in these 
activities? What are their relationships with other actors in society? And ﬁnally, what 
is the role of religion in all this?
29  The general sentiment towards cooperation with international organisations is open and interested. While 
there are still a relatively large number of the Muslim organisations that do not cooperate with any international 
organisations, even these emphasise their willingness to work with whomever and to learn from diﬀerent people, 
should the opportunity arise. 
30  Ironically enough, while international funding may have decreased, for some organisations national and local 
donations have actually increased since the terror attacks and the implementation of the new laws. In the words 
of one employee: “As the superpower pressure increases, people’s donations increase”.
31  One Jordanian Dinar equals approximately 1.4 US Dollars
32  Reﬂecting the population, a number of organisations are explicitly Christian. However, since the focus in this 
analysis is on the role of Islam in social welfare organisations, these will not be considered here.
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The analysis is based on interviews with 24 social welfare organisations. In selecting 
organisations, I have attempted to cover diﬀerent kinds, bearing in mind the above 
list of organisational types, while also attempting to include those in which I ex-
pected Islam to play a certain role, whether based on their names, their reputations 
or their activities.33 Apart from the social welfare organisations, a number of other 
civil society actors that are occasionally engaged in social welfare activities have also 
been interviewed, including representatives of informal networks of individuals and 
cultural organisations. Likewise, representatives of a number of governmental and 
semi-governmental institutions also engaged in social welfare activities have been 
interviewed, including the Ministry of Social Development, the National Aid Fund, 
the Zakat Fund (Sanduq al-Zakat) and the local zakat committees.34 
2.3  Islam and social welfare: Charity or development?
2.3.1  Islam and social welfare: zakat, thawab and the prophet’s deeds
Engaged in social welfare activities, the organisations studied here all have a com-
mon overall goal of assisting the poor and underprivileged. Their work is therefore 
aimed ﬁrst and foremost at solving problems of poverty and problems related to 
poverty such as illness, unemployment, abandoned or orphan children, etc. For most 
organisations, Islam plays an extremely important role as the underlying rationale 
for engaging in such social welfare work.35 Even organisations that otherwise do not 
seem to be very religiously oriented, such as the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Hu-
man Development ( JOHUD), sometimes draw on a religious discourse: “Through 
its Goodwill Campaign, JOHUD reaches out to those in most desperate need, 
33  See Annex C, Table III, for an overview of which organisations are included in the analysis, as well as the 
category to which they belong.
34  While these committees are run by volunteer citizens and as such could be considered non-governmental 
organisations, they are set up with the approval of, and often requested by, the governmental Zakat Fund, which 
then oversees all their activities, in eﬀect making them a private branch of the state (Wiktorowicz 2001: 65). 
There are approximately 170 local zakat committees in the country, in total supporting approximately 13,000 
families ﬁnancially. Apart from this, they provide material aid such as food, sacriﬁcial lambs and school bags, 
and also oﬀer medical care to poor families, emergency cases, orphans and students (Benthall 1999: 33). 
35  An interesting thing to note in this respect is that, while almost everybody I talked to mentioned Islam in relation 
to the goals of their respective organisations, this is not reﬂected in their oﬃcial mission or vision statements. An 
obvious reason for such omissions could be that, according to the law on social welfare organisations, Law No. 33, 
involvement in activities that can be interpreted as ‘political’, ‘sectarian’ or ‘religious’ is strictly forbidden. While 
this requirement is clearly not enforced in the majority of cases, the regime’s interpretation of what constitutes 
illegal ‘religious’ or ‘sectarian’ activities and what constitutes legal activities remains at best unclear and arbitrary. 
Thus, it is not implausible that, when applying for permission to establish the organisations, the founders simply 
chose to downplay the role of Islam in their mission statements, thereby avoiding unnecessary questioning and 
suspicion in the application process.  
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providing immediate assistance, drawing on Islamic values of solidarity and bring-
ing together the entire Jordanian community”.36 While for JOHUD Islam is one of 
many reasons for carrying out social welfare activities, in many other organisations 
the connection between Islam and social welfare plays a much more prominent role. 
Reﬂecting a common attitude, the director of the organisation Al-Afaf explained the 
connection in this way:
In general, human kind tends to do good work, but in Islam this is high-
lighted: giving and doing good are just as important as praying. The word 
“volunteer” is mentioned in the Quran. In Islam, it is not that hard to 
do good work. The Prophet Muhammad says that, if you see something 
harmful in the street and you remove it, you have done something good, 
you will receive points. So charity is good, whether it is small or big. 
Another good example is that it is considered a good deed if you smile 
to your brother’s face. And this really doesn’t cost you anything. This 
saying has two important aspects: that it is good to do charity, and that 
the relation between people should be good. A peaceful, loving relation-
ship between people is what Islam wants. This is what Islam is all about 
– doing good deeds. 
The relationship between Islam and social welfare aid rests on a number of important 
concepts and traditions in Islam. Stories and sayings (or hadiths) of the prophet and 
his followers, known by all and continually repeated, contribute to the construction 
of this connection between Islam and social welfare activities. One popular narrative 
tells a story about the second caliph after Muhammad, Omar bil Khattab, who used 
to wander around among the poor in Mecca, carrying a sack of ﬂour and making sure 
that everyone had enough to eat. Another tells how the Prophet took care of his old 
neighbour, even though the man had never been nice to him. Likewise, sayings such 
as “the one who sleeps with a full stomach while his neighbour is hungry, he is not a 
believer” and “the prophet said, ‘the person who takes care of an orphan will be my 
friend in heaven’”, were repeated over and over again by interviewees to illustrate the 
connection. Also, the concept of thawab, referring to the divine rewards given for 
good deeds, emphasises the importance of social welfare activities in Islam. Among 
the deeds recognised as triggering the most rewards are to visit the sick, to give alms 
and to help the poor. Furthermore, persuading others to do such good deeds also 
prompts rewards in the afterlife (Benthall 1999:35). Several hadiths, such as the one 
36  www.johud.org.jo 
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quoted below, give guidelines for how and when to do such good deeds and how 
many rewards they trigger:
Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah’s Apostle said, ‘If one gives in charity what 
equals one date-fruit from the honestly earned money and Allah accepts 
only the honestly earned money, Allah takes it in His right (hand) and 
then enlarges its reward for that person (who has given it), as anyone 
of you brings up his baby horse, so much is that it becomes as big as a 
mountain’.37
The concepts of zakat and, to a lesser degree, sadaqa also play an important role in 
people’s understanding of social welfare. While sadaqa, literally ‘to be truthful’, refers 
to voluntary almsgiving and charity, zakat refers to the obligation for all Muslims to 
pay 2.5 percent of their wealth to the poor and needy.38 Zakat is one of the ﬁve pillars 
of Islam and as such a crucial element of the Muslim faith. One person even told me 
that zakat and prayer are the two most important duties in Islam. As Benthall notes, 
the meaning is usually taken to be that, by giving up a portion of one’s wealth, one 
puriﬁes that portion which remains, and also oneself, through a restraint on one’s 
greed and one’s imperviousness to others’ suﬀerings. Likewise, the recipient is puriﬁed 
from jealousy and hatred of the rich (Benthall 1999:29). Thus, zakat is good for both 
the giver and the receiver and, by extension, for society, as one person pointed out to 
me: “When the rich people give, they feel better because they help people. And when 
the poor get money they will not hate the rich. This will contribute to the creation 
of a more secure community; there will be no hatred between the classes”. 
One verse in the Quran speciﬁes the permitted beneﬁciaries of zakat: 
Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer 
the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to 
Truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah and for 
the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge 
and wisdom.39
37  Sahih Bukhari, Book 2, no. 491.
38  The guidelines for the payment of zakat are not described in the Quran but in the sunna. Traditionally, the 
required annual amount was 1/40 of one’s wealth, but over the years the scholarly literature has set out more 
speciﬁc rules. For instance, people whose wealth is below a certain threshold are not required to pay zakat 
(Benthall 1999: 29). 
39  Translation by Yusuf Ali.
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Naturally, this verse has given rise to a number of discussions as to concrete interpre-
tations: who is to be included in the diﬀerent categories? Most importantly, do the 
categories include non-Muslims or only Muslims?40 The majority of organisations 
make a strong point of emphasizing that they include Muslims as well as non-Muslims 
in their work. As one person said: “We are not racists and we do not care about what 
religious belief people have. We have no intention of helping only Muslims”. Some 
even showed me photographs and identity papers of Christians receiving ﬁnancial aid 
in order to prove their point. A representative from the International Islamic Char-
ity Organisation was the only organisation with a slightly diﬀerent opinion on the 
topic: “The money goes primarily to Muslims. We prefer to give to Muslims ﬁrst, but 
if there are other people in need, we help them too – even the Jews! For example, in 
Africa, we help Christian people. But Muslims ﬁrst.” However, many scholars are of 
the opinion that, despite saying the opposite, some organisations do in fact limit their 
assistance to beneﬁciaries who show clear signs of being a Muslim. One researcher, 
Bakr M. al-Hiyari of the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, said to me: “I know 
of places in Amman where people would only get assistance if they wear the hijab or 
go to an Islamic school”. Likewise, Benthall notes among both Christian and Muslim 
organisations “a reluctance to give the same degree of assistance to non-co-religionists 
as to co-religionists and prospective converts” (Benthall and Bellion 2003:155). One 
staﬀ member of one of the organisations, whose director had actually emphasised 
the non-discriminatory approach of the organisation, supported this observation: 
“The director doesn’t want to give money to people who don’t wear the hijab, so 
they all do”, he told me. 
2.3.2  Solutions to poverty: charity and development
As can be inferred from the above, for most organisations Islam is the underlying 
raison d’etre, in other words, Islam is the reason why these organisations attempt to 
solve problems of poverty. In the following section, I will consider more closely how 
the organisations attempt to tackle poverty. 
Overall, the strategies used by most of the organisations studied can be described 
as implementation-oriented rather than advocacy-oriented. Apart from some of the 
royal organisations, no one engages in activities to try and change the underlying 
structures in society. No one lobbies for reform of the social welfare system or a new 
40  Theological arguments for targeting only Muslims include, e.g., those of the Egyptian scholar ‘Uthman Hussain 
Abd-Allah. On the other hand, Al-Khayyat, a Jordanian Islamic scholar, argues that the term al-fuqarâ must 
mean ‘all the poor’, and as such should include non-Muslim poor people as well (Benthall 1999: 31). 
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tax system or tries to inﬂuence political decisions in any other way – or at least, they 
do not do so openly. Instead, they focus on solving problems of poverty at the level of 
individuals. Since I did not inquire about this choice of strategy in the organisations 
I visited, it is diﬃcult to say anything deﬁnite about the underlying reasons for this. 
However, one obvious explanation might be the fear of social welfare organisations 
in engaging in what might be interpreted as political activities, thus crossing the red 
lines delimiting acceptable behaviour in civil society. The fact that the royal organisa-
tions are the only ones to engage openly in advocacy is a clear indication of the much 
larger room for manoeuvre they are given, due to their close connections to the royal 
family. As a representative of one of these organisations said: “We are respected by 
donors and by the government, even though we are highly critical”. 
More speciﬁcally, the organisations’ diﬀerent approaches to solving problems of 
poverty can roughly be divided into two kinds, namely a so-called charity approach 
and a more development-oriented approach. Whereas the charity-oriented approach 
refers to traditional and often short-term almsgiving and service provision in the form 
of material or ﬁnancial aid, health services and caring, social development refers to 
the longer term achievement of social and economic rights and self-sustainability, 
emphasising participation and empowerment in the process of getting there. In the 
group of organisations studied here, the so-called royal development organisations all 
display clear examples of a discourse similar to that found in many Western develop-
ment NGOs. For instance, the mission statement of the Jordan River Foundation 
reﬂects typical development jargon: “Our Mission: The Jordan River Foundation’s 
mission is to promote, in partnership with stakeholders, the development of a dynamic 
Jordanian society by initiating and supporting sustainable social, economic and cul-
tural programs that empower communities and individuals based on their needs and 
priorities”.41 Likewise, other royal organisations such as the Young Muslim Women’s 
Association, Tkiyet Um Ali and JOHUD use a secular development discourse. Often, 
they also have a strong human rights focus, like JOHUD, which on its website states 
that “Everyone is born with fundamental human rights. JOHUD strives to ensure 
that these rights are recognised, respected and upheld at all times”.42
Most researchers assume that more religiously oriented organisations have a very tra-
ditional charity approach to their work, and they are very critical of this. Asef Bayat, 
for instance, argues that “[t]he identity of Islamism has never articulated a vision 
41  Jordan River Foundation, www.jordanriver.jo 
42  JOHUD, www.johud.org.jo 
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of an alternative urban order around which to mobilise the community members, 
whom the Islamists see as deserving welfare recipients, to be guided by leaders. The 
members are rarely expected to participate actively in making their communities” 
(Bayat 2002:13). Likewise, while appreciating the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of the 
Muslim organisations, representatives of the royal social welfare organisations char-
acterise their work as purely charitable – as one person said to me, “It doesn’t really 
change things”. Representatives of the youth organisations agree with this assessment. 
One young woman put it like this: “They are supposed to help people develop and 
take control of their own life, not just give them money. They could help a woman 
start a business or give her a small loan. But they don’t. Instead, they make people 
dependant on the money”. 
My interviews with and visits to a number of organisations only partially conﬁrmed 
these views. Some organisations, especially the smaller ones, do seem to adopt a 
rather charity-oriented approach. Their activities focus primarily on the provision 
of ﬁnancial aid and material goods such as blankets, food packages and sheep to 
be sacriﬁced at Eid al-Adha. Support is often given in a random, unsystematic and 
short-sighted manner, primarily due to a lack of donations or human resources. While 
these organisations are deﬁnitely concerned about and care for the people they seek 
to help, the goal is to provide immediate relief, not to assist them in breaking out 
of their circles of poverty or by creating a more sustainable situation for themselves. 
However, many organisations actually seem to have a more development-oriented 
approach. In particular, one community centre under the ICCS displayed a very 
well-articulated understanding of development. According to the director of the 
centre, this is the result of almost ten years of cooperation with UNICEF.43 Telling 
me about this cooperation, he said: 
We had to rethink the way we help others. It’s about collaboration between 
people; it’s about interaction with society, with government institutions. We 
participated in a number of training courses – training in early childhood 
development, youth programmes, everyday life skills, empowerment of 
women. […] We started to work with the local community, we had repre-
sentatives going to diﬀerent areas and talking to people about their needs 
in relation to infrastructure, education, health and so on.
43  Likewise, the UNICEF employee responsible for the partnership was also extremely positive about the 
cooperation and the results obtained: “They were charity-oriented in the beginning, when we started cooperating 
with them, but now they have added the development component, and it was very easy to convince them of the 
beneﬁts of this approach. They just needed someone to put them on the right track”.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
35
Their approach turned out to be so successful that the centre received an award from 
the ICCS headquarters for being the best of the organisation’s 55 centres. With 
pride in his voice, the director told me that his centre has become an ideal for other 
centres in the ICCS to follow because of this development approach. The idea is to 
implement a similar approach in 25 percent of all ICCS centres within the next two 
years. But even now, other ICCS centres also seem to be very aware of concepts such 
as empowerment, self-sustainability and participation. The director of another centre 
told me that their work is not only about handing out money, but about changing the 
situation of the poor: “In the beginning, the poor and the widows would just come 
here for money. We tried to convince them to work, to change their lives. And I can 
see how they have changed. They have better morals, their aims in life have changed. 
The women now guide their children to education”.
Rather than reﬂecting a sharp divide between charity and development, most or-
ganisations do in fact engage in both kinds of activity. One example is the youth 
organisation Suna’a al-Hayah, which seems to be very much aware of the problems 
with purely charitable activities. As one of its members put it: “Poverty will not be 
solved by giving out 3,000 bags”. The organisation is currently preparing the launch 
of an income-generating project oﬀering ﬁnancial and technical support to people 
who have a project they wish to implement. At the same time, members spend a lot 
of energy and manpower on the organisation of iftar and the distribution of food 
bags during Ramadan. The International Islamic Charitable Organisation is another 
example. Their activities include income-generating projects, education and training, 
as well as building mosques, the distribution of sheep for sacriﬁce during Eid al-Adha 
and food distribution during Ramadan. In terms of concrete spending, however, 
development activities still seem to play a minor role compared to more traditional 
charity activities. In ICCS, for instance, in the period 2002-2006, only a little more 
than ﬁve percent of all funds was spent on development-oriented projects and ac-
tivities such as the Productive Families Project and the Training and Rehabilitation 
Project. Likewise, having told me about development-oriented activities such as 
training and awareness-raising in women’s rights and children’s rights, one employee 
at one of the ICCS community centres also emphasised that “these activities are 
just supporting activities to our main activities, which are to help orphans and their 
families ﬁnancially”.
While many elements in the organisations’ understanding of development are identi-
cal or similar to those of Western development NGOs, the redirection of their work 
cannot be seen as a simple rejection of traditional religious charity in favour of a secular 
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Western development approach. For many, their development approach is merged 
with a strong focus on Islam, as expressed on the website of Al-Farouq:
 
Our message: presenting free services and developmental as well as social 
solutions with the least cost possible; planting the experience in the local 
community using all scientiﬁc methods and creative ideas in order to meet 
our service recipients’ expectations – supported with local and international 
partnerships in accordance with our lenient Islamic constitution.44
This coupling of Islam and development is reﬂected very concretely in many activities 
of the organisations. For instance, some use the Quran to facilitate the introduction 
of concepts such as children’s rights. One employee in the Jordan River Foundation 
mentioned that, in their education on child safety, they use verses from the Quran to 
illustrate their points. Likewise, in one ICCS centre, staﬀ have initiated cooperation 
with the local imams, training them in issues such as women’s and children’s rights, in 
the hope that they will then pass on the message to the men in the area. One employee 
told me about this process:
Of course, we met a lot of criticism for our work. There were so many dif-
ﬁculties with the men. […] Some imams rejected the idea until we gave an 
example from the Quran – the Prophet Muhammad actually played with 
his children. There was one imam, he used to hit his children and never 
play with them, but then he heard this story and participated in our course 
and he actually apologised to his child. 
The concept of zakat also plays an important role in the formulation of this speciﬁ-
cally Muslim approach to development. As a representative of the ICCS put it: “If 
the proper Islamic approach was applied, there would be no poverty. In Jordan, for 
example, there are about 40 billion JD in frozen assets in the banks. If everyone paid 
zakat of this amount, it would equal 350 million JD. This would be enough to ﬁght 
poverty and unemployment”. As it is today, zakat is often distributed as alms in an 
unsystematic, random manner, detaining people in situations of dependence rather 
than empowering them. However, many of the people I talked to see zakat as having 
the potential to be something more and something else than merely a patronising 
system for almsgiving from rich individuals to poor individuals, often emphasising a 
rights-based understanding of the concept: “God orders people to take from the rich 
44  www.alfarouqsociaty.org 
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and give to the poor. This is a basic thing in Islam. God also said that it is the right of 
the poor to receive this money”, one person told me. Several people suggested that 
zakat be given solely through income-generating projects. Others thought that zakat 
should simply be collected and distributed among the poor once in the lifetime of a 
person, and this one time should cover all the person’s needs. Some, echoing Prince 
Hassan’s suggestion back in 1999, proposed the establishment of an international 
system for the collection of zakat. Regardless of how, there seems to be wide agree-
ment on the need to reform the current zakat system, thus ensuring a more systematic, 
eﬀective and development-oriented approach.45
While claiming that development approaches to poverty are inherent in Islam, no 
one rejected the inﬂuence of Western thought on these approaches: “We take Islamic 
studies and combine them with Western thoughts on development. We beneﬁt from 
the Western development approach – but we only take the good things”, one person 
said. When describing their understanding of development, some also mentioned 
the caliph Omar bil Khattab, who, during his reign from 634 to 644, established a 
system of birth control, originally imported from Iran. This story is told as an example 
of how diﬀerent systems can merge, and by extension as a legitimisation of the use of 
so-called Western approaches to development. 
Thus, in many organisations, Islam and development are not seen as two mutually 
exclusive categories; instead, true social development stems from Islam and as such 
is an inherent part of Islam. But how does this approach play out in practice? In the 
following section, I will present examples of diﬀerent activities in selected social 
welfare organisations, reﬂecting important aspects of development, such as self-
sustainability, empowerment and participation, with the purpose of illustrating this 
apparent combination of Islam and development. 
2.3.3  Micro-ﬁnance, women’s rights and participatory education
Self-sustainability through income-generating activities
Most social welfare organisations are engaged in the distribution of ﬁnancial aid. 
Changes in the ways this assistance is given illustrate very concretely a shift towards 
45  However, the current zakat system might in itself also provide obstacles to the introduction of a more development-
oriented approach. Many people who give donations to the organisations condition their aid, and most prefer to 
give to speciﬁc cases such as an orphaned child or a bright student rather than abstract development projects. 
Nonetheless, through seminars, meetings and visits to projects for potential donors, one ICCS centre actually 
managed to change this practice, convincing local donors to provide support for development projects instead.
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a more development-oriented approach aimed at long-term self-sustainability rather 
than immediate relief. Traditionally, ﬁnancial aid has been given as monthly allow-
ances to poor families. The amounts provided by many social welfare organisations 
are most often too low to make any real diﬀerence to the people receiving the as-
sistance.46 The director of one ICCS centre told me that the amount provided per 
family had recently been increased from 25 to 30 JD, but, as he rightly said, “even 
that is still too little”. 
Frustrated by the lack of sustainable results from the distribution of ﬁnancial aid, 
many organisations have started showing a growing interest in microﬁnance activi-
ties, income-generating projects and vocational training. One of the ﬁrst Jordanian 
organisations to engage in such activities, the royal development organisation JOHUD, 
initiated their income-generating projects back in the 1970s. Today, almost half of 
the organisations included in this study now engage in such activities. The director 
quoted above explained the reason for this shift to me: “If you give people money 
every day, the poverty will never end. There are more and more poor people. So we 
will start with these productive projects, and this way families might be able to manage 
on their own, and in the future they will be able to support us so we can help other 
families”. The ICCS community centres, Suna’a al-Hayah, the International Islamic 
Charitable Organisation, Al-Farouq and others all engage in income-generating 
projects. A representative of the International Islamic Charitable Organisation told me 
that, so far, they have provided loans to approximately 600 families with a return rate 
of more than 96 percent. Likewise, several hundred women participate in Al-Farouq’s 
vocational training programmes, which include activities such as honey production, 
handicraft courses and agricultural training. The organisation has rented some land on 
which the women plant their vegetables. 75 percent of the proﬁts go to the women, 
the association receiving 25 percent. In the majority of organisations, however, these 
activities are carried out on a much smaller scale. One women’s organisation, That 
al-Netaqueen, has hired eight poor women to work in the kitchen, where they learn 
cooking skills, hygiene and basic accounting. Their food is then sold to people in the 
neighbourhood. In Khawla bint al-Azwar, another women’s organisation, twenty 
women receive training in sewing, cooking and beauty issues. 
Many people refer to a story about the Prophet Muhammad in justifying this change: 
“The prophet Muhammad was once asked by a little boy to give him money. He 
46  This is also true of government aid. According to a brochure from the fund, four million JD has been distributed 
to 13,000 families, equalling approx. 25 JD per family per month. 
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gave him an axe and told him to go and cut wood instead. This is our approach”, a 
representative from the ICCS headquarters told me. I heard the story several times, 
always as a way of illustrating the connection between Islam and social development 
approaches, thus legitimising the introduction of activities such as micro-ﬁnance 
loans and income-generating projects.
Women’s role in the organisations: gender equality and empowerment
Another interesting aspect to consider when discussing the organisations’ under-
standing of development is gender equality and the role of women, as regards both 
participants and beneﬁciaries. Many assume that all Muslim organisations have a very 
traditional approach to these issues. As Bakr M. al-Hiyari of the Royal Institute for 
Interfaith Studies said to me: “As regards women’s position, I don’t see them as being 
able to empower women. They probably prefer the women to stay at home, take care 
of the children and support the family. But this is my opinion”.  Many organisations 
are very aware of such prejudices and stereotypes. Before one interview, the director 
of a women’s association said to me, slightly annoyed: “I assume that you are going 
to ask about women and Islam, you always ask about that, you all assume that [Mus-
lim] women are so oppressed”. And many, both men and women, were very eager 
to challenge these prejudices and stereotypes, explaining to me how Islam is in fact 
empowering women, not oppressing them, and how women’s rights are an inherent 
part of Islam. One man formulated it this way: 
Islam gave women all the rights, she is equal to men. Before Islam, women 
did not inherit anything; in Islam she does. Islam also asks people to treat 
women right. The prophet said this. He also said, be gentle with glass – that 
is, women – they are fragile. Don’t hate women. Before Islam, many people 
killed their baby girls. 
However, practices in many organisations present serious limitations on the highly 
appraised rights and empowerment of women. For instance, while continuously 
emphasising the rights of women, the director of the women’s association mentioned 
above also said that women’s participation as volunteers in the association ought to 
depend on the support of the husbands, thus demonstrating a rather conservative 
attitude. Also, many of the activities that are oﬀered support rather than challenge 
traditional gender roles. Vocational courses focus on ﬂower arrangements, basket-
making and cooking, and classes and lectures oﬀer topics such as motherhood, 
good kitchen hygiene and marriage. As a director of one women’s association 
explained: “We talk about how to have a good family, relations between husband 
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and wife, child-rearing and so on”. Likewise, although the director of a cooperative 
told me that Islam encourages women to participate in society, only four out of 35 
employees in the cooperative are women. Furthermore, and on a more general note, 
very few board members are women; almost no directors are women; and many 
organisations have an, if not formal, then informal policy of only hiring women 
who wear headscarves. 
That said, quite a few organisations did seem to present a less restricted under-
standing of women’s rights and empowerment, even managing actually to integrate 
their discourse into practice. One example is Al-Aqsa, established by a famous 
women’s rights activist and co-founder of the moderate Muslim Centre Party 
(Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami). In a speech on women’s rights and Islam to the women 
of Madaba at a local youth centre, she said that, for women, “knowledge can be a 
weapon for empowerment, a way to participate in social development”. Through 
lectures and workshops in her organisation, she attempts to promote women’s 
rights: “If women know their rights, we believe that they can make a change”, she 
said to me. Likewise, Khawla bint al-Azwar oﬀers health information courses and 
vocational training to prostitute women, motivated by a desire to empower them. 
The director told me that people often asked her why she did not just focus her 
eﬀorts on getting the girls married, but no, she said, “I want these women to be 
able to take care of themselves”. Likewise, a woman who participates in the activi-
ties of Khawla bint al-Azwar told me: “Before, I didn’t know that I had any rights. 
My husband had another wife, and all he thought about was having sex with me. 
Before I came here, I was lost. I didn’t know what I was capable of. Here, I learned 
about my rights, I learned what I was capable of, and I learned to stand up for 
myself ”. Finally, in one of the ICCS centres, female teachers and beneﬁciaries are 
engaged in projects with the purpose of empowering women. An employee told 
me about one of their projects: 
We have this program called “The Woman Can”. She can negotiate, she can 
speak her mind, express her feelings, she should not fear anything, she can 
do what the man can do. We teach them this. The teachers didn’t know 
about this in the beginning. They participated in the training; now they 
train others. Islam says that when you do something, do it out of love, not 
because you have to do it.
Another teacher said that she keeps talking about women’s rights and how to be 
active in society, because this is what Islam teaches: “It doesn’t matter whether you 
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wear the veil or not. […] We focus on teaching women to be active in the family and 
in society. Women can be role models. A woman should choose a career, she should 
not be dependant, she can earn money for the family”.
This focus on women’s empowerment and rights is further reﬂected in attitudes 
towards education. In fact, everybody I spoke to agreed that women and girls have 
a right to education and openly criticised those who do not support this right, 
such as the Salaﬁs: “They might insist that their wife and daughters wear niqab, 
they sometimes don’t think the girls should go to university – although this is 
wrong”, the director of an ICCS centre told me. Even the director of one of the 
most conservative and traditional organisations said that he encouraged the girls 
to continue their studies and go to university. Many organisations face problems 
with conservative relatives when promoting girls’ right to education. A teacher in 
one of the ICCS centres told me that they often face problems with relatives who 
will not allow the girls to go to school or who only allow them to go to school until 
they reach a certain grade, after which they are expected to get married. “But”, the 
teacher said, “we support the mothers and try to convince the uncles. We tell them 
that you never know what will happen in the future; the girl might get divorced, and 
what will she then do without an education?” This way, they are able to convince 
75 percent of the people.
Participation and problem-solving
A third interesting aspect to consider when discussing development-oriented ap-
proaches is participation. In the royal organisations, which strongly reﬂect a secular 
development discourse, this is a crucial element in most activities. In JOHUD, for 
instance, one representative presented me with the organisation’s strategy for com-
munity empowerment, which includes the establishment of committees to ensure 
participation and ownership of the local community. But this emphasis on participation 
is also found in other organisations. In particular, the new youth organisations seem 
to be driven by a participatory approach, emphasising discussion and problem-solving 
as important components internally in the organisation, as well as in their activities 
with beneﬁciaries. As a member of one of the youth organisations stated in talking 
about the recruitment of new members: “We like to discuss, to deal with each other, 
to convince each other, to share. We want people who have opinions, who know how 
to think, how to deal with problems”.. 
Likewise, the educational activities of some organisations reﬂect a strong focus on 
participation. In particular, the ICCS centres carry out education activities for chil-
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dren, most often orphans or children in poor families.47 Many centres oﬀer English 
and computer lessons every afternoon, together with tutoring classes for those who 
need it. Religious activities such as reading and memorising the Quran are important 
elements in the education oﬀered in many organisations. As Benthall notes, many 
people see such activities as encouraging passivity rather than active participation, 
critical problem-solving and creativity (Benthall and Bellion 2003:104). 
While the educational activities in the majority of organisations deﬁnitely reﬂect 
these prejudices, a few have managed to present an apparently successful synthesis 
of these diﬀerent kinds of learning. In one ICCS centre, for instance, a number of 
programmes for participation by girls have been introduced, targeting girls from six 
to seventeen years old, and including a total of more than 500 girls. One programme 
focuses on morals and ethics: “We try to teach them to know themselves, to know 
their families, to know about life and society, through this project”, the teacher told 
me. “We don’t only teach the basics of religion, we talk about protection from abuse, 
we talk about hygiene, and we talk about their rights – all from the point of view of 
religion”. Another programme aims to teach the girls to gather information, make 
plans and solve problems, while a third focuses on how to set goals and be ambitious, 
always with a strong focus on girls and women’s empowerment, as another employee 
told me. I participated in some of these activities, and in my ﬁeld notes from that 
day I wrote:
In a big room in the basement, twenty young girls, perhaps seven or eight 
years old and most of them with colourful scarves on their head, are sitting 
around a table. Their teacher, a young, energetic woman, writes on the 
blackboard and cracks jokes that make all the kids laugh. The topic for 
today’s lesson is problem-solving, and the children suggest a number of 
problems that they ﬁnd relevant to solve. One says drugs, another smok-
ing, a third jealousy and a fourth violence against children. During the 
lesson, they discuss all the topics written on the blackboard and talk about 
how to solve them. Some of the girls have prepared short presentations 
for the others. They all participate actively in the class and seem to be 
very engaged in the discussions. In another room, a group of older girls, 
approx. 12 years old, are having a lesson on how to set goals and achieve 
them. One of the girls is eager to speak and tells me that her goal is to 
learn many languages and go to college.
47  See Roald (1994) on education and Islamic movements.
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2.4  Doing good for God, yourself and others
Whereas the ﬁrst section of this chapter looked at the rationale, strategies and ac-
tivities of the organisations, this section turns towards those who are implementing 
them, considering who they are, what motivates them to become involved and what 
role Islam plays in this. 
2.4.1  Members, employees and volunteers
Participants in the organisations can be divided into three groups: members, em-
ployees and volunteers. As has already been noted, most members are relatively 
inactive, possibly participating in the general assembly meetings and paying their 
membership fees, but apart from that not playing an active part in the organisations, 
for which reason they have not been included in the present analysis. Instead, the 
focus will be on volunteers and employees, who are the active participants in the 
organisations. In approximately half of the organisations studied here, the work is 
carried out by a group of professional employees, often supported by a number of 
volunteers. This is the case in the highly professional royal organisations, but also 
in the ICCS, where 3,400 people work as paid staﬀ, while perhaps even more are 
attached to the organisation as volunteers. Some organisations are primarily run 
by volunteers but have hired a few paid staﬀ to take care of administrative matters. 
For example, Suna’a al-Hayah has one employee and more than 700 volunteers, 
Al-Afaf four employees and 300 volunteers. Finally, some organisations are run 
solely by volunteers, for example, Urwa al-Wuthqa, Al-Fayhah and the Islamic 
Anwar al-Huda Association. 
The professional employees working in the organisations include teachers, social 
workers, nurses, doctors and psychologists, as well as accountants, human resources 
and PR people.  The majority of regular staﬀ seem to be relatively young, while 
most of the directors are older than ﬁfty. Many people were proud to tell me that 
they have worked in the organisation all their professional lives. One young woman 
told me that she has worked in the organisation for ﬁve years, but, she continued 
“I wish I had known about this place many years ago, so I could have worked here 
even longer!”. A few come from other jobs, some from similar organisations, while 
others have had very diﬀerent jobs: one had been a project manager in UNRWA, 
another an oﬃcer in the military. Most learned about the job through friends, 
family or other networks. People working in the organisations all seem to come 
from the lower or upper middle class. Staﬀ in organisations such as the Jordan 
River Foundation and JOHUD tend to come from the upper middle class, while 
staﬀ in, for example, the ICCS centres and Al-Farouq are from the lower middle 
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class and many may in fact have experienced poverty themselves during their youth 
(Harmsen 2007:403). 
The group of volunteers is more diverse, and at least three diﬀerent types can be 
identiﬁed. One type is the so-called engaged citizens, including for example the 
volunteers in the women’s association, Islamic Anwar al-Huda. They are all relatively 
well-to-do women 50-60 years of age who wish to make a diﬀerence in their com-
munity, which is located in one of the wealthiest neighbourhoods in Amman. They 
are housewives and see their volunteer work as a chance to get out of the house and 
socialise while at the same time doing some meaningful work for others. My assist-
ant described them very precisely as nice old women with too much time on their 
hands. A second type of volunteer includes former beneﬁciaries who are integrated 
into the organisation as volunteers, perhaps receiving a small salary. This seems to be 
a common practice in the ICCS community centres. Some of the women’s associa-
tions, such as Khawla bint al-Azwar and That al-Netaqueen, also used this practice. 
In Khawla bint al-Azwar, one of the prostitutes who had previously participated 
in the health courses of the organisation now works as a counsellor to the other 
prostitutes, distributing condoms and giving health advice to the women. A third 
kind of volunteer, the young and resourceful, seems to be a relatively new species 
in the Middle East. In Jordan, the phenomenon is in its inception and numbers are 
still low, whereas in Egypt, some of the new volunteer youth organisations already 
count several thousand members.48 These new volunteers are young people from 
the upper middle or upper class, and most are or have been university students. 
For them, voluntarism is a conscious choice, which they see as what makes their 
organisation unique and diﬀerent from other organisations. 
While the leadership and board membership in most organisations is still 
predominantly male,49 women make up a large proportion of employees in all 
organisations, in many cases even at mid-level management, working as deputy 
directors, team-leaders, teachers, PR persons, social workers etc. As the assistant 
director of one of the ICCS schools jokingly put it: “Apart from maintenance, 
all educational staﬀ and directors are women. The dean is a man – but we would 
like to change this to a woman also”. Likewise, a large proportion of volunteers 
are women. In an organisation such as Suna’a al-Hayah, they even make up the 
48  See the following chapter for a detailed account of the Egyptian youth organisations.
49  Wiktorowicz notes that in a sample of 31 Muslim organisations, women serve on the boards of only ﬁve. Of 
the 248 board members in the sample, 34 (or 14 percent) are women (Wiktorowicz 2001: 87). 
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majority. This contradicts the ﬁndings of Wiktorowicz, for example, who claims 
that in his visits to various Muslim organisations, he met few female staﬀ and 
volunteers (2001:88). 
2.4.2  Personal gain, religious obligations and compassion 
Participants in the organisations all have their reasons for engaging in social wel-
fare organisations. Some quoted a wish simply to help others, others a religious 
obligation to help, and yet others personal gains. These factors are not necessarily 
contradictory: in fact, most people seem to be motivated by a mixture of all three 
elements, and the distinction should thus been seen primarily as an analytical one. 
For the participants, there is no contradiction between wanting to do something 
for yourself, for your god and for others. As one woman said to me, eloquently 
combining all three elements: “Everyone should do charity – not just because 
of religion, but because you help others and because it makes you feel good”. In 
almost all organisations, Islam plays an important role as a motivating factor, and 
many interviewees quoted Islam as one of the main reasons for engaging in this 
work. As the women from Khawla bint al-Azwar unanimously and frequently 
said when telling me about their work: “Fi sabil li-llah”, or “we do this for the 
sake of God”. 
For some of the employees, their work is simply a job that needs to be done, and 
their motivation is economic gain: “I applied for a job in the Ministry of Education, 
but my husband thought it was too far away. This is closer to my home. I heard 
about the place from friends, I applied and I passed the test. It doesn’t matter to 
me whether it is an Islamic place or not, I just wanted to work”, one social worker 
told me. This was emphasised by the director of an ICCS centre, who said that 
people come to work there simply because they want a job or because they want 
to ﬁll up their spare time. This focus on economic gains does not necessarily con-
ﬂict with other kinds of motivation. As one woman said, charity work gives you 
a double income – you get your salary and you get your reward from God. Some 
of the volunteers I met distanced themselves and their work from that of the paid 
staﬀ, implying that the paid staﬀ are driven solely by money, whereas their own 
motivation is not material: “Our motivation wasn’t the money we would get out of 
this; it was the emotions and feelings we would get from people”. Most employees, 
however, speciﬁcally stated that the desire for economic gain was not among the 
factors that motivated them to work, particularly since the salaries provided are 
often very low. According to one young man working in one of the ICCS centres, 
employees are paid a meagre 250 JD pr. Month, which is not even enough to buy 
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gas for his car. Instead, they (like the volunteers) emphasised other, less tangible 
aspects when explaining why they chose this particular job – qualities such as 
the atmosphere or the colleagues. And these qualities are often connected to the 
religiosity of the place. As one teacher expressed it:
It means a lot to me that it’s a Muslim place. Perhaps in other places I 
would feel a gap of belief. I am not sure I would get along with my col-
leagues. The fact that it’s a Muslim place means that you get support for 
your own beliefs. You already have the beliefs, but you want to work in 
a place that supports these beliefs and that makes it easier for you to 
practice your beliefs. 
For many, in particular women, their participation in the organisations is also 
driven by a wish to be active and play a role in society.50 As the volunteer director 
of a women’s association explained to me, when she resigned from her job, she 
suddenly felt useless. She started volunteering in the association, and the other 
women told her that she was not useless. Another woman told me that she used 
to work in a manufacturer’s shop but had to leave when her mother died and she 
was expected to take care of her father: “But I wanted to be active, I wanted to do 
something. So I asked about volunteer work and I heard about this place. When I 
started, I was so shy, I didn’t know how to do speeches and lectures. They taught 
me at the centre, and I am still learning”. For many women, Islam is used as a jus-
tiﬁcation for their participation. As many of the women I talked to said: “Islam is 
not about just sitting at home doing nothing. You have to engage in society, you 
have to achieve something”. As such, Islam becomes the tool to convince sceptical 
parents and husbands of the legitimacy of their participation. One of the leaders 
of the women’s organisation Khawla bint al-Azwar told me that, in the beginning, 
her husband did not want her to work with prostitutes, but then she said to him: 
“You have to think of the prostituted woman as someone in trouble – how can I as 
a Muslim leave her alone?” And this argument was diﬃcult for the man to reject, 
so he had to let her go. A woman from Suna’a al-Hayah told me a similar story: “In 
the beginning, my husband didn’t like it – it was new, he didn’t like that I had to 
leave all the time. But when you have a dream, when you live for something, you 
say everything is easy, I want to make my dream come true. I told him, okay if you 
want me to die, I can leave it. But he accepted.”
50  On women and Islamic activism, see Carøe Christiansen (2003).
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Many also said that their participation in the organisations is motivated by a wish 
to develop themselves and learn more. In particular, among the so-called young and 
resourceful volunteers, primarily from Suna’a al-Hayah, people are extremely articu-
late about the fact that, through their engagement in volunteer work, they not only 
help the poor, they also empower themselves. Almost all the young people I talked to 
said that their involvement in this work had strengthened their capacities and skills 
in diﬀerent areas. One had improved his networking skills, which had resulted in 
several job oﬀers, another had acheived straight A’s in school since she started work-
ing as a volunteer, and a third was no longer the social recluse she used to be. Finally, 
many people quoted the mere activity of doing charity as a reward and motivation 
in itself. One elderly man in one of the oldest organisations in Jordan told me that 
charity was the hardest of all the jobs he had had in his life, but it was also the most 
rewarding, the one that had given him the most pleasure. In a similar vein, a young 
girl from Suna’a al-Hayah ecstatically said that, “When you help people to ﬁx their 
souls, when you love, when you feel the charity, the giving, you will change – even 
your face will change. Your soul will be free. I feel sometimes when I help people I 
am actually ﬂying”.
Apart from concrete personal gains, religious obligations also play an important 
role as a motivating factor for most people. Helping others is a major part of Is-
lam, a basic Islamic principle, as one person said. The duty to give to the poor, or 
zakat, is one of the ﬁve pillars of Islam. Likewise, as already mentioned, concepts 
such as thawab, as well as the many stories about the good deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad and his followers, serve to emphasise the religious obligation to do 
good. As such, involvement in social welfare work becomes a way of pleasing 
God and earning points for the next life. When asked why she engaged in this 
kind of work, the director of the women’s organisation Islamic Anwar al-Huda 
answered: “We think that this job pleases God. You have to do something for 
your next life. You have to do good things”. Others said that doing charity is a 
kind of believing, that Islam orders people to help and give zakat, or that it gives 
extra points. Not many people mentioned da’wa, the duty to inform non-believ-
ers about Islam. Because they are themselves Muslim and because they work in 
a Muslim environment, most people ﬁnd it natural to include elements of Islam 
in their activities, but they do not see this as an active attempt to convert others 
or make them more religious: “We teach people about raising children in Islam. 
Most of the community is Muslim”, the director of Al-Farouq said, adding: “But 
we don’t try to make people become more Muslim”. While, in the majority of 
organisations, explicit missionary activities are clearly not a part of the agenda, in 
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a few, such activities do take place.51 In one case, the director of one of the ICCS 
centres told me a story about a woman who came to one of the centre’s training 
courses without a headscarf.  All the other women on the course were furious, 
and they approached the director asking how he could allow such a heathen into 
the centre. And he answered: “This is precisely why we should allow her here – so 
we can convince her to put on the headscarf ”. Likewise, according to Harmsen, 
some ICCS centres will withhold ﬁnancial aid if beneﬁciaries do not show up for 
religious lessons (Harmsen 2007:270).
Last but not least, for almost everybody their involvement in social welfare activities 
seems to be driven by compassion and a genuine wish actually to change the lives of 
the people they are helping. Although they sometimes present a rather patronising 
attitude towards the beneﬁciaries of their work, the volunteers and employees I talked 
to all seemed to be very preoccupied with their well-being. One old man who has 
worked in social welfare for 36 years said: “My father died in the war in 1948. I was 
an orphan and that’s why I understand the situation of the orphans. I made a vow to 
help them”. Another employee told me that, while social welfare work is the hardest 
kind of work he has ever engaged in, witnessing the changes it makes in people’s lives 
makes it all worth while. Everybody had stories to tell of such changes – of orphans 
who are studying in university, of single mothers who have learned to knit and are 
now selling their products on the market, of fathers who no longer beat their children, 
of women who have left prostitution and now teach other women about sexually 
transmitted diseases. For most people, such success stories are what motivate them 
to work. For some, however, these individual improvements are merely steps on the 
way to something bigger. Added up, changes in the lives of individuals will lead to 
changes on a much larger scale, and this end goal is what motivates people to engage 
in social welfare activities: the vision of a diﬀerent society. The new youth organisa-
tions expressed this particularly strongly. Through their engagement in social welfare 
activities, they hope to change the minds and conditions of people, thus contributing 
51  This leads to another relevant question: What are the views of the beneﬁciaries on the organisations and the 
religiosity they are exposed to? Is there any indication that beneﬁciaries choose a particular organisation because 
of its religiosity? Or do they simply use that organisation because it oﬀers the services that they need? Since 
this study did not include interviews with any signiﬁcant number of beneﬁciaries, it is diﬃcult to answer such 
questions. According to some scholars, the religiosity of the organisations is an important aspect of understanding 
their success – their religiosity gives them better access to poor communities.  This is also supported by the World 
Bank study, Voices of the Poor, from 2001, which among other things concludes that poor people often have more 
conﬁdence in religious organisations than secular ones. In her study of the ICCS, however, Clark notes that the 
fact that many poor families attempt to receive funding from several organisations challenges the assumption 
that the poor attribute some form of ideological aﬃliation or loyalty to the aid they receive from the ICCS 
(Clark 2004: 110). Likewise, many other people said to me that poor people choose which organisation to go to 
according to where they receive the best service, not according to what religion was being preached.
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to the creation of a better society based on qualities such as social justice, eﬃciency 
and good morals – a Muslim renaissance, as their idol, the Egyptian TV preacher Amr 
Khaled, formulates it. One girl told me: “Changing society is not easy – you have to 
begin with yourself. You can start with coming on time, make exact appointments, 
stop lying, and help the poor people”. As Harmsen notes, this vision of a changed 
society distinguishes modern social welfare organisations from charitable associa-
tions in medieval and early modern times, for whom overcoming poverty as a social 
phenomenon was of little if any interest (Harmsen 2007:196).
2.5  The Muslim Brotherhood, the regime and the organisations
Whereas the two preceding sections have focussed on what can be termed internal 
aspects of the organisations, such as rationale, strategies and motivations, and have 
provided examples of the importance of Islam in relation to these aspects, this third 
and last section turns towards the broader context in which the organisations operate, 
discussing some of their external relations and the way Islam inﬂuences these. 
Jordanian social welfare organisations do not operate in a political vacuum, but are 
inﬂuenced (and often even restricted) in their actions by a number of external factors, 
the regime being the most obvious one. As has been noted in the previous sections 
of this chapter, all civil society organisations are subject to strict state control and 
surveillance, and a large number of people complained, either directly or indirectly, of 
this level of bureaucracy. As one activist put it: “Civil society in Jordan is not demo-
cratic and participatory. It is pure administration”. Another said that the amount of 
bureaucracy is so overwhelming that it might in fact hinder new initiatives:
I do think that the government has a hand in the problems, they are not 
making room for new paths, new ideas. A good example is that the rules and 
regulations for organisations are from 1966 – they haven’t changed. That’s 
a big problem. They don’t allow any space for new thoughts. […] When 
people want to do volunteer work, they ﬁnd all these rules and regulations, 
which limit them – you can’t go on.
While there is no doubt that all Jordanian civil society organisations are subject to 
strict control, it is also clear that some are subject to stricter control than others. 
It seemed to be common wisdom among the organisations I spoke to that while 
the royal organisations enjoy a high degree of government support and freedom, 
organisations related to the Muslim Brotherhood have an increasingly problematic 
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
50
relationship with the regime, reﬂecting the relationship between the regime and the 
Brotherhood itself. 
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was founded in November 1945 and was 
granted legal status as a charitable society in January 1946 by King Abdallah I. 
For many years, relations with the king and the regime were good, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood was seen as a strategic ally in the ﬁght against what were then the main 
opposition forces, namely communism and other leftist forces. The Brotherhood 
was allowed to establish branches and spread throughout the country, and it was 
one of the few organisations allowed to operate during the years of martial law from 
1957 to 1989, when many other civil society organisations and all political parties 
were prohibited from organising.52 Likewise, prominent members were often ap-
pointed ministers in especially the Ministries of Justice and Education. The Muslim 
Brotherhood for its part openly backed the King and the regime when necessary, 
for instance, in the King’s confrontations with Arab nationalists (Wiktorowicz 
2001:97). While history has also witnessed clashes between the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, until recent years a strong sense of loyalty has prevailed 
between the two. However, this trust now seems to be crumbling. In particular, 
the regime’s peace negotiations with Israel, starting at the beginning of the 1990s, 
became a watershed in relations between the regime and the Brotherhood. As one 
researcher noted, Oraib al-Rantawi from the Al-Quds Centre for Political Studies, 
the regime began to see the Muslim Brotherhood as part of the problem, rather 
than part of the solution, while the Brotherhood began to see the government as 
involved in an alliance with the US and Israel.53 In the following years, the regime 
took various steps to control the Muslim Brotherhood, something that has only 
intensiﬁed under the new king.54 
52  Compared to other Arab countries, Muslim groups and organisations have generally been allowed more 
organisational freedom and autonomy in Jordan, and Jordan is one of the few states in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood has obtained legal status (Noyon 2003: 84).
53  As one representative of the Muslim Brotherhood expressed it: “They asked us to adopt their principles and 
policies, to follow them, and market their policies. But we don’t agree with them, especially not as regards the 
agreement with Israel in 1994, the invasion of Iraq by the American forces, the cooperation between Jordan 
and USA, the constant limitations of the freedom and community work – all these are reasons for the growing 
diﬀerences between the visions of the government and the Muslim Brotherhood”. 
54  A recent example of the troubled relations between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood is the imprisonment 
of four members of parliament from the Islamic Action Front who oﬀered their condolences to the family of the 
terrorist Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. They were later pardoned by the King. However, pardoning someone does not 
erase that person’s punishment, meaning that the members of parliament are in eﬀect still convicted to 13 months 
of prison. Since a person cannot be a member of parliament with a sentence of more than 12 months, they can 
no longer be members of parliament. 
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Traditionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has had strong relationships with many civil 
society organisations, most obviously with the Islamic Centre Charity Society, estab-
lished by members of the Brotherhood in 1963, but also with other organisations. 
During an interview, a spokesperson from the Brotherhood explained in detail rela-
tions between the Brotherhood and the various civil society organisations: While the 
ICCS is the only organisation directly under the authority of the Brotherhood, there 
are some other organisations that are connected to it, although they are established 
by individuals. An example of such an organisation is Al-Afaf, whose chairman is a 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s general assembly. Furthermore, a few women’s 
organisations, small community associations and cultural organisations such as the 
Society for the Protection of the Holy Quran are also connected to the Brother-
hood, which plays an important role in the professional associations and the student 
councils, as has been mentioned above. 
Many of these organisations have, in one way or another, felt the consequences 
of the increasingly tense relations between the regime and the Brotherhood. As 
noted earlier, the professional associations and the student councils have been made 
subject to new laws aimed at restricting the inﬂuence of the Brotherhood, and its 
members are subject to strict surveillance, as one of its representatives told me: “The 
government […] controls all members, whether they work in student unions, in the 
professional associations or somewhere else. There are limits to how much a mem-
ber of the Muslim Brotherhood can get promoted, for instance”. Furthermore, and 
particularly relevant to this analysis, in July 2006 the Islamic Centre Charity Society 
was charged with corruption. The executive board of the ICCS was disbanded and a 
government-appointed committee was put in its place to run the organisation during 
the investigations. These have now lasted more than a year without apparent results, 
prompting many to conclude that the whole aﬀair was primarily meant as a show of 
force on the part of the government. 
At a celebration of the anniversary of the Islamic Hospital, one high-ranking 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a consultant to the ICCS openly voiced 
this criticism in his speech to the public, rhetorically targeting the regime: “Why 
do you think we are the enemy? We build hospitals, we help the people, we are 
the ones who can unite Jordan”. But not everybody can say things like that, my 
companion at the event made clear to me. Because this man is retired and because 
he is from an important family, he can. Ordinary people have to keep a low proﬁle 
as regards their views on the Brotherhood and the regime. This attitude was clearly 
reﬂected in the ICCS and other organisations closely linked to the Brotherhood. 
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
52
In my interview with a representative from Al-Afaf, for instance, it was evident that 
the organisation itself is aware of its image as a Muslim Brotherhood aﬃliation, 
but the representative clearly sought to downplay this connection: “Some people 
classify us in relation to the Muslim Brotherhood. But in Jordan, most people are 
Muslims. We are Muslims; we are not connected to any political Islamic movement”. 
Even in the ICCS, only a few people were willing to talk about this relationship. 
Most ICCS representatives I talked to either avoided talking about the Muslim 
Brotherhood or denied there was a connection. Only one person talked openly 
about it:  “In reality, the ICCS, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action 
Front have the same thoughts. Before, we used to be separate, every organisation 
working on its own, but now it all goes together – it all goes according to the Islamic 
movement. We have the same goals – there’s more cooperation”. One person said 
that, while there is deﬁnitely a connection between the ICCS, the Islamic Ac-
tion Front and the Brotherhood, this is a secret: “They have a consultancy board 
consisting of people from the Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the ICCS; it’s hidden, but they make the decisions”. He was worried about being 
under surveillance, and said that people’s phones are being tapped and many are 
constantly being questioned by the police. 
People from organisations not directly connected to the Brotherhood seemed much 
less wary of speaking up about the problematic relationships between the regime, the 
Brotherhood and the ICCS. A few organisations were downright critical of the con-
nection between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ICCS, often claiming that their 
social welfare activities function as a way of attracting people to the Islamic Action 
Front. As one person said: “The Muslim Brotherhood is well-organised and very good 
when it comes to charity. But their problem is that they have a political agenda”. The 
director of another organisation shared this view: “They ask people to vote for them, 
they have the money in one hand and the voting ballot in the other”. Among scholars, 
some supported this claim, arguing that these organisations simply buy poor people’s 
votes by oﬀering them services. According to one scholar, who preferred to remain 
anonymous, the activities and reach of the Islamic Centre Charity Society in Jordan 
was in fact one of the main reasons for the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Islamic Action Front in the 1989 elections. Furthermore, Musa Schteiwi from the 
Jordan Centre for Social Research told me that, in order to convince people to vote 
for the Islamic Action Front, members of the ICCS will call them, bring them to the 
polling stations in buses, make propaganda and even intimidate them. And, as he said, 
“they use religion in this process”. Likewise, when conducting ﬁeldwork during the 
2003 elections, Egbert Harmsen noted that ICCS workers were, to varying degrees, 
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engaged in election campaigns on behalf of the Islamic Action Front, and information 
material on the party was available in several centres (Harmsen 2007:72). 
The majority, however, refuted this accusation and stressed the non-political nature 
of most social welfare organisations, including the ICCS. One representative from 
UNRWA who has cooperated with the ICCS in the refugee camps said that she 
had never heard of any cases of the organisation laying down conditions for its 
help: “At least in the camps, all they do is help other people”. Some acknowledged 
the political stances of the ICCS and its connections to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Islamic Action Front, but said that they trust the organisation to be able 
to distinguish between this and their charity work. As one employee at the Queen 
Zein Institute for Development remarked, the organisation and the people working 
there might have a political agenda, but they do not ask people to vote for them 
when they do charity work. This is supported by research conducted by the political 
scientist Sami al-Khazendar, suggesting that workers in the ICCS are not primarily 
motivated by a desire for political inﬂuence, but by a wish to provide spiritual, ma-
terial and ﬁnancial aid to beneﬁciaries, and further, that the beneﬁciaries of ICCS 
activities do not necessarily see a connection between the services they receive 
from the ICCS and a vote for the Islamic Action Front (Harmsen 2007:205). On 
the other hand, this does not mean that there are no connections between the 
two, merely that the connections are perhaps not as explicit or conscious as some 
think. Although ICCS staﬀ may not ask beneﬁciaries directly to vote for them, 
beneﬁciaries’ satisfaction with the services received may be expressed in political 
support for the Islamic Action Front.
In the eyes of most people, be it researchers, organisational representatives or ordinary 
citizens, the ICCS is seen as a well-organised, democratic and transparent social welfare 
organisation, and many openly stated that the replacement of the ICCS board was 
a political game that had nothing to do with corruption. In fact, even a government 
representative from the National Aid Fund took the side of the ICCS, stating that, 
despite what the government says, he still thinks that the organisation does a good 
job. The director of one organisation said to me: 
They changed the director. But they didn’t do anything wrong – it’s a political 
issue. They are considered to be the social wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the government wants to weaken them. But the population supports 
them because they are honest, transparent, they tell you how they work, 
where the money goes. 
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Some argue that, in the end, the government’s charges of corruption could end up 
strengthening the Muslim Brotherhood and the ICCS, as people will sympathise 
with them: “People know that the government is more corrupt”, the researcher Oraib 
al-Rantawi noted somewhat sarcastically. While their religiosity is obviously not the 
only reason for the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and the ICCS, it plays 
an important role. As Bakr M. al-Hiyari expressed it: “The fact that they are Islamic 
makes people think that they are good and nice. Even if you are not religious, you 
are programmed to think that they are nice and good. The label is important. It gives 
them accept, credibility – sometimes over-credibility”. 
2.6  Concluding remarks
The almost 900 social welfare organisations in Jordan constitute a diverse group 
of organisations, each of which, in their own way, seek to provide support to 
disadvantaged people in the country. Overall, the group can be divided into six 
types of organisation: general social welfare organisations, women’s associations, 
cooperatives, royal organisations, youth organisations and international organisa-
tions. Typical activities include ﬁnancial and material aid, careactivities, education, 
vocational training, health services and income-generating projects. The majority 
of organisations reach out to a relatively small number of beneﬁciaries, while the 
royal organisations, the international organisations and a few others, such as the 
Islamic Centre Charity Society, count their beneﬁciaries in several thousands. In 
most organisations, a small group of members make up the organisation’s board 
and also work as volunteers implementing its activities. Some organisations em-
ploy one or two people to take care of administrative matters, while a few are run 
entirely by professional staﬀ. Most organisations base their income on membership 
fees and donations, often from local individuals and businesses. Not many seem to 
receive government support, and only a few receive any funding from international 
donors. 
Just as the social welfare organisations diﬀer in terms of organisational structures, 
participants and activities, they also diﬀer as regards the role of Islam. Some organisa-
tions are explicitly non-religious or even anti-religious, while others are inﬂuenced by 
religion in all they do and say. For the majority, however, this sharp divide between 
the religious and the non-religious does not make much sense. Rather than whether 
or not Islam plays a role for the organisations, their participants and activities, it is 
a question of how and in what ways it does so. The foregoing analysis has provided 
examples of some of those aspects to which Islam seems to be of particular relevance 
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to the organisations, namely rationale and strategies, motivations and relations with 
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.
For most organisations, Islam plays an important role as the underlying rationale for 
their engagement in social welfare. Based on stories and sayings of the Prophet Muham-
mad, as well as the Islamic concepts of thawab, sadaqa and zakat, a strong connection 
between Islam and social welfare is constructed. This understanding of social welfare 
and Islam as being closely connected inﬂuences the strategies and concrete activities 
of many organisations, but not necessarily as one might expect. Many scholars, as well 
as the representatives of more secular organisations such as the royal ones, assume that 
religiously inspired organisations have a very traditional and charity-oriented approach 
to social welfare. While some of the organisations studied here did present examples 
of this, many actually seem to have a more development-oriented approach. While 
this approach in many ways resembles that of Western development NGOs, it cannot 
be taken to be a simple rejection of traditional religious charity in favour of a secular 
approach. Rather, the organisations merge their understanding of development with 
Islamic aspects, thus creating a speciﬁcally Muslim approach to development. 
This approach is reﬂected in the organisations’ activities and practices. Frustrated 
with the limitations of traditional alms-giving, many organisations have shifted to 
micro-ﬁnance and income-generating projects, a shift that is often explained with a 
reference to the story about Muhammad who, instead of money, gives the poor boy 
an axe and tells him to go and cut some wood to sell.  Likewise, concepts such as 
women’s rights and empowerment are popular in almost all organisations, and while 
their implementation seems still to be limited by traditional religious and cultural 
gender practices in the majority of organisations, a few manage actually to integrate 
this discourse into practice, often using Islam as a tool in the process. Finally, whereas 
many organisations seem to focus on very traditional kinds of education, such as 
Quran recital and memorising, and arguably encourage passive rather than active 
participation, some organisations combine these activities with methods of criti-
cal thinking, problem-solving and discussion, creating a seemingly unproblematic 
synthesis between Islam and modern education.
For those implementing all these activities, Islam also plays a signiﬁcant role as a 
motivational factor. For a few people, their engagement in social welfare is simply 
a job like any other job, and they are primarily motivated by a need for economic 
gain. However, most people quote other, less tangible factors such as the atmosphere 
or the colleagues, often linking these factors to the religiosity of the organisation. 
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Many, in particular women, also cite a desire to be active and to play a role in soci-
ety, and they often use Islam as a tool to convince sceptical parents and husbands 
of their participation. Others say that their participation is a way to develop their 
personality and skills, while yet others say that the mere activity of doing charity is 
a reward and motivation in itself. Apart from these diﬀerent kinds of personal gain, 
many also mention religious obligations as an important motivational factor. As 
already noted, most people regard charity as an important part of Islam, and as such, 
involvement in social welfare activities becomes a way of pleasing God and ensuring 
a place in heaven. Not many mention da’wa, the duty to inform other about Islam, 
and nobody sees their involvement in social welfare activism in this light, at least 
not oﬃcially. In practice, however, missionary activities do appear to take place in a 
few organisations. Last but not least, for almost everybody, participation seems to 
be driven by a genuine wish to contribute to improving the lives of the people, and 
perhaps even improving society. 
Moving from the perspective of the individual organisations to the broader context, 
it becomes clear that Islam also plays a signiﬁcant role here, albeit in much more 
concrete terms.  While all civil society organisations in Jordan are subject to strict 
state control and surveillance, it is clear that some are subject to stricter control 
than others. Royal organisations most often enjoy a high degree of state support 
and organisational freedom, whereas organisations related to the Muslim Brother-
hood have an increasingly problematic relationship with the regime, mirroring the 
Brotherhood’s own troubled relations with it. One of the most obvious examples of 
this is the replacement of the ICCS executive board with a government-appointed 
board following charges of corruption in the organisation. A few organisations and 
scholars support the regime, adding to the charges that ICCS activities suppos-
edly function as ways of attracting votes for the Islamic Action Front. Most people, 
however, reject this argument and place themselves on the side of the ICCS and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which they see as democratic, transparent and honest. While 
their religiosity is not the only reason for this popularity, Islam does play a major 
role, creating a common frame of resonance and recognition. 
However, the ways in which Islam inﬂuences these organisations is one thing – an-
other is what kinds of Islam are exerting these inﬂuences. The religious discourses 
and practices of Muslim civil society actors cannot be described in simple terms: to 
say that someone is a Muslim or Islamic is not self-explanatory, but can mean a wide 
range of things. Thus, among Jordanian social welfare organisations, at least four 
diﬀerent kinds of Muslim discourse can be identiﬁed: a militant religious discourse, 
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a conservative discourse, a moderate discourse and liberal discourse.55 While an 
analysis of these discourses was not among the main aims of this initial study, but 
will be explored in more detail in later studies, a few preliminary considerations on 
the topic should nonetheless be included here. 
Not surprisingly, the militant discourse arguing for the need for violent jihad against 
heretical regimes was not visible in any of the social welfare organisations I visited. 
Recent years have witnessed the introduction of new anti-terror legislation, often 
explicitly aimed at catching individuals and groups adhering to such ideologies, and 
people supporting these views keep a very low proﬁle. Nonetheless, a few individuals 
did express their sympathies with people known to be associated with the militant 
Salaﬁ movement, such as Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqavi. 
The conservative discourse is much more popular and might in fact represent the most 
common interpretation of Islam among the social welfare organisations. Conservative 
Muslims generally profess a relatively literal interpretation of the Quran, emphasise 
the importance of rituals such as prayer, fasting and the correct clothing, and usually 
often oppose abortion, homosexuality as well as gender equality in a Western sense. 
Most accept ideas of democracy, but adapt these to their own traditionalist concep-
tions (Harmsen 2007:68). Examples of this discourse are found in organisations such 
as the Islamic Anwar al-Huda Women’s Association, the Urwa al-Wuthqa Welfare 
Association, the ICCS Dar al-Achram school and several ICCS centres.56  
The moderate discourse is characterised by being precisely that – moderate, in the 
sense that it is a position consciously situated between conservatives and liberals, 
sometimes with the stated goal of mediating between the two. While it still emphasises 
the importance and relevance of Islam to all aspects of life, it does so in a less ritualistic 
and formalistic manner than the conservatives. Likewise, it is open to concepts such as 
human rights and gender equality, but insists on a speciﬁcally Muslim interpretation 
of these. Examples are Al-Afaf, led by a member of the Muslim Centre Party, Al-Afaf, 
certain ICCS centres, Al-Farouq and to a certain degree Khawla Bint al-Azwar.57
55  Apart from these Muslim discourses, in Jordan we also ﬁnd other religious discourses, in particular Christian 
discourses, as well as various non-religious discourses. Since the current analysis deals with the role of Islam in 
civil society organisations, these discourses are not included in the above.
56  Apart from the social welfare organisations, this discourse is found among conservative Salaﬁs, in major parts 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, and in the missionary movement Jamayat al-Da’wa wal Tabligh.
57  On the political scene, moderates are found in certain parts of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action 
Front and the Muslim Centre Party (Hizb al-Wasat al-Islami). Furthermore, the initiative Amman Message, 
launched by King Abdallah and endorsed by more than 500 leading Muslim scholars all over the world, is also a 
clear example of a moderate discourse. For further information, see www.ammanmessage.com. 
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Finally, the religiously liberal discourse articulates Islam as a primarily private mat-
ter and as such not necessarily relevant to all aspects of life. Furthermore, according 
to this discourse, there is no conﬂict between Islam and concepts such as human 
rights and gender equality. In fact, whereas the moderates often interpret such con-
cepts from an Islamic point of view, it could be argued that liberals interpret Islam 
from the point of view of human rights or gender equality. Examples of the liberal 
discourse are relatively few, but they can be found among some royal development 
organisations such as Tkiyet Um Ali and the Young Muslim Women’s Association. 
Among these organisations, Islam primarily plays a role in relation to the motivation 
of individual participants. However, some of the organisations also make use of Islam 
in their activities when deemed opportune. For instance, while otherwise completely 
non-religious, the Jordan River Foundation uses verses from the Quran when training 
people in issues of child safety58. 
As has been hinted at above, Islam is not a homogeneous entity but rather a plethora 
of diﬀerent discourses and practices – a diversity that is reﬂected in the group of 
civil society organisations studied here. It is my hope that the preceding empirical 
examples and descriptions of Jordanian social welfare organisations and Islam may 
provide a useful starting point for further analysis of the diverse religious discourses 
and practices found in Jordanian civil society.
58  Naturally, some organisations fall outside these four categories. One example is the youth organisation Suna’a 
al-Hayah. On one hand, many of the organisation’s members prefer not to shake hands with the opposite sex, 
and many activities are gender segregated, leading one to assume a rather conservative, ritualistic understanding 
of Islam. On the other hand, the young people have very tolerant attitudes towards diﬀerent interpretations of 
Islam, a typical characteristic of more liberal discourses. One young man told me: “Islam is not only about how 
you dress, it’s about what you believe in and what you give to the community”.
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3. New youth organisations and Islam in Egypt
Recently, a new group of actors has emerged in Egyptian civil society. During the last 
ﬁve to ten years, an increasing number of primarily urban upper middle class young 
people have started engaging in voluntary social welfare activities and forming their 
own organisations. These organisations distinguish themselves from other Egyptian 
youth organisations, as well as from more traditional religious organisations. As such 
they present a new phenomenon. They engage in social welfare activities, but do so in 
other ways than many traditional social welfare organisations. They are established and 
dominated by young people, but while many other youth organisations have a secular 
or non-religious approach, for these organisations Islam plays an important role. 
Based on concrete empirical studies, this chapter oﬀers an analysis of some of these new 
religiously oriented youth organisations. In particular, aspects of identity and meaning 
construction, participants, practices and relationships will be explored, paying special 
attention to the role of Islam. The ﬁrst section provides a short introduction to the 
history and context of civil society in Egypt as well as important Muslim actors within 
this ﬁeld. This is followed by an introduction to the group of new youth organisations. 
The third section deals with the rationale, strategies and activities of these organisations. 
What are the problems they identify in Egyptian society, and how do they approach 
them? Here, three approaches are presented by participants in the youth organisa-
tions, namely the importance of a development-oriented approach to social welfare, 
a connection between youth and voluntarism, and ﬁnally a combination of Islam and 
modern management. The analysis will pay particular attention to the role of Islam in 
the formulation and implementation of these approaches. The fourth section takes a 
closer look at the participants in the organisations. Who are they, and what are the 
motivations of their involvement? Finally, the ﬁfth section places the youth organisa-
tions back in their context by discussing relationships between the organisations and 
the regime. The sixth section sums up the most important ﬁndings of the study and 
presents further perspectives on this new group of civil society actors. 
3.1  Islam and civil society in Egypt
3.1.1  History and context of Egyptian civil society
Like Jordan, Egypt can be characterised as having a semi-authoritarian form of 
rule with democratic elements. The country is ruled by a regime headed by Hosni 
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Mubarak, president since 1981, and his governing party, the National Democratic 
Party. Mubarak has institutionalised a party system, which is made up by the Na-
tional Democratic Party in the centre and an array of small opposition parties to its 
left and right.59 The president and the ruling party have the predominant power, the 
opposition parties being weak and divided and not posing any credible alternatives 
to the government party (Albrecht 2005). There are many restrictions on political 
participation, as well as on the formation of new parties in Egypt. Furthermore, the 
Emergency Law60 restricts many basic rights of citizens, for example, by allowing the 
arrest of citizens without charge and restricting the right to freedom of association 
(CIVICUS 2006:39-50). 
Instead of political parties, opposition is primarily expressed through political pressure 
groups in civil society such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Kifaya movement. 
Unlike Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is an illegal organisation and is 
not recognised as a political party.61 However, members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
are known to express their views publicly and openly, although they do not explicitly 
identify themselves as members of the organisation, and in elections they typically 
compete as independents or members of secular parties. A more recent but similarly 
important movement is Kifaya or the Egyptian Movement for Change, established 
in 2004 as a broad, grassroots coalition primarily concerned to oppose President Mu-
barak’s presidency and the Emergency Law. It draws its support from across Egypt’s 
political spectrum, including Nasserites, Liberals and Leftists, as well as members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Kifaya is famous throughout the Middle East for categori-
cally crossing former “red lines” by arranging mass demonstrations and protests that 
attract a large and broad mass of supporters (Browers 2007). 
Partly because of the ongoing struggle between the regime and the Muslim Brother-
hood and militant Islamic groups, Islam has always played an important role in the 
public sphere of this predominantly Muslim society.62 Since President Sadat, the 
Egyptian regime has used Islam to legitimise its rule. It has promoted the Islamisation 
of the public space and the educational system,63 and has allowed members of the 
59  The most important of these are the Wafd Party, which espouses a liberal ideology, the leftist Tagammu Party, 
and the Nasserite Party which embraces a pan-Arab Nasserite ideology. 
60  The Emergency Law has been in eﬀect since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. With the Egyptian 
government’s recent launch of an anti-terrorism law, many human rights organisations fear that the situation in 
the country might even worsen.
61  Current Egyptian law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion.
62  Muslims constitute approximately 90 percent of the total population.
63  For analyses of Islam and the educational system, see e.g. Starrett 1998.
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Muslim Brotherhood to participate in elections to professional syndicates and the 
parliament. However, at the same time the regime has carried out several attacks on 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders and activists, and the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
prohibited from operating as a political party (Meital 2006).  
A similar ambiguity characterises the relationship between the regime and civil society 
organisations that display a clear religiosity. Due to the threat that these organisations 
might pose to the power and legitimacy of the Egyptian state, diﬀerent Egyptian 
governments have tried to contain their power and inﬂuence. Under Mubarak, as 
under earlier regimes, the government has used a policy mix of repression and co-
optation towards the diﬀerent civil society organisations. Through diﬀerent legal 
mechanisms, it has tried to co-opt organisations in order to make use of their resources 
and mass base for its own interest (AbdelRahman 2004). Civil society activists have 
long tried to persuade the state to loosen its grip on civil society, but so far no major 
improvements have been achieved. Muslim civil society organisations are tolerated 
by the state, but only if they manage to keep within the red lines. For example, they 
are not allowed to practice politics, and no organisation can openly admit to having 
connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Compared to other Middle Eastern countries, Egypt has a relatively long tradition of 
civil society organisations. By the middle of the nineteenth century, shortly after the 
founding of the modern Egyptian state, organised charity associations and mutual 
aid societies began to appear (LaTowsky 1997). The ﬁrst organisations were estab-
lished primarily by foreigners serving foreign nationals and the Christian population 
in Egypt. Examples of these are the French Benevolent Association, established in 
1865, and the St. Vincent de Paul Society, established in 1853. A few decades later, 
and very much inspired by these organisations, the ﬁrst Muslim and Coptic social 
welfare organisations started to appear. Among the largest were the Coptic Associa-
tion dating from 1891 and the Islamic Charity Organisation established in 1896. 
Later, from the 1920s to the 1950s, a sizable community of private associations in 
Egypt’s major cities, comprising general charity, religious welfare, cultural and mutual 
aid societies, were established by migrants and a small but expanding middle class 
of urban professionals and civil servants (LaTowsky 1997). Among these was the 
Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928. 
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Graph I: Growth of civil society organisations in Egypt64
As with other statistical information on Egypt, there is no directory giving the 
exact number of civil society organisations today.65 Depending on the deﬁnitions 
used, the total number is estimated to be somewhere between 14,000 and 22,000 
(AbdelRahman 2004:44, Clark 2004:50),66 of which the majority, or 80 percent, 
are found in urban areas, especially in the Cairo governorate (CIVICUS 2006:29). 
Although less than half of all organisations are said to be active (AbdelRahman 
2004:121), this still makes Egypt among the countries in the Middle East and 
South with the largest civil societies (LaTowsky 1997). Membership of Egyptian 
civil society organisations in 1992 was approximately 3 million, and the same year 
the number of beneﬁciaries was estimated at approximately 5.5 million Egyptian 
citizens (Clark 2004:50). 
Social welfare organisations constitute the vast majority of all civil society organi-
sations in Egypt. Organisations in this group include charities, zakat committees, 
development NGOs, cooperatives, orphanages, training centres, schools, clinics 
and hospitals, all focusing their services and activities on the country’s many poor.67 
Other important actors in civil society are the cultural, sports and scout organisa-
64  Source: AbdelRahman 2004
65  In general, the statistical information on civil society organisations in Egypt is both outdated and deﬁcient, 
making it diﬃcult to relate ﬁndings on the new youth organisations to information on other civil society actors.
66  In some studies, professional associations, such as professional syndicates and trade unions, and even political 
parties are included, while in other studies the number includes only social and cultural organisations.
67  Egypt suﬀers from widespread poverty as well as a high rate of illiteracy. 43.9 percent of the population live 
on less than 2 dollars a day, and 44 percent of the adult population are illiterate (CIVICUS 2006:44).
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tions, who are engaged in recreational activities such as sport, culture, art, heritage, 
music, education and science. The more than 1,000 youth centres distributed all over 
Egypt and supervised by the Ministry of Youth represent one of the largest groups 
within this category. 
Among the strongest civil society actors in Egypt are the country’s 22 profes-
sional syndicates, with a total membership of approximately 3.5 million people. 
Due to the general weakness of political parties, much political activity has been 
transferred to the syndicates (Fahmy 1998:551). A quite diﬀerent, but similarly 
outspoken and politically involved group of civil society actors are the small and 
rather weak group of advocacy organisations, engaged in matters such as the envi-
ronment, human rights or women’s issues. The Egyptian Organisation for Human 
Rights (EOHR) and the Arab Women’s Solidarity Association are among the 
most important actors here. These organisations have strong links with another 
important group of actors, namely international donor organisations and institu-
tions, which provide funds and development assistance. Because of the country’s 
long history of foreign presence and involvement, as well as the central role and 
location of Cairo in the region, Egypt is among the Middle Eastern countries with 
the largest presence of foreign and international organisations and institutions. 
Among these are UN agencies, the World Bank, Care and Save the Children, as 
well as some Muslim NGOs. 
Finally, Egyptian civil society also hosts a number of movements, informal networks 
and community groups. On a smaller scale we ﬁnd mosque congregational groups, 
da’wa movements and personal networks for the collection of money for charities. 
On a larger scale, there is the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya and the 
more ﬂuid and loosely structured Salaﬁ movement. 
3.1.2  Important Muslim actors in Egyptian civil society
As several recent studies have shown, Islam plays a signiﬁcant – and most likely in-
creasing – role in Egyptian civil society.68 But here, as in Jordan, Muslim civil society 
actors do not constitute a homogenous group. Instead, they are to be found among a 
wide range of diﬀerent types of civil society actors. As in Jordan, some of the strongest 
and most inﬂuential Muslim actors are found among the professional associations, 
the social welfare organisations and the more ﬂuid category of movements, informal 
68  See e.g. Sullivan 1994, Ibrahim et al. 1996, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, Bayat 2000, Wickham 2002 and 
Clark 2004. 
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networks and community groups.69 Islam plays a signiﬁcant role in the professional 
syndicates because of the strong inﬂuence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which domi-
nates the councils of the ﬁve most active syndicates, namely the doctors, engineers, 
pharmacists, scientists and lawyers (AbdelRahman 2004, CIVICUS 2006). As for 
social welfare organisations, a very large proportion of these are said to be Muslim 
(Clark 2004).70 This group comprises a wide variety of organisations, including 
small-scale local mosque-related charities and community-based associations, large 
organisations with branches all over the country, zakat committees, schools, clinics, 
orphanages, women’s organisations, etc. Al-Jama’iyya al-Shar’iyya, dating from 1912, 
and the more recent Mahmoud Mosque Association established in 1976 are among 
the largest and most inﬂuential.  
A very recent but increasingly popular phenomenon is the movement surrounding 
the young Egyptian “accountant-turned-preacher” Amr Khaled and other new preach-
ers like him.71 While still working as an accountant, Amr Khaled started preaching 
in mosques and private clubs in the early 1990s. His audience grew rapidly, and 
today his shows are broadcast widely on a number of satellite channels, including 
the popular religiously oriented Iqra channel. His main audience in Egypt is young 
people, in particular young women, from the upper-middle class, but his messages 
reach millions of young Muslims all over the Middle East, as well as in Europe and 
North America. Recently, Amr Khaled has been attacked from many sides. Liber-
als and secularists accuse him of being too conservative, while traditional sheikhs 
and the Salaﬁ movement ﬁnd him too moderate (Atia 2005). In 2002 the Egyptian 
government is said to have forced Amr Khaled to leave Egypt, but he continued his 
increasingly popular shows from abroad. Lately, his popularity seems to be decreas-
ing in Egypt, whether from a fear of government retaliation or simply because he no 
longer possesses the charm of novelty. However, rather than representing an isolated 
phenomenon, it seems that Amr Khaled has become the catalyst for a much broader 
trend facilitated by new media such as the internet and satellite TV, and showing, 
among other things, the growing number of preachers with a similar style and message. 
69  Due to the general lack of statistics ﬁelding this area, it is diﬃcult to determine the exact number of Muslim 
civil society organisations. Also, as noted above, the question remains on what basis we determine whether an 
organisation is Muslim or not. According to Kandil (cf. Clark 2004: 50), so-called “Islamic NGOs” constituted 
approximately 43 percent of all Egyptian civil society organisations in Egypt in 1991, and some scholars set the 
number even higher than that. For comparison, the number was only about 16 percent in the 1960s and 30 percent 
in the 1970s (AbdelRahman 2004:138).
70  Christian constitute approximately ten percent of the total Egyptian population, and naturally a considerable 
number of Christian organisations are found among the group of social welfare organisations. However, since 
focus of this study is on Islam and civil society, they will not be included in the analysis. 
71  Other similar Egyptian popular preachers are Umar Abd al-Kaﬁ and Khalid al-Jindi (Bayat 2007:149).
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This movement, often referred to as “Islam light” or “air-conditioned Islam” by both 
critics and adherents (Haenni and Tammam 2003), is characterised by the fact that 
its spokespersons are lay people who speak an easily understandable colloquial Arabic 
rather than the standard Arabic spoken by the traditional sheikhs. Their style is soft 
and compassionate, not disciplinary and strict. As Amr Khaled has put it: “My main 
concern is to make young people love religion instead of fearing it”.72 These preachers 
do not dwell on rigorously detailed rituals and regulations, which are often seen as 
irrelevant and incomprehensible to many young people. Instead they focus on how 
to reconcile Islam with a modern life-style (Bayat 2007:151-5). 
The movement has inspired young people all over Egypt to establish their own organi-
sations, and it also had an inﬂuence on some already existing organisations. In line 
with Amr Khaled and similar lay preachers, the young people in these organisations 
believe in making Islam a natural part of their and their target groups’ daily lives. 
Introducing a new approach of Islam and voluntarism, the organisations combine 
conventional social welfare activities with a human development approach, as well as 
activities associated with advocacy and awareness-raising aimed at mobilising young 
people to participate in civil society. These organisations represent a minor but grow-
ing part of Egyptian civil society. And because of their distinct constituency, their 
strong emphasis on development and their new and somehow diﬀerent understand-
ing and application of Islam, they represent an interesting focus for a study of Islam 
and civil society in Egypt. 
In total, nine religiously oriented youth organisations were studied in depth during 
the ﬁeldwork period: Alashanik Ya Baladi, Bayan, Boraq, Mazeed, Misr Shoryan 
al-Ata’a, Resala, Sama, Suna’a al-Hayah and Zedny.73 In order to relate these youth 
organisations to the broader ﬁeld of social welfare organisations in Egypt, interviews 
with participants from ﬁve more traditional Muslim social welfare organisations 
were conducted. In addition, I visited two cultural Muslim organisations and three 
semi-governmental organisations, all targeting youth. These interviews provide an 
insight into how participants in other, more traditional institutions and civil society 
organisations view the new youth organisations. Finally, three more secular-oriented 
youth organisations were studied in order to relate the religiously oriented youth 
organisations to the general movement of youth and voluntarism in Egypt.
72  Interview with Al-Ahram Weekly; cf. Wise p. 57.
73  Though there deﬁnitely are more than nine youth organisations in Cairo (I estimate the number at a maximum 
of twenty organisations at the time of my ﬁeldwork), the organisations in this study were the most famous among 
the people I talked to.
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3.2  The new youth organisations: an introduction to the ﬁeld
As noted already, this group of youth organisations is a very recent phenomenon in 
Egypt. All the organisations in this study were established around 2000 or later. The 
majority of them started as student initiatives at universities in Cairo. One example 
is Resala, which is the oldest and largest of the organisations in this study. Resala 
started as a student initiative at the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University in 1999. 
Initially, its activities were blood donation, college services and visits to orphanages, 
nursing homes and hospitals. In 2000, a rich businessman donated a piece of land 
to the organisation, and the members decided to register Resala as a formal NGO. 
Today, it is the largest voluntary organisation in the Arab world, with approximately 
50,000 volunteers and 25 branches all over Egypt. Compared to Resala most other 
new youth organisations are much smaller in size and reach, but they have many 
similarities with this pioneer organisation when it comes to organisation, activities, 
participants, etc. 
Like other so-called voluntary civic associations, the new youth organisations are 
subject to a number of very extensive rules and regulations, outlined in NGO Law 
84 of 2002. All organisations must register with the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs, where 
they are classiﬁed according to their activities. They are restricted to working in this 
ﬁeld of activities and cannot widen or change their scope without prior permission.74 
Furthermore, they are required to have a board of members of four, including at least 
a president, vice-president, treasurer and secretary (CIVICUS 2006). 
Most of the activities of these organisations fall under the category of social welfare. 
While some organisations are specialised in ﬁelds such as health care or human 
development, others direct their eﬀorts to the development of certain geographical 
areas, carrying out projects and activities of very diﬀerent kinds. Yet others pursue 
a wide variety of activities at diﬀerent geographical locations. Generally speaking, 
they address two groups of people, poor families and young people. In some cases 
the target groups are poor families in general, but most organisations try to direct 
their eﬀorts at particularly vulnerable groups, such as women, orphans, students, 
74  The thirteen categories of activity are: social assistance; religious, scientiﬁc and cultural services; maternity 
and child care; family welfare; special categories and handicapped welfare; old-age welfare; friendship among 
peoples; family planning; social protection; management and administration; prison inmates’ welfare; literacy; 
and multiple services (Clark 2004:49). One exception is the large group of so-called Community Development 
Organisations (CDAs), registered under a separate category at the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs. Unlike organisations 
in the other categories, they are allowed to carry out a wide range of activities and services. Some have strong ties 
with the state authorities, they receive substantial subsidies from the government and have volunteer boards, 
though the staﬀ are usually paid by the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs (LaTowsky 1997).
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the disabled or the elderly. Two organisations, Bayan and Zedny, are special cases. 
Their beneﬁciaries are not speciﬁcally poor people, but young students and college 
graduates, primarily from the middle class, who lack the necessary skills to enter the 
labour market.75 
The board members are those responsible for the daily management and running of 
the organisation. Other participants are the volunteers and the ordinary members 
who participate in the activities, sometimes paying an annual membership fee to the 
organisation. Most of the organisations have a small headquarters from which they 
plan and organise their activities. The majority of these headquarters are found in 
the neighbourhoods where most of the members and volunteers live or where the 
universities are situated, often middle or upper middle-class residential areas such as 
Nasr City and Heliopolis. Alashanik Ya Baladi is an exception. Though most of the 
members and volunteers are from the upper middle class, their headquarters are in a 
very poor neighbourhood in Old Cairo. Two of the organisations I studied, Zedny 
and Bayan, work through larger and more traditional mosque-related Muslim social 
welfare organisations, which provide them with oﬃces and lecture facilities. 
The NGO law permits seven possible ways for civil society organisations to obtain 
revenues, namely members’ subscription, fees for services rendered, waqf revenues, 
income from lottery sale and exhibitions, donations from indigenous sources, assist-
ance from foreign donors and Egyptian government aid (Clark 2004:59). According 
to a recent survey among Egyptian social welfare organisations, membership fees 
represent the prime source of funding, with donations from indigenous sources being 
the second most important source (CIVICUS 2006:36). Religious social welfare 
organisations, and in particular Muslim organisations, are the most successful at 
raising funds and donations locally (Clark 2004:60). This is also the case for the 
group of youth organisations studied here. Like other religious organisations, they 
do not seem to have any diﬃculties in attracting donations from private Egyptians, 
and they do very little advertising for their organisations in order to attract funds.76 
All but one organisation rely primarily if not solely on donations from individual 
Egyptians, many of which are given to the organisations during Ramadan, in the 
form of zakat al-ﬁtr.77 Furthermore, revenues from activities such as attendee fees 
75  For a discussion of the beneﬁciaries of Muslim organisations in Egypt, see e.g. Clark 2004. 
76  As pointed out by several recent studies (e.g. Daly 2004, CIVICUS 2007), the public entrust religious 
organisations in particular with their money.
77  Zakat al-ﬁtr is a duty on every Muslim to pay a share of his or her wealth immediately after the holy month of 
Ramadan to bless his or her fast (Daly 2004: 55).
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or revenue from the sale of second-hand clothes represent an important income 
for these organisations. However, most activities do not require large funds. All 
organisations rely almost solely on voluntary labour; only half of them have salaried 
staﬀ, and in most cases these constitute only a minority of the total number of 
participants. Besides, what the organisations need in materials (e.g. food, clothes, 
books, etc.) is often given to them as donations. In fact, these organisations receive 
many in-kind donations, and because of the many restrictions and extensive bu-
reaucratic procedures related to all monetary aid, some organisations even prefer 
in-kind donations to in-cash donations.
In the following pages, I will explore the group of religiously-oriented youth or-
ganisations further. While looking at various aspects of discourses and practices, 
I attempt to answer questions such as: Why and how do the organisations engage 
in social welfare and human development activities? Who is the primary group of 
participants? What is the relationship of these organisations to the state? What is 
the role of religion in all this? And ﬁnally, do they represent a new movement in 
Egyptian civil society?
3.3  Islam, development and voluntarism: solutions for society
Usually, participants in movements and organisations direct their work towards the 
solution of certain problems, identiﬁed as the most pertinent in society (Benford and 
Snow 2000). In the youth organisations studied here, three types of problem were 
repeatedly named. The ﬁrst has to do with the poor and unprivileged. Like other 
social welfare organisations, participants in the youth organisations see poverty and 
poverty-related problems such as illiteracy, unemployment and illnesses as the pri-
mary problems in Egyptian society. One of the female volunteers expressed a rather 
pessimistic view of the socio-economic situation in Egypt:
If we start counting the problems in society, we will not ﬁnish today. There 
are educational problems, health problems, poverty problems, environmental 
problems. Some families seem ﬁne, but when you go to their homes, you 
will see that they are in desperate need for help. 
Several participants pointed out that problems of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment 
and illness should be addressed by the state, which they blamed for not living up 
to its responsibilities in serving the needs of the population through the provision 
of basic services. One board member put it this way: “Why has this happened? 
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From my point of view it is because of the reluctance of the government to do 
something for society”. However, several people added that it is not solely the 
responsibility of the state and society. The individual needs to take responsibility 
of his or her own life. This is especially the case when it comes to young people. 
According to many, young people have the opportunity to change their situation 
and take responsibility for their own lives instead of just relying on the support 
of their family.
The second problem identiﬁed by the participants has to do precisely with the present 
state of Egyptian youth. First of all, for the majority of young people prospects for 
the future are bleak, and there is a lack of job opportunities for young graduates 
from higher education institutes, colleges and universities. Many young people 
complain that they are not able to gain economic independence from their parents 
and create families of their own due to a lack of income opportunities. One of the 
reasons for this is that the graduates’ qualiﬁcations do not match those required 
in most private companies, and for most young people employment in the public 
sector is not considered an option, primarily due to the extremely low salaries. 
This is particularly critical for young people from the lower and middle strata of 
the middle classes. Unlike the upper middle class and the elite, they cannot aﬀord 
private universities and do not have the connections necessary to obtain access to 
jobs in the private sector. 
A related problem is the state of indiﬀerence and apathy among Egyptian youth. Ac-
cording to several participants, young Egyptians are not participating in or contribut-
ing to society. “Our youth waste time doing nothing instead of helping their society”, 
as one board member put it. This criticism was especially directed at educated and 
resourceful young people from the middle and upper classes. One female volunteer 
in Sama noted: “When people go through their career, they don’t do anything to 
help other people. But when you’re young, you have the energy.” The young people 
themselves are to blame for this situation, but at the same time, the “system” and the 
older generation are seen as excluding them from society.
The third problem identiﬁed by the participants concerns beliefs and values. Ac-
cording to many, there is a general lack of religious ethics and morals in society. 
Religion is constantly being misunderstood, and people are not aware of the true 
meaning of Islam. When they look around, the young people see a society that does 
not comply with the precepts of Islam. A male volunteer from Suna’a al-Hayah 
put it this way:
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It is well known that we in Egypt are not mature enough. You see it in the 
streets and how people are driving. […] Also, there are no borders between 
girls and boys, and this doesn’t comply with Islam. The same is true as regards 
relations with girls, smoking cigarettes and using drugs. [..] They are not fol-
lowing the book. We want to inspire people around us with these ideas.
The participants want to “inspire people” to follow the religious instructions. This 
goes for poor people, the beneﬁciaries of their projects, as well as for other young 
people. According to the president of one of the organisations, Egyptian youth need 
religious role models. Everyday life and experiences are not addressed properly by the 
sheikhs and imams of religious institutions in Egypt.
I want the youth to see some role models, because we as a country lack the 
models. I am not judging anyone, but the role models are not good enough. 
They might be very good at preaching in the mosque, but when they go 
out it is like they are disconnected. What I’m trying to do is this “out”. We 
deal with the Islamic trails but we do not preach them.
In sum, the overall mission of the youth organisations in this study is two-fold but 
intertwined: They aim to assist poor and underprivileged people in Egyptian society, 
and they wish to engage young Egyptians in this process. Furthermore, they identify 
a general lack of religious ethics and morals, which is one of the reasons for problems 
facing Egyptian society today. Three solutions to these problems are put forward: i) a 
combination of Islam and social welfare; ii) youth voluntarism; and iii) the creation 
of a new role model combining Islamic values and behaviour with modern ideas of 
management. What all of these solutions have in common is an insistence on Islam 
as an important frame and guideline. 
3.3.1  Islam and social welfare
In the youth organisations I studied, Islam was articulated as closely connected with 
charity, good deeds and social justice. According to participants, Islamic concepts 
such as zakat, sadaqa and thawab78 provide the general guidelines for achieving social 
justice. By giving part of one’s wealth to the poor through zakat and sadaqa, privi-
leged Muslims are able to help less privileged groups in society, thus contributing to a 
fairer distribution of wealth and resources. In return they will receive the appropriate 
rewards from God, or thawab, in this life and in their afterlife. This behaviour was 
78  See Chapter 2 for further information on and discussion of these concepts.
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often illustrated by stories about the Prophet Muhammad. Like more traditional 
Muslim social welfare organisations, the youth organisations see it as their role to 
channel wealth  from the rich (including themselves) to the poor in society through 
zakat and sadaqa. 
But Islam has more to oﬀer than that: it also provides the framework and guidelines for 
the implementation of concrete activities aimed at helping the poor and unprivileged. 
Many highlighted the deeds of the Prophet. As a board member in Bayan put it: “I’m 
trying to get to the heart of the hadith and implement it.” Furthermore, some of the 
organisations have activities with a profound religious content, though such activities 
are deﬁnitely fewer than in more traditional Muslim welfare organisations. One example 
is Alashanik Ya Baladi’s programme “Ethics and Morals”, which targets poor women in 
the neighbourhoods of Old Cairo and in which the organisation “oﬀers various religious 
programs to elevate the ethics and morals of the community”79, including among other 
things, teaching of the Quran, explanations of Quranic verses and stories and actions 
of the Prophet. One female volunteer explained the purpose of the programme as giv-
ing the women “a deeper understanding of Islam – how to treat others”. According to 
participants in several organisations, many poor people are ignorant and do not know 
the true Islam. By being good role models and telling others about Islam and the right 
ethical and moral behaviour, young people believe that problems related to the lack 
of religious ethics and morals will lessen. Furthermore, poverty will decrease, because 
people will take more responsibility for their own and their families’ lives. 
Poverty and poverty-related problems are addressed by a large percentage of Egypt’s 
civil society organisations. The many social welfare organisations, including the large 
group of religious organisations, oﬀer services for the poor and underprivileged. 
However, according to many of the young people engaged in the youth organisations, 
many of these eﬀorts are not eﬀective enough. One reason is that most organisations 
in Egypt have a purely charitable approach and as such “just fulﬁl the needs of people” 
without searching for the roots of the problems.80 Instead, the young people argue 
for a more development-oriented approach, replacing the traditional and short-term 
79  www.ayb-sd.org
80  This argument is supported by a recent study of civil society in Egypt. Although there has been a general move 
from charity to development, most civil society organisations in Egypt have a conventional top-down charity 
approach to poverty alleviation (CIVICUS 2006: 64). My visits to more traditional Muslim social welfare 
organisations conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. While some organisations, mainly larger ones like the Mahmoud Mosque 
Association, have recently started supplementing their charity projects with projects of a more development-oriented 
approach, such as micro-ﬁnance and vocational training, most small-scale Muslim social welfare organisations 
are engaged in traditional almsgiving and basic service provision.
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almsgiving and service provision with longer term achievements and self-sustainability 
for the people involved. One male volunteer in Misr Shoryan al-Ata’a stressed the 
diﬀerence between traditional charitable activities and activities of a more develop-
mental character, such as those of most new youth organisations:
Charity is just fulﬁlling the needs of people who are in need, like people who 
don’t have a stable ﬁnancial situation, people who need care, either medical 
or social – they are fulﬁlling it, without any idea of the origin of that need 
and what are the problems. The other level, the sustainable development 
concept, is searching for the reason. Why are these people in need?
For the participants in the youth organisations, charitable activities are not enough to 
solve the problems facing Egyptian society. Some went so far as saying that “charity is 
creating passive communities”, as the president of Zedny put it. According to almost 
all the participants I talked to, there is a need for another approach aimed at longer 
term and sustainable development. However, they did not always have the same under-
standing of the concept of development. Some pointed to the physical environment 
of the people. For example, the chairman of Misr Shoryan al-Ata’a conceptualised 
development as “improving the environment – that is living standards, sewage systems, 
employment opportunities and standards of schools”. But the majority stressed that 
development is more about changing people’s minds and self-understanding: “When 
the humans understand that they don’t need the charity – that is development”. There 
seemed to be general agreement over the positive connotations of phrases such as 
capacity-building and sustainable development. More speciﬁcally, board members 
and volunteers mentioned vocational training, micro-ﬁnance and human capital 
development as some of the activities that foster longer term development. 
Islam was often used to justify an approach based on development rather than char-
ity by referring to stories about the Prophet or to Amr Khaled’s ideas of “faith-based 
development” (see below). But proverbs from other cultural contexts, such as the 
Chinese, were also used to emphasise and explain why development is the right ap-
proach. In the statement below, the Muslim duty to help the needy is combined with 
a Chinese proverb to justify a development-oriented approach to social welfare: 
I believe in the Chinese proverb: “Don’t give a man a ﬁsh, but teach him 
how to ﬁsh.” Charity delivers the stuﬀ, but it doesn’t teach. You only help 
people stay the same way and not improve. But I do charity during Ramadan. 
In Islam you have to do charity. But Islam also says that you have to ﬁnd the 
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neediest family and help him in the best way – not just with money, but to 
teach him how to build his life.
In practice, many of the activities carried out by the youth organisations are develop-
ment-oriented, especially when compared to the majority of other religiously ori-
ented social welfare organisations. Health and environmental awareness campaigns, 
vocational training programmes, micro-ﬁnance activities and human development 
courses are examples of some of these activities. One organisation, Zedny, even tries 
to spread and propagate the development approach among more traditional social 
welfare organisations through a so-called NGO Club, in which organisations are 
trained in how to plan, manage and carry out projects and activities. The president 
explained their aim with such activities this way:
We are trying to push the NGOs to work in development – even if it is 
charity. Even if it is charity, we can transform all the charity projects to 
be development projects. It is not necessary to do one hundred percent 
development projects, but the development elements should be in the 
charity projects.
But according to many participants, activities of a more developmental character are 
often more diﬃcult to organise and implement. For volunteers with no training or 
experience in the ﬁeld, charity activities, such as distributions of clothes and food 
or the provision of basic medical services, are a lot easier to carry out. Conversely, 
activities of a more developmental character require both knowledge and training. 
Furthermore, development projects are often met with scepticism by the beneﬁciaries. 
In the following extract, a female volunteer in Zedny reproduces what she claimed is a 
common discussion between volunteers and beneﬁciaries: “If you go to someone and 
tell her: ‘I am going to make a project and you are going to work in the project and 
earn your own money and not just wait for us to come and give you money’, she will 
say: ‘No, I don’t have the time, I don’t have the energy. Just give me the money.’”
 
Though obviously sometimes diﬃcult in practice, the participants seemed to be very 
aware of not reproducing traditional patterns of patronage between giver and receiver. 
Instead, they emphasised respect and equality when talking about their beneﬁciar-
ies. One example is the second-hand clothes exhibition project run by many of the 
organisations. Instead of giving out the clothes for free, the organisations involved in 
this activity have decided to sell the clothes to poor people at a very favourable price. 
One female volunteer from Boraq justiﬁed this approach: “We collect used clothes 
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and sell them to poor people for a low price. Why don’t we just give it to them? We 
want to give people the opportunity to choose what they like – feeling that he or she 
is buying like any other normal person.” Furthermore, many participants used words 
such as “development” and “empowerment” when talking about the beneﬁciaries 
of their projects and activities, and they seemed to agree that the individual should 
always be the starting point of every eﬀort. Instead of just providing basic services, 
the youth organisations aim to help people to break out of their poverty by changing 
their attitudes: “We need to change the way people think. We need to change them 
from sitting and waiting for someone with a solution to trying to create their own 
solution for their own problems. […] We want to change the people themselves, the 
way they think.” However, sometimes the focus on changing individuals’ attitudes 
and ways of thinking had a patronising ring to it: “When dealing with the [poor] 
people, we notice if they are behaving particularly badly [so] we bring knowledgeable 
people to tell them more about life and religion.” 
Despite all the talk of long-term and sustainable development, many of the participants 
agreed that Egyptian society needs both charity and development. In fact, many of 
the new youth organisations also engage in traditional charity activities similar to 
those carried out by other social welfare organisations. Examples of such activities 
are the provision of health services, the distribution of food bags among people in 
poor areas and the sale of second-hand clothes. During my ﬁeldwork, I participated in 
some of these charitable activities. One was the so-called Clothes Exhibition Project 
mentioned earlier, an activity carried out by several of the organisations. This particular 
event took place in the poor neighbourhood of Ezbet El Hagana in the outskirts of 
Cairo. Before the actual clothes sale, the organisation had spent months collecting, 
sorting and cleaning clothes that had been donated to the organisation by individual 
Egyptians. The following passage is an excerpt from my ﬁeld notes that day:
Mohamed and I followed the truck though Nasr City and towards Ezbet 
El Hagana. What we saw was one of Cairo’s many poor suburbs. The streets 
were not paved. And everywhere dogs were rooting for food in the many 
piles of garbage. Most of the houses looked half-ﬁnished and none of them 
were plastered or painted. 
A large room, part of a mosque-related social welfare organisation, was the 
place where the exhibition was going to be held. The building was buzzing 
with activity; people, and especially children, were running up and down 
the stairs. On the second ﬂoor, a group of about ﬁfteen girls were reciting 
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the Quran together with a woman from the local organisation. When we 
arrived, people from the local organisation were already there ready to help 
unpacking and arranging the clothes. One of the young girls from Mazeed 
showed me how to arrange the bags, and instructed me about prices and 
what to say to the customers. She informed me that prices were ﬁxed – three 
pounds for one bag. 
When everything was ready, the people of the neighbourhood were let 
into the room. They had been waiting since we arrived behind a barrier at 
the entrance put up by the people from the local organisation. In groups 
of about twenty they were let into the room. Most were women with their 
children. They rushed to the tables and stands, searching through the piles 
of clothes and shoes. Each group were allowed to stay in the room for about 
twenty minutes, before a young woman, dressed in black from top to toe, 
shouted from the middle of the room that now they had to pay and leave 
the room. Then the next group was let in. It went on like this for more 
than three hours. 
To be sure, the young people who were involved in projects like the one described 
above seemed to be very aware of the limitations of such activities, which they realise 
will not contribute to long-term and sustainable development. Instead, they seek to 
meet some of the basic needs of poor people in Egypt. Thus, for most participants, 
charitable activities are seen as part of a much broader strategy to change individuals 
and society. Most eﬀectively, poverty should be fought through empowerment of the 
individual, including education, vocational training and moral strengthening.
3.3.2  Youth and voluntarism
A second solution to the problems identiﬁed by the youth organisations is using 
youth as a resource. Here the concept of voluntarism is introduced. In an interview, 
a male employee in Resala presented it this way:
You have to spread awareness among youth – help society within itself. I 
wish to spread the essence and the idea of voluntarism – all over the country 
and maybe in the rest of the world. The idea is that anybody is able to receive 
the help from his or her home. Later this person will volunteer. It’s about 
solidarity – making everybody volunteer. We should make a ﬁxed time for 
volunteering, like we have a ﬁxed time for prayer. Then nobody will be in 
need of help and not ﬁnd it. He will ﬁnd people – just across the street.
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According to him and many of the other participants, it is possible to solve or at least 
contribute to solving both poverty-related problems and problems of indiﬀerence 
and apathy among young people by involving them especially in voluntary activities. 
Furthermore, many of the participants agreed that there are many advantages in re-
lying on a voluntary workforce instead of salaried staﬀ. “Volunteers somehow do it 
better. […] So why should we pay for human eﬀort that people are ready to exert to 
please God?”, as the president of Resala rhetorically asked in his recruitment speech 
to potential new volunteers. According to him, volunteers do a better job because 
they “do this work from their heart, so it reaches the hearts of its recipients”. Later 
on, he gave an example of their work with orphans:
Imagine the impact on him [an orphanage child] when he ﬁnds people that 
truly love him and call themselves his brothers and sisters – people who 
take care of him, visit him and take him out. Do you think those would 
have a better eﬀect if they were volunteers or if they took some monetary 
compensation for it? They MUST be volunteers! The child won’t be truly 
convinced that they love him unless they are volunteers.
The very large proportion of volunteers among the participants is one of the fac-
tors distinguishing the youth organisations from other civil society organisations, 
religious or not.81 Many organisations do not have any salaried staﬀ. Others have 
a handful or even fewer to take care of routine organisational and ﬁnancial tasks.82 
In fact, a voluntary workforce is the foundation of these youth organisations. And 
naturally the leaders of the organisations try to make the volunteers’ conditions as 
good as possible. The head of one of Resala’s branches put it this way: “Here we use 
the youth and open the doors for them. Our environment makes it easier for them. 
Other NGOs don’t have the space. We have space and we are expanding. We have 
phones so the volunteers can call the families. You develop yourself to be able to do 
your job better.” All the board members I talked to saw this organisational structure, 
with many volunteers, as one of the major strengths characterising the new youth 
organisations. The voluntary aspect of participation entails that no one is there for 
the money and very few for the prestige alone, in contrast to other organisations 
in which staﬀ are there solely because of the salary and the prestige. According to a 
board member of one of the more traditional Muslim social welfare organisations, 
81  A high percentage of Egyptian civil society organisations rely entirely or partially on paid staﬀ; very few rely 
entirely on volunteers (Clark 2004: 62).
82  See Table II, Annex D, for participants and beneﬁciaries.
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this is actually a widespread problem. As she sees it, since such organisations do not 
serve society, they are inactive and useless. 
However, several board members acknowledged that there are some disadvantages 
in not having permanent staﬀ in the organisation. First of all, many of the volunteers 
are students or have a full-time job besides their work in the organisation. Naturally, 
there is a maximum number of hours they can spend in the organisations, and espe-
cially during exam periods in the universities, most organisations have a serious lack 
of hands. Furthermore, volunteers are not always one hundred percent reliable; many 
volunteers participate in one or two activities, after which they either try another 
organisation or stop doing voluntary work at all. Finally, many leaders acknowledge 
that some volunteers lack the necessary experience and qualiﬁcations. A few organisa-
tions oﬀer basic training to new volunteers, but in most organisations, they just watch 
and learn from the others. This means that activities cannot be too sophisticated but 
must be relatively easy to carry out.
According to all the participants I talked to, however, the advantages of relying on 
volunteers instead of paid staﬀ by far exceed the disadvantages. Furthermore, voluntar-
ism was seen as the right thing to do, because it helps involve young people in society 
and makes social welfare work more cost-eﬀective, as well as more sincere.
3.3.3  Islam, management theories and role models
Apart from activities aimed at assisting and helping poor people at the community 
level, many youth organisations also engage in what can be termed human and career 
development courses. While the engagement in social welfare activities is motivated 
by a wish to ﬁght poverty in general, the organisations carry out human and career 
development courses because they want to solve more youth-speciﬁc problems such 
as unemployment, apathy and the poor quality of higher education. 
Two organisations, Zedny and Bayan, specialise in this ﬁeld. Through up-to-date 
courses in human and career development oﬀered at an aﬀordable price, their mission 
is to prepare young people, especially students and graduates, for their professional 
careers and adult lives. Highly respected university professors and successful manag-
ers in multinational companies teach courses in topics such as leadership, coaching, 
problem-solving, time management, and presentation and communication skills.83 
83  For further information on the courses oﬀered by Zedny and Bayan, see www.zedny.org and www.bayan-
online.org.
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Whereas in Zedny the aim is to reach as many young people as possible and several 
hundred young people are often taught in the same course, in Bayan they prefer 
workshops and therefore only teach groups of between twenty and thirty.
Both organisations have professionally designed websites in both Arabic and English 
which provide information on the organisations’ background, mission and vision, 
activities, board members, etc. The courses are clearly inﬂuenced by North American 
management theories, and the chairman of Zedny claims that the organisation is 
“managed like any multinational company”, using tools and concepts such as “stra-
tegic objectives and directions”, “brand manual” and “outcome”. But management 
theories are not the only source of inspiration. On Zedny’s website, for instance, a 
diverse range of celebrities and legends are also quoted, including North American 
sports stars, politicians and writers, as well as historical legends and philosophers 
such as Gandhi and Aristotle. 
It is signiﬁcant that, at least at ﬁrst sight, neither Zedny nor Bayan seem to make any 
reference to Islam and their religious identity. However, in talking to the participants it 
becomes obvious that Islam does play a signiﬁcant role in the practices and discourses 
of these organisations. In fact, Islam and modern management are seen as mutually 
reinforcing, and religious commitment and practice is expected of members of and 
volunteers in the organisations. On a very concrete level, the organisations make sure 
to leave time for common religious prayers and lectures in an otherwise tight sched-
ule. “It’s something natural to pray together, to refresh our minds with something 
related to our ideology”, as the president of Zedny put it. Also, both organisations 
practice gender segregation in their courses: “We’re trying to keep to the rules, and 
we’re proud of it”, one member said.
Furthermore, through the introduction of the ideal of a so-called ‘Muslim professional’, 
the practices and strategies of an eﬀective businessman is seen to complement rather 
than contrast with the values and morals of a good Muslim. A Muslim professional is 
someone who dresses in the right way, works eﬃciently and has high moral standards. 
The lecturers and board members act as role models for the volunteers and the young 
people attending the courses, thus promoting this ideal of the Muslim professional. 
The following statement from a board member in Bayan illustrates this approach:
My point of view is that we don’t need to speak about Islam on how to do 
and what to do. We need to act. We need to show the other face – be good 
role models. So we try not to preach to people but to do something. We 
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don’t talk, we do. […] We deal with the Islamic trails but we don’t preach 
them. For example, appointments: When I say that the lecture starts at six, 
at six-O-one you are late. When I say that you have to attend three out of 
four lectures to pass, if you only attend two, you have failed. There are no 
excuses. This is what it takes to be a Muslim professional. […] We inﬂuence 
the behaviour by acting as role models.
Undoubtedly, the young volunteers and attendees see the slightly older people who 
manage to combine a successful career with being good and active Muslims as role 
models. Wickham (2004:238-9) refers to this as “the eﬃciency” of agents or “social 
carriers” in social movements. The lecturers and board members in organisations such 
as Zedny and Bayan are able to act as role models for the young people, partly due to 
the recent decades of de-monopolisation of the authority to interpret sacred texts, and 
partly due to the fact that they speak from a similar socio-economic background.   
The kind of religion communicated to the young people is not so much concerned 
with rituals and theological doctrine. Instead, Islam is the underlying motivation and 
what provides the general guidelines for the modern individual, whether it concerns 
major choices in life or daily interaction with friends, family and business partners. If 
understood and practised in the right way, Islam will help the individual achieve his 
or her goals in life and become an active and useful participant in society.
3.4  Islam, individual empowerment and change 
The foregoing pages have explored the rationale, strategies and activities of the organisa-
tions. It is now time to turn towards the people implementing these. In the following 
pages, I will take a closer look at the group of participants and the motivations for 
their involvement. In particular, I will explore the role of Islam in this. 
3.4.1  Participants
Usually four categories of participants are found in the youth organisations being 
considered here, namely board members, ordinary members, employees and volun-
teers.84 All the participants are young people in their 20s or 30s, and almost all are 
college students or recent graduates of public or private universities in Cairo. The 
vast majority of the participants belong to the upper strata of the middle class. Their 
educational backgrounds often reﬂect the activities and approach of the particular 
84  See Table II, Annex D, for more information on this.
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organisation. Some organisations, such as Misr Shoryan al-Ata’a, oﬀer services within 
the ﬁeld of health care, and naturally many of the volunteers are students and graduates 
of medicine. Others recruit volunteers from all possible educational backgrounds. 
Usually, board members have been in the organisation for a long time – they might 
even be its founders. Therefore, they are often slightly older than the average volunteer 
– usually in their late 20s or early 30s – and many of them have a professional career 
besides their work in the organisations. However, when compared to board members 
in civil society organisations in general, they are still extremely young. According to 
a survey of 60 civil society organisations conducted by AbdelRahman (2004:158), 
74 percent of all board members are over 50 years old. 
Women constitute a very large part of the groups of volunteers and ordinary 
members. In the organisations studied, they make up minimum of 65 percent of 
the volunteers, and in some organisations close to 90 percent (e.g. Alashanik Ya 
Baladi). In fact, several board members remarked that young women participate 
more regularly in the activities of the organisations, and many of them described 
the female volunteers as “more dedicated” and “responsible towards problems in 
society”. This is something that distinguishes the youth organisations from many 
older and more traditional Muslim social welfare organisations, as well as from 
civil society organisations in general, where women are often not as well repre-
sented. According to a recent study, there is a serious gender gap in Egyptian civil 
society organisations. In a nationwide survey of 1,048 civil society organisations, 
men’s membership was twice that of women. Also, women are more likely to be 
members of organisations engaged in conventional mother-child care service 
(CIVICUS 2006:28). This argument was supported by the Egyptian researcher 
Abdel Ghafar Shukr, who was interviewed during my ﬁeldwork. According to 
him, the people in charge of the organisations do not think that women should 
become involved in such organisations unless their work is concerned with chil-
dren or other women.85 
Women make up a large proportion of mid-level management, working as team lead-
ers, coordinators and PR persons in the youth organisations. However, they are not 
as well-represented in the leadership as one might think. Apart from Alashanik Ya 
Baladi, in which seven out of ten seats on the board are held by women, and Suna’a 
85  Another general feature of the group of people engaged in the new youth organisations – educated upper 
middle class young people with an over-representation of women – is also that they match the target group of lay 
preachers like Amr Khaled. According to a study conducted in 2006 by the American University in Cairo, Amr 
Khaled is making a deeper impact on young women than on young men in Arab societies (Taylor 2007).
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al-Hayah, where women have three out of seven seats, women constitute a much 
smaller proportion of the boards in the other organisations.86 The same pattern is 
found more generally among civil society organisations in Egypt (CIVICUS 2006:29), 
and the gender gap is even larger when it comes to more traditional Muslim social 
welfare organisations. However, people in the youth organisations seem intent on 
changing the situation. Several of the board members acknowledged the importance 
of having women in the leadership, for example, in Boraq: “We decided that the 
board always must have a female representative. It is important that the decisions 
suit the girls. Situations are sometimes diﬃcult for girls, and someone must always 
think of their situation.”
While there did not seem to be any restrictions on the kinds of people who were 
recruited as volunteers in or ordinary members of the organisations, it was diﬀerent 
as regards board members. At least in Bayan, commitment to the objectives of the 
organisation, as well as the person’s religious values and behaviour, seemed to be of 
great importance when the leadership was looking for new board members: 
We do very strict interviews. It is not left to just wanting to be a member. 
[…] The interviews are based not on ability but on the willingness to do 
something for the society. If they have the willingness, they will deﬁnitely 
have the ability. And some very good behaviours. For example, one of the 
very good things I ask for is whether they pray the fajr,87 because I think 
that this shows if he is willing or not.
Most volunteers, male and female, had learned about the organisation and its activi-
ties through personal networks or campaigns in the universities. When they came to 
the organisations for the ﬁrst time, it was often together with friends or colleagues 
who were to a greater or lesser extent already involved in the organisation. Since their 
establishment, many of the youth organisations have experienced a great interest in 
their work, and compared to older and more traditional charities they have a very large 
number of volunteers. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look at why young 
people engage in these organisations. In other words, what are their motivations for 
participation? And from the perspective of the board members of the organisations, 
how are new volunteers and members recruited? 
86  E.g. in Zedny and Bayan all the board members are male, and in Boraq only one out of ten seats is held by a 
woman. 
87  The early morning prayer, conducted in the period between dawn and sunrise.
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3.4.2  Motivations for involvement
By engaging in social welfare activities, the young people are not only trying to em-
power the poor – by default they are also empowering themselves. Almost all the 
young people said that their involvement in social welfare activities had strength-
ened their skills in areas such as project planning, management and communication 
– skills that might be of great importance when it comes to job opportunities. And 
the leadership was aware of this as an important motivation for volunteering. One 
female member of Bayan put it as follows: “We not only develop the people we help, 
but also the people working with us. The volunteers develop skills.” 
The social aspect of the work in the organisations is another important motivation 
for the young people. Many pointed to the social environment and the feeling of be-
longing and intimacy with the other members and volunteers. One female volunteer 
in Zedny put it this way:
You can also enjoy your time. There are many people to know, you have many 
experiences to gain. There are many older people who have the patience 
to teach everyone, like Dr Mohamed and all the board members. For any 
young female or male, they will ﬁnd themselves in a very rich environment 
in many things.
Female participation was explained by most male and some female participants as a 
consequence of their abundance of free time, compared to young men who have to 
earn money and prepare for their wedding: “I think that the reason is that girls and 
females have more time to spend. Boys are always looking for the jobs to gain money 
to start building their future. The women have more time. That’s why they can go 
and help in society. They don’t have to work in a proﬁt organisation.” Furthermore, 
it is considered more respectful for women to work in a Muslim social welfare 
organisation than to have a job where they have to mix with the opposite sex. This 
is particularly true when it comes to upper middle and upper class women. Due to 
their families’ secure economic situations, they are often not required to take a job 
after graduation.
These examples all illustrate the rather tangible beneﬁts of participation. They point 
to personal gain and interest as the motivational factors. But in interviews, many of 
the participants often stressed a more normative basis for their actions, pointing to 
a religious obligation and/or a responsibility to contribute to the change or devel-
opment of their country. This normative aspect of the rationale for participation is 
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also what the president of Resala referred to in his recruitment speech to potential 
volunteers:
Some people think that those volunteers volunteer because they have lots 
and lots of free time to spend. On the contrary, we don’t volunteer because 
we have time to ﬁll, we volunteer because that’s the right thing that should 
be done. Volunteerism is the right thing to do in all standards, it is correct 
religiously, it is correct patriotically, and it is correct in humanitarian terms. 
[…] So from all the perspectives, religious, patriotic, or even humanitarian, 
this is the right thing that should be done. And one who doesn’t do it is 
mistaken, and should ask himself why he doesn’t do it.
For the vast majority of the young people I talked to, religious obligation was the 
initial motivation for their involvement in social welfare activities. “Generally we all 
work to please God”, as the chairman of Misr Shoryan al-Ata’a put it. Other phrases, 
such as “I do voluntary work because it is obligatory” or “it is something that religion 
requires us to do”, illustrate the same religious obligation as an essential motivational 
factor for volunteering. Many of the young people I interviewed even quoted the 
Quran or the hadiths to underline their message. Referring to a speciﬁc passage in 
the Quran, the president of Resala described two sins that result in a person going 
to hell: not believing in God, and refraining from providing food for the needy. And 
many of the volunteers actually experienced themselves becoming better Muslims in 
the process of doing community work. One male volunteer in Suna’a al-Hayah put 
it this way: “We were not all oriented towards helping ourselves, but were focused 
in helping others. In the process, we found out that we became better Muslims. We 
thought we were already good Muslims.” The female participants were often seen as 
more religious than the young men, which, according to some people, is the main 
reason why they engage in religiously motivated charitable and development work. 
The leadership also use Islam to recruit and motivate the young people. In Zedny, 
for example, a person from the religious establishment is sometimes invited to talk 
to the volunteers about Islam and why voluntary activities should be taken up: “Just 
to motivate people to go”, as the president put it. Another way to motivate the young 
people was to talk about the possible rewards given by God. In return for paying 
zakat and/or doing voluntary work to help the poor, Muslims believe that they 
receive rewards from God, or thawab. They can come in this life or the next, and the 
rewards materialise in everything from rather tangible things, such as wealth and 
professional success, to more intangible things, such as improved health, fertility or 
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merely happiness. In his recruitment speech to potential volunteers, the president of 
Resala gave several examples of how volunteers in his organisation had been rewarded 
by God. One had been given a pay rise the day after he volunteered for the ﬁrst time. 
Another no longer suﬀered from migraine. And a third suddenly became pregnant 
after several years of trying. 
For many of the participants, however, involvement in the organisations is more than a 
religious obligation, and certainly more than collecting thawab to ensure one’s own place 
in Paradise: it is about developing and changing the society and the country. Inspired by 
Amr Khaled, some even said that they wish to contribute to a renaissance of the Arab 
and Muslim world.88 “Our goal is to work together toward a promising future, and our 
achievements would be changing our country to a better place”, is what is written on 
the website of Zedny.89 Along similar lines, the slogan of Alashanik Ya Baladi is “The 
path for a better country”.90 The young people want to take part in and contribute to 
the development of their country. They want to take part in building the foundation of 
their future and the future of Egyptian young people in general. “We cannot wait for 
others to come and build this future”, as the president of one of the newly established 
organisations put it. And he continued: “Our slogan is ‘Our Future, Our Decision!’” 
While most talked about a change or development of society in general terms without 
describing more speciﬁcally how this society should be organised and governed, one 
board member stressed that in his opinion the organisation was striving for the estab-
lishment of a society in which Islam would play a greater role. In his words, they “are 
trying to do something so that one day Islam will lead the country”. These statements 
might be expressions of what Bayat (2007) terms “nativism”. According to Bayat, in 
Egypt religious loyalty has not replaced nationalist sentiment. On the contrary, Islam 
and nationalism are combined, mutually strengthening each other. 
People in the leadership in particular emphasised a wish to contribute to the change 
or development of the country as a motivation for their participation in the organi-
sation. But due to the political climate in the country, involvement in any kind of 
political activism is very risky. In other words, social welfare activities are the only 
possibility for young people who do not want to risk a confrontation with the state 
authorities. And the young people were very aware of that: “Our mission is to help 
build the society, changing a lot of circumstances that people are living under. […] 
88  www.amrkhaled.net
89  www.zedny.org
90  www.ayb-sd.org
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When you’re concerned with these things, working in a NGO is the only window”, as 
one female volunteer put it. According to the Egyptian researcher and activist Heba 
Raouf Ezzet, young women especially choose this kind of civic engagement rather 
than involvement in direct political activities, such as protests and demonstrations. 
Thus, involvement in social welfare activities might be a way for some young women 
to gain a sense of contributing to social and political change in society without run-
ning the risk of disgracing themselves and their families.
Although only few people referred directly to Amr Khaled when discussing their 
motives for participating in the organisations, undoubtedly many of the young 
people were initially inspired by the ideas and concepts of faith-based development 
that he formulated in his TV programme Suna’a al-Hayah from 2004/2005. In this 
programme, Amr Khaled encouraged young people especially to develop themselves 
and their fellow citizens by actively participating in their communities. According to 
him, Islam is not only about praying ﬁve times a day and wearing the hijab the correct 
way, and da’wa is not simply a call to live by these rules. Islam is about improving 
yourself and your community, and da’wa is a call for engagement and social reform. 
As he put it himself, he wanted “to encourage our men and women, both young 
and old, to have eﬀective and beneﬁcial roles in serving our country.”91 Awareness 
campaigns on drugs and smoking, as well as the collection and distribution of food 
and second-hand clothes in poor areas, were some of the projects suggested by Amr 
Khaled and carried out by young people.92
Among scholars, not everybody thinks that Amr Khaled has a positive impact on 
Egyptian youth. The following statement is one Egyptian researcher’s rather critical 
analysis of Amr Khaled and his target group, upper middle-class youth:
He is the symbol of a young Muslim from the upper middle class, who can 
still do everything – go abroad, wear fashionable clothes and have a relation-
ship with girls. He has thousands of young followers who can’t ﬁnd other 
leaders. He plays under the umbrella of religious culture, which is horrible. 
And he made a very good business. […] It is suitable for the upper middle 
class youth. It gives them peace inside. It is like a policeman giving a person 
a license to drive. And he is intelligent and smart looking.
91  www.amrkhaled.net 
92  www.amrkhaled.net
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According to him, Amr Khaled’s messages might give this particular group of young 
people “peace inside”, but they also pacify them. This is without doubt an important 
aspect of the discussion of the phenomenon of Amr Khaled and other lay preachers 
like him. And, as many scholars and journalists have pointed out, Amr Khaled is not 
a liberal Muslim thinker. “His sermons, […] with their clear and vivid warnings of the 
hell-ﬁre that awaits unbelievers, appear to be just another form of fear mongering” 
(Atia 2005). According to Bayat (2007:153), some of Amr Khaled’s ideas are highly 
conservative and his methods manipulative. But like others who have commented 
on the inﬂuence of Amr Khaled on Egyptian youth, these critics do not mention the 
many young people who, inspired by Amr Khaled’s TV programme, Suna’a al-Hayah, 
started engaging in voluntary social welfare work. 
3.5  The new youth organisations and the state
So far the analysis has dealt with the rationale, strategies and activities of the organi-
sations, as well as with those who are implementing these and their motivations for 
doing so. It is now time to consider more closely the context in which the organisa-
tions operate, in particular, what is the relationship of the organisations to the state, 
and how much room for manoeuvre do they actually have?
 
Generally speaking, the government has an ambivalent relationship with many Muslim 
social welfare organisations. One the one hand, it fears that these organisations are 
supporting the Muslim Brotherhood or other political Islamic movements against 
the regime in one way or another.93 And, even if these organisations have no con-
nections with such Islamic political actors, they still “oﬀer concrete, visible examples 
of what Islam can provide, in contradistinction to the state’s secular modernization 
failures” (Wiktorovicz 2004:11), which make them a threat to the legitimacy of the 
government. On the other hand, the government is very much aware of the fact that 
Muslim social welfare organisations provide good and much needed services to the 
poor, a task the government is unable to solve by itself. This ambivalent relationship 
is very much reﬂected in the regime’s stance vis-à-vis the diﬀerent kinds of civil so-
ciety organisations. According to AbdelRahman (2004:114), “the regime wished to 
93  Because of the general status of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as some of the new youth organisations’ 
reservations towards myself and my research project, I abstained from asking questions about the relationship 
between the Muslim youth organisations and the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamic political actors. However, 
it is my impression that few if any of these organisations had links to Islamic political actors. This observation 
is supported by several scholars in the ﬁeld, for example Bayat (2007: 14), who emphasises that, “contrary to the 
common perception, Islamic social welfare organizations in Egypt are not sites of Islamist political activity. They 
simply act as service organizations. The vast majority have no link to political Islam as such.”
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neutralize the power of Islamic NGOs by attempting to co-opt those with no strong 
political inclinations, while subjecting the more politically active Islamic NGOs, for 
example Al-Gamaiaa Al-Sharaia, to its most extreme measure of scrutiny.”
In practice, the government often uses the NGO law as a way to restrict the power 
and inﬂuence of Muslim social welfare organisations that are considered to be a 
threat. Apart from control over most of the ﬁnancial resources available to organisa-
tions, the government has the power to block individuals from competing in board 
elections on unspeciﬁed grounds, to dissolve organisations without the need for a 
juridical order and to appoint up to 50 percent of the board members (Human Rights 
Watch cf. CIVICUS 2006:50, AbdelRahman 2005:129, 132-5). In order to avoid 
such consequences, as well as more general harassment by the government, Muslim 
social welfare organisations must accept two rather broad conditions. First of all, they 
must stay completely out of politics. According to the NGO law, the government has 
the power to dissolve organisations if they are involved in political activities. In fact, 
if a civil society organisation accepts this condition and refrains from carrying out 
political activities, other infringements of the law generally do not seem to disturb 
the government (Ibrahim et al. 1996). The participants I talked to were all very much 
aware of this condition. In an interview, the president of one of the youth organisa-
tions put this quite openly, and he assured me that they make this point clear to all 
the participants in the organisation:
We don’t have political aspirations and we cannot have political aspirations. 
It is dangerous. If we had these aspirations, we would not have this meeting 
and we would not do all the work we do. […] You will ﬁnd groups who believe 
that it is their duty to do political work. But we cannot do this. And we are 
not a religious organisation. […] We cannot work in politics. We know that 
it is dangerous. You have to avoid politics and religion. If you raise one of 
the two banners, you will not be allowed to work. We make sure that the 
whole organisation understands this. Politics is dangerous.
In this statement, he touches upon the second, rather implicit condition laid down by 
the government, namely that Islam should not be too visible in the organisation. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the term “Islamic”, initially intended to describe this group 
of religiously oriented civil society organisations, proved to be rather problematic. 
Several participants objected to this labelling. For many Egyptians, the term “Islamic” 
has connotations of this dangerous political ﬁeld, and they fear punishment from the 
government if they raise the religious banner too high. Most social welfare organisa-
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tions, including the youth organisations studied here, prefer to register under other 
categories than that of cultural, scientiﬁc and religious association, precisely because 
of the suspicion and harsher treatment that the state often reserves for Muslim or-
ganisations (AbdelRahman 2004:122). Below a male volunteer reﬂects on how many 
Muslim social welfare organisations handle this issue:
I think that most people working in charity and development are afraid 
to announce that they are Islamic. The government places restrictions 
on any group that has an Islamic name. I think that this make them say 
that their motives are not Islamic, but consciously or subconsciously 
they are aware that their real motives inside them are Islamic. They have 
a mission or a role in developing their society, but they are not willing 
to announce that their motives are Islamic. They are not comfortable to 
announce so after the incidents here in Egypt in the 80s and early 90s, 
when Islamic groups did some terrorism and something. I think that 
people have that idea that the government will restrict or even harm any 
groups that belong to Islam. 
These circumstances are also signiﬁcant when it comes to recruiting members and 
volunteers, as well as for the discourses internally in the organisations: “We are not 
used to talk about this [the role of Islam] – not because we fear it, but because we 
fear that people fear it. People appreciate it inside, but they are afraid of the political 
consequences. It is safer to talk about the social aspects rather than the religious ones.” 
According to one Egyptian journalist, only two kinds of organisation can maintain 
a good relationship with the state: secular organisations, and Muslim organisations 
that manage to stay completely out of politics. 
However, by no means all participants expressed a solely negative view of the 
government and state authorities. The president of one organisation mentioned 
that his experiences with the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs during the registration 
process were mainly positive. Despite a rather lengthy process, according to him 
the people in the Ministry were very helpful. Furthermore, some of the partici-
pants I talked to advocated greater communication and cooperation between the 
organisations and the government. They wanted the government to acquire a 
better impression of them and their work: “There has to be contact between us 
and the government. They have to understand what we are doing. There are many 
unprofessional people in the NGOs. Therefore the government gets a wrong 
impression of the NGOs.”
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It seems that some of the youth organisations have a relatively good relationship 
with the state. Resala is one of them. At Resala’s Mother’s Day event in Cairo Sta-
dium, the Egyptian Minister of Organisational Development delivered a speech 
commending the work of Resala. He ended his speech with the words: “Thank you 
Resala, thank you volunteers!” Resala was founded by rich people, and because of 
the huge donations it is able to attract from the public, it has succeeded in expand-
ing beyond everybody’s expectations. According to the Egyptian journalist cited 
above, they are now in a good position in which the government cannot touch 
them or stop them from growing. Furthermore, the organisation has proved that 
it is able to stay completely out of politics. However, according to the journalist 
Resala is an exception, and most organisations do in fact have a more problematic 
relationship with the regime. 
Examples of this are organisations like Suna’a al-Hayah and to some extent Sama, 
which seem to have the most problematic relationships with the state. The main 
reason for this is their close link to Amr Khaled. The name Suna’a al-Hayah derives 
from Amr Khaled’s TV programme on faith-based development mentioned before. 
The programme was a huge success with thousands of young people participat-
ing in the development projects. According to Amr Khaled, 1.4 million young 
people – 40 percent of them Egyptian – had participated in the projects by 2005 
(Atia 2005). But long before these events, the Egyptian government had already 
started to fear the popularity of this new lay preacher. One participant described 
the reaction of the government in this way: “The government doesn’t like it that 
we are doing something that they can’t do. When Amr Khaled is on TV, he can 
gather more than ﬁve million people and make them do something. It frightens 
the government that he can aﬀect that much. They fear that the masses will rise.” 
In 2002 the Egyptian government allegedly forced Amr Khaled to leave Egypt, 
but he continued his increasingly popular shows from abroad. Another attempt 
by the government to contain the inﬂuence of Amr Khaled was to prohibit other 
organisations with the name Suna’a al-Hayah from registering either by shutting 
down those that had not yet registered. Sama is one organisation that had to work 
under another name. One male volunteer from one of the other organisations had 
this comment on the reaction of the government and the circumstances facing 
Suna’a al-Hayah organisations in Egypt: “It is not very smart to say that you are 
part of Suna’a al-Hayah. In Canada you can do it. In Egypt, most organisations 
inspired by Amr Khaled are working under another name. […] The government 
here dislikes Amr Khaled. […] It is not safe to say that you are part of Suna’a al-
Hayah.”
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However, despite the circumstances described by some of the young people I talked 
to, some Suna’a al-Hayah organisations have managed to overcome the crackdown and 
continue their work. With more than 1,700 volunteers and a wide range of diﬀerent 
activities, the organisation I studied is one of them. This organisation even received 
computers as a donation from the Ministry of Education, which could either be a sign 
of the government’s approval of the organisation or an attempt by the government to 
inﬂuence or even co-opt it. Or it might just be that communication and coordination 
between the diﬀerent ministries are not that eﬀective. 
Regardless of the harsh circumstances facing some of the youth organisations, all 
participants agreed that, for security reasons, there has to be some kind of control 
with civil society organisations. “The security dilemma is that the control prevents 
good things from being done and bad things from happening”, as one male volunteer 
put it. Generally they seemed both conﬁdent and optimistic in talking about the 
possibilities for continuing and even expanding their work in Egypt. 
3.6  Concluding remarks
The group of religiously oriented youth organisations studied here represents an 
interesting new phenomenon in Egyptian civil society, among other things because 
they are engaging a new segment of the Egyptian population, the upper-middle class 
young people. Furthermore, they seem to interpret and use Islam diﬀerently than 
many of the more traditional Muslim social welfare organisations.
As has been described in the previous pages, these youth organisations combine 
conventional social welfare activities with a human development approach, as well as 
activities that are normally associated with advocacy and awareness-raising. Despite 
also being involved in traditional charity activities, such as the provision of food and 
clothing, they are strongly promoting a development-oriented approach to social 
welfare. In this approach, the empowerment and development of the individual 
beneﬁciaries is the primary goal, and this is best realised through activities such as 
awareness campaigns, vocational training and micro-ﬁnance activities. Furthermore, 
voluntary social welfare work among young people especially is presented as an 
important contribution to the solution of poverty-related problems, as well as to 
the widespread state of apathy among large segments of the younger generations. In 
fact, some organisations spend much time and energy mobilising young people to 
become more involved in their society and local communities. When it comes to 
youth-related problems, the youth organisations see it as essential to combine human 
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development courses and other management tools with the right religious behaviour. 
More speciﬁcally, they have introduced the ideal of a so-called Muslim professional 
which combines the practices and strategies of an eﬀective businessman with the 
values and morals of a good Muslim. 
Generally speaking, Islam plays an important role for the participants in these 
organisations. As this study has shown, Islam is what initially motivates many of 
the young people to engage in social welfare activities: to be a good Muslim is to 
do something for others. But, combined with secular ideas of development, Islam 
is also what provides the guidelines for how to do something for others. Poverty 
is not fought through the random distribution of zakat, but through individual 
empowerment and moral strengthening. Finally, by providing concrete beneﬁts in 
terms of strengthened personal capacities, Islam is also what makes the young people 
keep doing something for others. Due to strict state control, however, participants 
are aware that they should not raise the religious banner too high, and some even 
felt restricted in how far they could display their religiosity because they feared 
government harassment.
That Islam is an important element in these new youth organisations is also visible 
in the alliances and relationships that the organisations are a part of. Aside from the 
group of religiously oriented youth organisations, there are a dozen of more secu-
lar-oriented youth organisations that carry out similar activities and have a similar 
approach of development and voluntarism.94 But despite being aware of the exist-
ence of these similar organisations, none of the youth organisations in my study had 
any kind of cooperation with them. Instead, they preferred to cooperate with other 
organisations with a religious output, be it youth organisations or traditional social 
welfare organisations. Compared to other sectors of Egyptian civil society, coopera-
tion, coordination and the exchange of ideas and experiences was fairly widespread 
among especially the leaderships of the new religiously oriented youth organisations, 
and to some extent they also cooperated with a handful of more traditional Muslim 
social welfare organisations. Furthermore, some of the volunteers were involved with 
more than one organisation at the time, which also contributed to this continuous 
exchange of ideas and experiences between the organisations. This lack of cooperation 
between the religiously oriented youth organisations and their secular counterparts, 
together with the existence of widespread cooperation and communication among 
94  Examples of these are the Meshwar Organisation for Community Development, Nahdet El Mahrousa and the 
Youth Organisation for Population and Development. 
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the former, also strengthens the image of these youth organisations as a movement 
rather than a series of isolated and independent entities. 
As the above has shown, it is clear that Islam is one of the factors uniting this move-
ment. However, the question remains of the kind of Islam we ﬁnd in the these youth 
organisations. Despite their alliances with some of the more traditional Muslim 
social welfare organisations, the understandings of Islam found in the two kinds of 
organisation do not always seem to concur. In some respects, the youth organisations 
might even be closer to their secular counterparts. The kind of religion communicated 
to the young people is not so much about rituals and theological doctrine. Instead, 
Islam is the underlying motivation and what provides the general guidelines for the 
modern individual. For the participants, Islam is primarily about how individuals 
treat each other and what goals and visions they set for themselves and the society 
that surrounds them. If understood and practised in the right way, Islam will help the 
individual to achieve his or her goals and become an active and useful citizen. 
One of the reasons for this particular use and understanding of Islam is to be found 
in the organisations’ distinct constituency – educated young people from the upper 
middle class. In many ways, recent decades have witnessed drastic changes in social 
and political realities for large sectors of the Egyptian population, including this group 
of privileged youth. Many of them were brought up in secular homes oriented more 
towards the West than the Arab or Muslim worlds. But recent years have experienced a 
decrease in the power and inﬂuence of the secular discourses in society. This is also the 
case with regard to these young people, who have instead been aﬀected by the general 
Islamisation of society. Many girls have donned the veil, and an increasing number of 
young people from the upper middle class and the elite are now praying in mosques 
and in the universities’ prayer halls, to mention just a few concrete manifestations of 
this development (Bayat 2007:147). Yet, the religiosity of this group of young people 
is diﬀerent from that of the lower middle class and working-class youth. First of all, 
the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood and other political Islamic actors does 
not seem to appeal to the majority of these young people. Secondly, since many of 
them did not grow up with any particular religious understanding and practice, they 
are inclined to practice religion in a more syncretistic way, combining traditional 
Islamic practices and norms with Western ideas and concepts. 
For this reason, lay preachers like Amr Khaled have exerted a strong appeal among 
these young people. He has managed to attract and even mobilise large numbers of 
them, precisely because of his focus on how Islam can be combined with a modern 
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life-style, but also because he gives voice and initiative to the young people. Although 
the new trend in religiosity might, as Bayat puts it, signify “a shift from Islamism as a 
political project to one concerned primarily with personal salvation, ethical enhance-
ment, and self-actualization” (Bayat 2007:149), some of the young people – among 
them the participants in the new youth organisations – use their religiosity as an 
inspiration and motivation for their engagement with society. Like the majority of 
young Egyptians, they feel marginalised and excluded from important decisions taken 
by both the regime and the older generation. They see problems in society – problems 
that neither the state nor initiatives from the outside have been able to solve. Inspired 
by Amr Khaled and others like him, they want to take responsibility and contribute 
to the solution of these problems and the creation of a more just Egyptian society.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
94
Literature
AbdelRahman, Maha 2004. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt, 
The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo.
Albrecht, Holger 2005. ‘How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons 
from Egypt’, Democratization, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 378-97.
Anheier, Helmut K., and Lester M. Salamon 1998. The Nonproﬁt Sector in the Devel-
oping World: A Comparative Analysis, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
Ansari, Hamied N. 1984. ‘The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 123-44.
Antoun, Richar T. 2000. Civil Society, Tribal Processes and Change in Jordan: 
An Anthropological View, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 441-63.
Atia, Tarek 2005. ‘Amr Khaled: A Preacher’s Puzzle’, Al-Ahram Weekly, no. 765, 
October 2005 [online] http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/765/proﬁle.htm
Bayat, Asef 2000. Social Movements, Activism and Social Development in the 
Middle East, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper No. 3, 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Bayat, Asef 2002. Activism and Social Development in the Middle East, Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 1-28.
Bayat, Asef 2007. Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Is-
lamist Turn, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Ben Néﬁssa, Sara; al-Fattah, Nabil Abd; Hanaﬁ, Sari, and Milani, Carlos (eds.) 
2005. NGOs and Governance in the Arab World, The American University in 
Cairo Press, Cairo.
Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow 2000. ‘Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 
26, pp. 611-39.
Benthall, Jonathan 1999. ‘Financial Worship: The Quranic Injunction to Alms-
giving’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, vol. 5, pp. 1-27.
Benthall, Jonathan, and Bellion-Jourdan, Jérôme 2003. The Charitable Crescent: 
Politics of Aid in the Muslim World, I.B.Tauris, London.
Brand, Laurie 1995. ‘In the beginning was the State…: The Quest for Civil Society 
in Jordan’, in Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. I, Richard Norton (ed.), Brill, 
New York.
Brenner, Louis (ed.) 1993. Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica, Hurst, Bloomington.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
95
Brenner, Louis 2000. Controlling Knowledge: Religion, Power and Schooling in a 
West African Muslim Society, Hurst, Bloomington.
Browers, Michaelle 2007. ‘The Egyptian Movement for Change: Intellectual 
Antecedents and Generational Conﬂicts, Contemporary Islamic, vol. 1, pp. 
69-88.
al-Bukhari, Sahih. Al-Bukhari’s Authentic Sources, USC-MSA Compendium of 
Muslim Texts [online], http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/ha-
dithSunna/bukhari/ 
Burgat, Francois, and Dowell, William 1993. The Islamic Movement in North 
Africa, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, Austin.
Burr, J. Millard, and Collins, Robert O. 2006. Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terror-
ism in the Islamic World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Carapico, Sheila 2006. No Easy Answers: The Ethics of Field Research in the Arab 
World, PS:. Political Science and Politics, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 429-31.
Carøe Christiansen, Connie 2003. ‘Women’s Islamic Activism: Between Self-
Practices and Social Reform Eﬀorts’ in John Esposito and Francois Burgat 
(eds.), Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East 
and Europe, Hurst & Company, London.
CIVICUS 2005. An Overview of Civil Society in Egypt: Civil Society Index Report 
for the Arab Republic of Egypt, CIVICUS, Cairo.
Clark, Janine A. 2004. Islam, Charity and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and 
Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, Indiana University Press, Bloom-
ington.
El Daly, Marwa 2004. Philanthropy in Egypt: A Comprehensive Study of Local Phi-
lanthropy in Egypt and Potentials of Directing Giving and Volunteering towards 
Development, Center for Development Studies, Cairo. 
Dekmejian, R. Hrair 1995. Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab 
World, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse. 
Elbayar, Kareem 2005. ‘NGO Laws in Selected Arab States’, International Journal 
of Not-for-Proﬁt Law, vol. 7, no. 4 [online], http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/
ijnl/vol7iss4/special_1.htm 
Esposito, John 2002. What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford. 
Esposito, John, and Burgat, Francois (eds.) 2003. Modernizing Islam: Religion in 
the public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe, Hurst & Company, London.
Fahmy, Ninette S. 1998. ‘The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform?’, The Middle East 
Journal, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 551-62.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
96
Faksh, Mahmud 1997. The Future of Islam in the Middle East, Praeger, Connecticut.
Gubser, Peter 2002. ‘The Impact of  NGOs on State and Non-state Relations in the 
Middle East’, Middle East Policy, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 139-48.
Haenni, Patrick & Husam Tammam 2003. ‘Chat Shows, Nashid Groups and Lite 
Preaching: Egypt’s Air-conditioned Islam’, Le Monde Diplomatique, Sept. 2003 
[online], http://mondediplo.com/2003/09/03egyptislam
Hammad, Waleed 1999. Jordanian Women’s Organizations and Sustainable Develop-
ment, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Sindbad Publishing House.
Hannigan, John A.1991. ‘Social Movement Theory and the Sociology of Religion: 
Toward a New Synthesis’, Sociological Analysis, Vol. 52, pp. 311-31.
Hannigan, John A. 1993. ‘New Social Movement Theory and the Sociology of 
Religion’, in A Future for Religion? New Paradigms for Social Analysis, William 
Swatos (ed.), Sage, Newbury Park.
Harmsen, Egbert 2007. Islam, Civil Society and Social Work: Muslim Voluntary 
Welfare Associations in Jordan between Patronage and Empowerment, un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Leiden.
Hoﬀman, Valerie 1995. ‘Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychosocial Proﬁles’, in 
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby 
(eds.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin 1980. ‘Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Method-
ological Notes and Preliminary Findings’, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 423-53.
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin; Kandil, Amani; Zaki, Moheb; Hassan, Nagah; El-Ramly, 
Ola; Al-Ga’arah, Sahar; Sami, Mohammad;p and Abu Al-Yazid, Ahmed (eds.) 
1996. An Assessment of Grassroots Participation in the Development of Egypt, The 
American University in Cairo Press, Cairo. 
Ihle, Annette Haaber 2007: Moral Discourses, Moral Communities, and Expecta-
tions of Social Mobility among Young Muslims in Northern Ghana, Journal of 
Muslim Minorities Aﬀairs, vol. 28.
Ismael, Tareq, and Ismael, Jacqueline 1997. ‘Civil Society in the Arab World: His-
torical Traces, Contemporary Vestiges’, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, 
pp. 77-87.
Kandil, Amani 1995. Civil Society in the Arab World: Private Voluntary Organisa-
tions, Civicus, Washington DC.
Kassim, Hisham (ed.) 2006. Directory of Civil Society Organizations in Jordan, Al-
Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Amman.
Kaufman, M. & Alfonso, H.D. (eds.) 1997. Community, Power and Grassroots De-
mocracy, IDRC and Zed Books, London.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
97
Knowles, Warwick M. (ed.) 2000. Professional Association and the Challenges of 
Democratic Transformation in Jordan, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung with Al-
Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Sindbad.
LaTowsky, Robert J. 1997. ‘Egypt’s NGO Sector: A Brieﬁng Paper’, Education for 
Development Occasional Paper Series, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 1-22. 
Mandaville, Peter 2002. Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, 
Routledge, London.
Manger, Leif 2002. ‘Religion, Identities, and Politics: Deﬁning Muslim Discourses 
in the Nuba Mountains of the Sudan’, Journal of Arab and Islamic Studies, vol. 
4, pp. 132-52.
Meital, Yoram 2006. ‘The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 
Elections’, The Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 257-79.
Morville, Kristian 2007. German Minds, Medina Hearts. Muslim Student Activ-
ism, Political Culture and Democratization in Indonesia, unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Copenhagen.
Munson, Henry 1986. ‘Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyp-
tian Muslim Brotherhood’, Sociological Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 487-510.
Narayan, Deepa (ed.) 2000. Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?  Published for 
the World Bank, Oxford University Press, New York.
Norton, Augustus R. 1993. ‘The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East’, The 
Middle East Journal, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 484-6.
Norton, Augustus R. (ed.) 1995. Civil Society in the Middle East, Brill Academic 
Publishers, Leiden.
Noyon, Jennifer 2003. Islam, Politics and Pluralism: Theory and Practice in 
Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria, The Royal Institute of International 
Aﬀairs, Middle East Programme, London. 
Özdalga, Elizabeth, and Persson, Sune 1997. Civil Society, Democracy and the Mus-
lim World, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Transactions, vol. 7.
Roald, Anne Soﬁe 1994. Tarbiya: Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in 
Jordan and Malaysia, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm.
Salibi, Kamal S. 1993: The Modern History of Jordan, I.B. Tauris, London.
Salih, M.S. Mohamed 2004. ‘Islamic NGO’s in Africa: The Promise and Peril of 
Islamic Voluntarism’, in Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, Alex De 
Waal (ed.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
Sajoo, Amyn B. (ed.) 2002. Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary 
Perspectives, I.B. Tauris, London.
al-Sayyid, Mustapha Kamel 1993. ‘A Civil Society in Egypt?’, Middle East Journal, 
vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 228-42.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
98
Schwedler, Jillian (ed.) 1997. Islamic Movements in Jordan, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Center and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Amman.
Schwedler, Jillian, and Gerner, Deborah J. 2004. Understanding the Contemporary 
Middle East, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
Schwedler, Jillian 2006. ‘The Third Gender: Western Female Researchers in the 
Middle East’, PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 425-8
Shukr, Abd al-Ghaﬀar 2005. ‘Islamic NGOs and the Development of Democracy 
in Egypt’, in NGOs and Governance in the Arab World, Sarah Ben Néﬁssa, Nabil 
Abd al-Fattah, Sari Hanaﬁ and Carlos Milani (eds.), The American University 
in Cairo Press, Cairo.
Smith, Christian (ed.) 1996. Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Move-
ment Activism, Routledge, New York.
Starrett, Gregory 1998. Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious 
Transformation in Egypt, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and London.
Sullivan, Denis 1994. Private Voluntary Organizations in Egypt: Islamic Development, 
Private Initiative, and State Control, University Press of Florida, Gainesville. 
Sullivan, Denis J. & Sana Abed-Kotob 1999. Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil 
Society vs. the State, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London.
Talal, Basma Bint 2004. Rethinking an NGO: Development, Donors and Civil 
Society in Jordan, I.B. Tauris, London.
Taylor, Guy 2007. ‘To Veil or Not to Veil?’, Forward Magazine, no. 2, pp. 24-26. 
Valbjørn, Morten 2007. ‘The Political Situation in Jordan’, oral presentation given 
at the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Copenhagen.
Waltz, Susan 1986. ‘Islamist Appeal in Tunisia’, Middle East Journal, vol. 40, 
no. 4, pp. 651-70.
Weiss, Holger 2002. ‘Zakat and the Question of Social Welfare: An Introductory 
Essay on Islamic Economics and Its Implications for Social Welfare’, in Social 
Welfare in Muslim Societies in Africa, Holger Weiss (ed.), Nordic Africa Institute, 
Uppsala.
Westerlund, David, 1997. ‘Reaction and Action, Accounting for the Rise of Is-
lamism’ in African Islam and Islam in Africa, David Westerlund and Eva Evers 
Rosander (eds.), Hurst & Company, London.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky 2002. Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political 
Change in Egypt, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky 2004. ‘Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt’, 
in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Quintan Wiktorow-
icz (ed.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
99
Wiktorowicz, Quintan 2001. The Management of Islamic Activism: Salaﬁs, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan, State University of New York 
Press, New York.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan (ed.) 2004. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.
Wise, Lindsay 2003. Worlds from the Heart: New Forms of Islamic Preaching in 
Egypt, M.Phil. Thesis in Modern Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford University.
Zaki, Moheb 1995. Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981-1994, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, Cairo.
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
100
Annexes
Annex A: Glossary95
Eid al Adha: The Islamic New Year. An Islamic festival celebrated as a commemoration 
of Ibrahim’s (Abraham’s) willingness to sacriﬁce his son Ismael for Allah. Muslims 
who can aﬀord to do so sacriﬁce their best domestic animals (usually sheep, but also 
camels, cows, and goats) as a symbol of this sacriﬁce. Eid al-Adha lasts for four days 
and starts on the 10th day of the month of Dhul Hijja of the lunar Islamic calendar, 
approximately 70 days after the end of the month of Ramadan.
Da’wa: The duty to inform non-believers of Islam.
Eid al Fitr. An Islamic holiday marking the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting.
Fajr: The ﬁrst of the ﬁve daily prayers (salat), the early morning prayer, made between 
dawn and sunrise.
Hadith: Oral traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Hadith collections are regarded as important tools for determining the Sunna, or 
Muslim way of life, by all traditional schools of jurisprudence.
Hajj: The pilgrimage to Mecca. One of the ﬁve pillars of Islam.
Hijab: The word means ‘to cover’ and refers in some Arabic-speaking countries and 
Western countries primarily to women’s head and body covering, but in Islamic 
scholarship, hijab is given the wider meaning of modesty, privacy and morality
Iftar: The evening meal that marks the end of the daily fast during the month of 
Ramadan.
Niqab: A veil which covers the face, worn by some Muslim women as a part of sarto-
rial hijab. It is popular in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, in particular Saudi 
Arabia, but it can also be found in North Africa, Southeast Asia and the Indian 
subcontinent.
95  Sources are Benthall (1999), Bæk Simonsen (2001), Esposito (2002) and the online encyclopedia www.
wikipedia.org  
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Sadaqa: The word means to be truthful and refers to voluntary almsgiving and 
charity.
Salaﬁ: The word “Salaﬁ” derives from salaf which means to precede. The term al-
salaf al-salih refers to the forefathers of Islam, the companions of the Prophet and 
the following two generations. A Salaﬁ is someone who adheres to the example of 
the salaf and strictly follows the Quran and the Sunna as the only sources of religious 
understanding in preference to the texts of any of the schools.
Salat: The ﬁve daily ritual prayers that any Muslim should carry out. One of the ﬁve 
pillars of Islam.
Sawm: Fasting during Ramadan. One of the ﬁve pillars of Islam.
Shahadah: The profession of faith. One of the ﬁve pillars of Islam. 
Sunna: The customs and habits of the Prophet Muhammad, narrated through a 
number of hadiths. 
Thawab: The spiritual rewards or points given by Allah for good deeds performed 
by one. If a person has more positive points (thawab) than negative points (ithim), 
he or she will go to heaven, if not, to hell. If the two are equal, the person will be in 
limbo. 
Waqf (pl. Awqaf ): An Islamic endowment typically devoting a building or piece of 
land for religious or charitable purposes.
Zakat: The word derives from the verb zaka, meaning to purify. Zakat refers to the 
obligation for all Muslims to pay 2.5 percent of their wealth to the poor and needy. 
The guidelines for the payment of zakat are not described in the Quran but in the 
Sunna. Traditionally, the required annual amount was 1/40 of one’s wealth, but over 
the years the scholarly literature has laid down more speciﬁc rules. For instance, people 
whose wealth is below a certain threshold are not required to pay zakat. Zakat is one 
of the ﬁve pillars of Islam.
Zakat al-ﬁtr: A duty on every Muslim to pay a share of his/her wealth to charitable 
purposes immediate after the whole month of Ramadan to bless his/her fast.
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Annex B: Interview Guide
Questions regarding the organisation
History
When was the organisation established? 
Why was it established?
Who were involved in the establishment?
What does the name of the organisation mean?
Identity
What is the purpose of the organisation?
What is its vision?
How is this formulated?
How is it communicated to participants?
In what ways does it show in the organisation?
How does this diﬀer from other organisations?
What role does Islam have in this vision?
In what ways is the organisation religious? Activities, structure, motivation, purpose etc.?
Are there diﬀerent ways of being Islamic?
Does the organisation follow speciﬁc religious schools or movements – e.g. Salaﬁ, 
Suﬁ, Wahabi etc.?
What does this mean for the work of the organisation?
Structure
What is the institutional structure of the organisation? 
Does the organisation have any branches?
If yes, what is the relation between the diﬀerent branches? Are they autonomous or 
under the same leadership?
Where do you work? (in what areas of the city/the country)
Why here?
Does the organisation have any connections to any mosques? In what ways?
Decision-making structures
Who are the person(s) in charge?
How are they elected?
What is their background – economic, educational, professional?
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Participants
What are the kinds or categories of participants – members, users, employees, 
volunteers etc.?
What do they do?
How many people in each category?
What is their background – economic, educational, professional?
What is the relationship between these diﬀerent groups? How do they work to-
gether/communicate?
How many members does the organisation have?
How do you become a member?
Why do people become members?
How much time do they spend in the organisation?
Does the organisation have volunteers?
Why do people volunteer?
What do they do? 
How much time do they spend in the organisation?
Does the organisation have salaried staﬀ ?
What kinds? What do they do?
Why do they choose to work for this organisation?
What are the organisation’s target groups and users? 
Is the target group religiously deﬁned?
Why do people use this organisation?
How often do they use the organisation?
How do people know that this is an Islamic organisation?
How does the organisation signal its religiosity to potential participants? 
Do you talk a lot about Islam? In what situations?
Are there any diﬀerences among participants in their perception of Islam and its role 
in the organisation? 
Activities
What are the activities of the organisation?
Why these activities?
What activities do you consider the most important? Why?
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How many people participate in the activities? 
Do the various activities have diﬀerent target groups? (men/women, young people/
children/adults etc.)
Who organises and carries out the activities?
Do the activities diﬀer from the kinds of activities secular or non-religious organisa-
tions carry out? In what ways?
Economy
How is the organisation ﬁnanced? By whom? 
(state, membership fees, private donations, foreign donors, aid agencies etc.)
Context
What are the major problems in society today – and how should they be solved? In 
what ways does the organisation contribute to solving these problems? (develop-
ment/charity?)
Do other civil society organisations try to solve these problems? If so, how?
How would you describe civil society in general?
What are the major and most inﬂuential civil society organisations – are any of these 
Islamic?
What are the relevant groupings and divides? Any conﬂicts? Over what?
What kinds of Islamic civil society organisations exist? What distinguishes one group 
from another?
How do you perceive the role of Islamic organisations in civil society and in society 
in general? 
What is the general population’s perception of the Islamic organisations?
What role do they play in people’s daily life?
Cooperation and networks
What is the relationship to other Islamic organisations, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood?
What is the relationship to non-Islamic organisations, including non-religious, 
atheist, Christian organisations? How does the organisation view non-religious 
organisations?
What is the relationship to state authorities?
What is the relationship to political parties and movements?
What is the relationship to international organisations? 
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Does the organisation cooperate with other organisations? If so, what organisations 
and in what ways?
Did you experience any diﬀerences working with Islamic organisations compared to 
non-Islamic organisations? What strengths and weaknesses do they present?
Development/future
How has the organisation developed since its establishment – size, activities, target 
group, area?
Have activities/structure/vision changed?
What were then main events in the history of the organisation?
How do you view the future of the organisation?
How do you view the future role and inﬂuence of the Islamic organisations?
Is it a strength or a weakness for an organisation to be religious? In what ways?
Will they grow in number? If so, why?
How do they inﬂuence society?
Do they have a political inﬂuence?
Questions regarding the individual
Members/volunteers
How did you ﬁrst learn about the organisation?
How long have you been involved in the organisation?
How and why did you become involved in the organisation?
What motivated you to join? 
Is it important to you that the organisation is Islamic? Why/why not?
Do you agree with the vision of the organisation? Why or why not?
What is your role/position in the organisation?
What do you do? What are your main responsibilities and activities in the organisa-
tion?
Why these responsibilities - how was this decided?
Have you always had the same position in the organisation or has your position 
changed?
Which activity(ies) do you consider to be the most important for the organisa-
tion?
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How would you improve the activities if you could?
What is your relationship to other groups of participants? 
(users/members/employees/volunteers)
Will you stay involved in the organisation in the future? Why?
Staﬀ
How did you ﬁrst learn about the organisation?
How long have you worked for the organisation?
How and why did you become involved in the organisation?
What motivated you to seek the job? 
Is it important to you that the organisation is Islamic? Why/why not?
Do you agree with the vision of the organisation? Why or why not? If not, is this 
problematic when carrying out your job?
What is your role/position in the organisation?
What do you do? What are your main responsibilities and activities in the organisa-
tion?
Why these responsibilities – how was this decided? Do you have a formal qualiﬁca-
tion to carry out this kind of job?
Have you always had the same position in the organisation, or has your position 
changed?
Which activity(ies) do you consider to be the most important for the organisa-
tion?
How would you improve the activities if you could?
What is your relationship to other groups of participants? (users/members/volun-
teers)
What are the diﬀerences between working in an Islamic and a non-Islamic organisa-
tion? Activities, colleagues, salary etc.
Will you keep your job in the organisation in the future? Why?
Would you continue working as a volunteer, if needed? 
Would you consider becoming a member of the organisation?
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Users
How did you ﬁrst learn about the organisation?
How long have you used the organisation?
How and why did you start using the organisation?
Is it important to you that the organisation is Islamic? Why/why not?
Do you agree with the vision of the organisation? Why or why not?
What services do you receive from the organisation?
Are you satisﬁed with the services provided? Why/why not?
What activities do you participate in? Why these?
Which activity(ies) do you consider to be the most important for the organisa-
tion?
How would you improve the activities if you could?
What is your relationship to other groups of participants? (members/employees/
volunteers)
Will you keep using the organisation in the future? Why?
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Annex C: Tables, Chapter 2
Table II: Number and percentage of civil society organisations with a Muslim 
name96
Types of organisations Examples
General social welfare 
organisations
Al-Afaf, Al Fayhah, Al-Farouq, Green Crescent, Hamzah bin abd 
al Mutaleb, the Islamic Center Charity Society (including Abura 
Orphan Center in Jabal Hussein; Abu Dhar Al Rfai Community 
Center; and the Orphan’s Care centre in Jabal Nathif), Islamic 
Science League Society and Urwa al-Wuthqa,
Cooperatives
Rural Anjara Cooperative Association, Rif Ladies Association, 
Fatima Sahra Association
Women’s associations
Al Aqsa, Islamic Anwar al-Huda Welfare Associations, Khawla 
bint al Azwar and That al-Netaqueen.
Royal development 
NGOs
Tkiyet Um Ali, Jordan River Foundation, Queen Zein Institute 
for Development/ Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development and Young Muslim Women’s Association.
Youth organisations Suna’a al-Hayah, Zedny
International 
organisations
International Islamic Charity Organisation
Category Number Percent
Social welfare organisations 83/881 9.4
Cultural associations 29/239 12.1
Sports, youth and scout organisations 6/264 2.3
Advocacy organisations (human rights, democracy, women’s rights etc) 11/117 9.4
Research centres and think tanks 10/118 8.5
International non-governmental organisations 3/27 11.1
Total 142/1646 8.6
Table III: The organisations included in the analysis, divided into sub-categories
96  The numbers have been calculated by the author using information from the Directory of Civil Society 
Organisations, Al-Urdun al-Jadid, 2006. The categories of professional associations, labour unions and employers’ 
professional associations have not been included since they all have standard names that do not reveal anything 
about possible religious aﬃliations or orientation.
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Table IV: Overview of employees, volunteers/members and beneﬁciaries 
Organisation Staﬀ
Volun-
teers
Beneﬁciaries (annual)
Al-Afaf Welfare 
Association
4 2-300
Organisation of marriages for 100 
couples, provision of 3.000 loans, 10.000 
participants in courses
Al Aqsa
- 15
Financial aid to10 families, social club for 
10-20 old people, education and training 
courses for women
Al Fayhah
- 3
Financial and material aid to 390 
families, 170 students, 18 sick people, 7 
handicapped 
Al-Farouq Welfare 
Association
80 100
Financial and material aid, education and 
health services to1.200 families (7.000 
people)
Islamic Anwar al-Huda 
Welfare Association
- 9
Financial and material aid to 92 families, 
recreational courses for 100 women
Fatima Sahra Association 12 85
60 children in kindergarten, job 
assistance to 12 women, food for 12 
families, workshops for 50 people, loans 
to 20 women
Green Crescent 4 ?
Distribution of 6.000 school bags, 2.000 
food packages, 3.500 iftar meals
Hamzah bin abd al-
Mutaleb Educ. & Islamic 
Charity Society
6 - Financial aid to 19 children (orphans)
International Islamic 
Charity Organisation
5 -
Financial aid to 220 students and 300 
orphans, distribution of 5.000 school 
bags, 2.500 food packages, courses for 
2-300 people, loans to 600 families, 
building of 25 mosques
Islamic Charity Center 
Society97 (ICCS)
3.400 700
Financial and material aid, education and 
health services to13.500 orphans, 6.000 
families (35.000 people), 1.000 students.
Abura Orphan Center, 
Jabal Hussein, ICCS
30 20-25
Financial and material aid, education 
and health services to 600 orphans, 300 
families, 400 women
97  The ICCS numbers include ﬁgures from Abura Orphan Center, Abu Dhar al-Rfai Community Center and 
the Orphan’s Care Center Jabal Natif.
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Table IV (continued)
Organisation Staﬀ
Volun-
teers
Beneﬁciaries (annual)
Abu Dhar Al Rfai 
Community Center, Nasr 
Area, ICCS
11 14-16
Financial and material aid, education 
and health services to 153 orphans, 45 
university students, 276 poor families, 
500 children
Orphan’s Care Center, 
Jabal Nathif, ICCS
15 20
Financial and material aid, education 
and health services to 320 families, 100 
orphans
Islamic Science League 
Society
- 50-100 Financial aid to 50 families
Jordan River Foundation 150 ?
26 economic empowerment projects, 
home for 32 abused children
Jordanian Hashemite 
Fund for Development 
(JOHUD)
450 4.000
Cooperation with 50 community centers, 
including ﬁnancial aid, training and 
technical support
Khawla bint al Azwar - 10
Training and education of more than 
1.000 women
Rif Ladies Association 10 -
Loans to 300 women, training of 100 
women
Rural Anjara Cooperative 
Association
35 -
Financial aid to 230 orphans, medicine to 
20 families, loans to 300 families 
Suna’a al-Hayah 1 700
Distribution of 3.500 food packages, 
training and education for 100 children
That al-Netaqueen 12 50
Training and recreational courses for 2-
300 women, ﬁnancial and material aid to 
120-150 families
Tkiyet Um Ali
? ?
Material aid to 3.000 families (15.000 
individuals), 18 schools, provision of jobs 
and loans to 91 families
Urwa al-Wuthqa - 7
Financial and material aid to 150-300 
families
Young Muslim Women’s 
Association
100 100
Education for 250 handicapped children, 
young people and adults, college students
Zedny 2 100
1.000 participants in courses, distribution 
of iftar meals for 700 orphans, clothes 
and gifts for 200 orphans
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Activity Number Percentage
Financial aid 16/2498 66.6
Material aid, incl. sacriﬁcial lambs, iftar etc. 16 66.6
Education and awareness-raising (adults) 11 45.8
Vocational training 11 45.8
Microﬁnance loans and income-generating aid 10 41.7
Education and awareness-raising (children and youth) 10 41.7
Facilitation of jobs 10 41.7
Health care 9 37.5
Student support 5 20.8
Child care, incl. kindergarten, orphanages etc. 5 20.8
Cooperative activities 3 12.5
Table V: Kinds of activities
98  The three ICCS centres are entered as separate organisations: the ICCS headquarters are not included.
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Types of organisations Examples
General social welfare organisations
Bedaya for Developing Education and 
Culture, Al-Jama’iyya al-Shar’iyya, Al-Arqeba 
wal Tarbeya al-Islamiyya Association,
Mahmoud Mosque Association, Raba’a 
Al-‘Adawiyya Association
Youth organisations
Alashanik Ya Baladi organisation for 
Sustainable Development, Bayan, Boraq, 
Future Protectors Association, The 
International Muslim Youth Association, 
Mazeed, Meshwar Organization for 
Community Development, Misr Shoryan 
al-Ata’a, Nahdet El Mahrousa, Resala, Sama, 
Suna’a al-Hayah, Youth Association for 
Population and Development, Zedny
Student organisations 
The Annual Conference for Engineering 
Students (ACES)
Sports, cultural and scientiﬁc organisations
The Cultural Centre of Manshiet Nasser, 
Youth Centre of Manshiet Nasser, Cairo for 
Culture and Dialogue
Annex D: Tables, Chapter 3
Table I: The organisations included in the analysis, divided into sub-categories
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Table II: Overview of participants and beneﬁciaries in Muslim youth organisations
Organisation Employees
Board 
members
Members/ 
volunteers
Beneﬁciaries 
Alashanik 
Ya Baladi 
Association 
for Sustainable 
Development
4 10 Approx. 400
Poor families, in Old Cairo, 
in particular young people 
lacking language, computer 
and vocational skills, illiterate 
women, and under stimulated 
children 
Bayan 0 4
25 active 
(55 in the 
database)
Until now approx. 1,000 
mostly young people 
(students and college 
graduates)
Boraq 0 10
Approx. 150 
active (approx. 
1,000 in the 
database)
Delivers 600-650 hot meals 
to people in poor areas; visits 
an orphanage with approx. 
100 orphans; visits to kidney 
patients
Mazeed 0 ?
50 active 
(approx. 
130 in the 
database)
Poor people: delivering 40-
50,000 hot meals annually; 
selling of cheap second-hand 
clothes 
Misr Shoryan 
al-Ata’a
2 30
Approx. 
60-70 active
70-80 poor out-patients 
and their families; cancer 
patients;
medical students and their 
families; patients in remote 
poor areas; delivering food 
bags to poor families
Resala
Approx. 
1,000
10
Approx. 
50,000 active
Orphans; poor families; blind 
people; sick and disabled 
people; deaf and mute people; 
children and young people 
(tutoring, vocational training, 
computer skills)
Sama 0 ? ? Poor families; young people
Suna’a 
al-Hayah
4 7
1,700 regular 
(more than 
4,000 in the 
database)
Poor families; orphans; 
elderly; young people; 
children; disabled people
Zedny 10 10
100 organisers
17 instructors
Young people (students and 
graduates, primarily from the 
middle class)
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Table III: Activities of Muslim youth organisations
Organisation Activities
Alashanik Ya 
Baladi Association 
for Sustainable 
Development
Economic empowerment programme, including micro-credits, 
vocational training centre and career opportunity oﬃce
Education programme, including computer learning centre, 
language programme, ethics and morals programme and illiteracy 
eradication programme
Children development programme, including art expression 
programme, human development programme and tutoring 
programme
Social entrepreneur programme, including courses in public 
speaking, leadership, marketing and innovation, time management, 
change management, career planning, power of teams, emotional 
intelligence, English language and computer skills.
Bayan
Courses in soft skills, including time management, presentation 
skills, practical exercises, communication skills, the art of dealing 
with personality types, stress management, negotiation skills
Courses in career management, including practical exercises, 
decision making, dealing with your boss, dealing with diﬃcult 
people, conﬂict resolution, creative thinking, balancing work and 
life, career management
English courses, including conversation, business writing, TOEFL, 
TOEIC
Safety courses
Business courses
Boraq
Computer help and developing of open-source software to blind 
people; helping blind university students
Business course at Faculty of Engineering, Ain Shams University 
Clothes exhibition projects
Delivering of 600-650 hot meals weekly
Emotional and educational support to orphans
Visits to kidney patients at the hospitals, bringing them money and 
teaching the handicrafts
Recycling project 
“The bag of good”: annual food distribution project during 
Ramadan 
Mazeed
Recycling project 
Social assessment and eﬀective distribution of food, including case 
studies of families, packing and distribution of food backs in Cairo 
and outside
Clothes exhibitions project
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Table III  (continued)
Organisation Activities
Misr Shoryan al-Ata’a
Blood donation campaigns for hospitals and awareness campaign of 
donation in cooperation with Resala once a month
Medical awareness project in cooperation with the Egyptian Forum 
Organisation
Economic, social and emotional care for about 70-80 poor out-
patients and their families
Complete care of cancer patients and their relatives
Advocacy programme for obtaining health insurance for medical 
students and their parents
Provision of medical equipment to poor medical students
Medical caravans: small, condensed hospitals with doctors, medical 
students and others travelling to villages in Upper Egypt and the 
Delta. Assessment and screening of poor patients in a village. 
Resala
Orphanages
Collection and selling of used clothes
Help to poor people (food, mattresses, ﬁnancial help for marriage, 
school fees, medicine 
Help to blind people (education, reading and recording books) 
Help to sick and disabled people
Help to deaf and mute 
Blood donation campaigns
Recycling project
Resala merchandise: tissues, pens, etc.
Computer courses
Sewing and drawing workshops
Private tutoring to poor students
Publicity activities: visiting companies, schools and clubs to tell 
about Resala
Mother’s Day event
Sama
Clothes exhibition project
Provision of training to 400 people from Shobra in diﬀerent ﬁelds, 
such as leadership, time management, and teambuilding.
Distribution of food from rich to poor people in Shobra
“The Future Guardians Project”: an international programme for 
combating drugs addiction among youth
DIIS REPORT 2007:13
116
Table III  (continued)
Suna’a al-Hayah
Computer courses
Encouraging and helping youth to make small projects
Paper collection and recycling
Handicraft production and training workshops
Psychological support programme
Charitable activities: ﬁnancial support to poor families, orphans, 
poor couples getting married; provision medicine and medical aid 
for poor patients; provision of seasonal aids like clothes, blankets, 
school requirements and Ramadan bags to poor people; monthly 
trips for orphans and the elderly
Social awareness campaigns: orphans and disabled; drug addiction; 
smoking, child rearing and handling of teenagers.
Visits and support to orphanages and old people’s institutions
Human development courses and training programmes. 
Activities for the disabled: courses in how to care for those with 
special needs
Workshop and lectures in applied art, literature, music acting, 
directing and music production
Zedny
Human and career development courses, including leadership, 
coaching, time management, communication, planning, mind 
mapping, self-learning, ethics, advanced marketing, How to 
be proactive, Think diﬀerently, marketing planning, business 
planning, job hunting, stock market
Courses in managing NGOs
Human development courses for children
